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How can you go but free? Beginning.

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Okay, good morning everyone. Thank you for attending your session. Today I'm presenting an ongoing study maybe it's what my graduate students have been conducting over the last few months where we examine the effects of occupational polarization on mass preferences for restricting immigration.

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Specifically what we're trying to aim to do in this study is to identify the social psychological mechanisms that underlie How something like economic insecurity would translate into people preferring to limit the degree of migration within the country.

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So I'll begin today's presentation with kind of identifying motivation behind the study, specifically talking about the persistent increasing rate of migration, especially from areas from the global south.

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In particular the rise of radical right parties who are primarily building platforms designed. To restrict integration as a way of placating these rising antiimbration sentiments.

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One of the fundamental empirical problems of doing this type of study though is coming up with a comparative measurement of immigrant threat perception, which we argue is a key mechanism behind this process.

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And specifically we leverage the most recent wave of the world value survey and specifically the new immigration module that they introduced into it in order to kind of construct this measurement.

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This will lead us into kind of developing a more conceptual model that identifies this kind of complex relationship between economic insecurity, perception, and then in turn the preferences for restricting immigration or policies.

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Then we'll kind of talk about the details of the study and then follow some of the preliminary results, specifically a decomposition of what we call the conditional, unconditional effects of economic insecurity.

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So broadly, the rate of migration has been simply increasing, especially in the 20 first century. But what's most interesting about this trend is that the rate is largely driven at a higher degree by migrants originating from the global south.

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As you're going to see in the first graph here, particularly since 2,000 the you know total volume of migrants from the Molotapa has increased.

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While migrants from the global north is almost like precisely maintain the same rate. But what's most interesting about this, especially in context of European countries, which has kind of dominated this literature, is that there's this almost reactionary wave of nationalism going on and particularly a key platform amongst these.

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Radical right parties is the need to restrict immigration. So kind of tapping into this growing anti-immigrant sentiment.

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But what's kind of interesting about all this is to understand this, growth of restricted immigration regimes, we really only have evidence on Europe.

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And that's kind of like a major limitation with the literature is we don't know whether this same kind of process is going on, particularly in non-European countries and especially in more less developed countries.

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So again, this kind of drives the primary motivation behind this study is to identify one. There's the same process we identify in European society as that occurring in non-European and less developed societies.

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And at the same time, how is this process being linked to mass preferences for restricting immigration? So broadly one of the initial research questions kind of driving this study is how is anti-immigrant sentiment related to mass preferences for restrictive immigration policy.

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That is there's this assumption amongst a number of studies in this literature that attitudes automatically translate into policy preferences.

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But there really has been a lot of empirical investigation into that kind of leak. Which is interesting because recently There's been an interesting like analytical framework proposed that kind of identify the, you know, growth of restrictive immigration regimes or the main argument is that these regimes are just largely reflective of people's attitudes

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and thinking within the country itself. Again, this is more of a presumption, something that hasn't been empirically analyzed.

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It specifically when thinking about something like anti immigrant attitudes, I think it's important to identify what specifically is the underlying process behind these attitudes and a lot of this literature gravitates around this idea of fret perception.

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Or broadly this has been conceptualized in a very unidimensional way that it's economic threat.

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I mean put simply immigrants are taking their jobs kind of mentality. But again, this is more of kind of multiimensional understanding in the sense that there's kind of this realistic threat perception that yes, there is material loss for migration, but also there's potential for things like higher crime with migration and then almost a symbolic dimension

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too of the results of cultural loss and threat with this as well. But again, a lot of this literature hasn't really kind of examined particularly the comparative literature on this really haven't examined how something like immigrant threat perception for a multi-dimensional perspective translates into this rising preference to restrict migration.

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And so again, in order to kind of empirically investigate this, one of the first initial kind of tasks of the study is to come up with a comparative measure of threat perception.

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Or again, a lot of this literature has been predominantly done with European societies or the United States.

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Where we kind of leverage the most recent wave of the world value survey to see whether there is something like scalar invariance that is a consistency in this measurement of bread perception across a diverse set of countries.

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So here we draw in about 44 different countries in the world value survey and then we use multi-group confirmatory factor analyses to identify whether there is this consistent perception of immigrant threat.

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But what's really interesting about this migration module that was introduced in the most recent wave of the World Value Survey is it has items in the survey that kind of identify both support for migration, that there's a benefit for migrants coming into the country, but also kind of your traditional questions about the threat.

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Of migration. And so putting all these items together in the same measurement model and then seeing whether it varies across countries, we find evidence that there is, again, consistency across this.

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What's most interesting is that the first factor we identify in the analyses, what we call support.

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Is actually kind of like weekly tying together these. And migration are good items. But what's kind of consistent and more robust is this idea of threat.

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So threat kind of dominates. This kind of a cross national variation of perceptions of migration across these different items that we utilized.

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From the world value survey. And so drawing on this measurement model, we then start the simple process of looking at cross national variation and threat perception.

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And this is especially important in a sample from the World Value Survey because compared to other cross-national or international surveys at the ESS.

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There's a lot more diversity in terms of the countries that are included within this survey.

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And so here it might be a little hard to see. You can see all the different countries within our sample and then we're kind of looking at variation in 2 items.

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One, that right perception, so the factor 2 we saw in the previous slide. And then we look at the proportion of the sample within these countries that have a preference for restricting immigration.

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Whether that's completely prohibiting immigration or quite simply there needs to be more limitations or barriers to migration.

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But what's interesting, especially if you compare like which countries align here from weeks to most. Is that there's not a clear overlap in terms of countries.

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Like there is, for example, like Jordan, which is high both in average thought perception as well as proportion.

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But there's quite a bit of difference if you look at other countries. And so one of the initial things we do after we kind of map on this cross-national variation and threat perception and preference is in simply look at country-level correlations.

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That is we take the data we just saw in the previous graph and just can make a simple scatter plot here and then measure the correlation and test the significance of the correlation.

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We do identify there as a positive association between these 2 items, which not unexpected, right? On average, if there's a large portion of the country that proceeds immigration to be a threat.

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And of course that means on average there's a large proportion of those country samples that would. Want to reduce or restrict immigration.

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But the fact that we identify that's like a weak positive association was an interesting motivation here and kind of spawn these 2 other questions.

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That are kind of guided us through the study specifically, so we kind of observed that it's a weaker association, well what contextual factors could be potentially conditioning this association?

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And then most importantly, and this is where a lot of the literature has gravitated, is simply identifying, well, what are the respondent level or country-level determinants of threat perception?

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And so drawing on these 2 other research questions, this kind of leads us more into kind of our theoretical argument of the study.

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Specifically, one of the most prominent explanations for something like Bret perception is simply economic insecurity, broadly conceptualized.

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But that's like something like occupational vulnerability or labor market vulnerability. Needless to say, people that are in kind of a precarious economic position are generally more likely to perceive immigration as a potential threat.

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But here we kind of identify 2 critical macroeconomic changes within countries that could be increasing this kind of insecure or precarity.

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Specifically in kind of like very prominent especially in the sociological literature is global competition with the rise of globalization.

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And then in turn, and this is kind of been primarily studied within more advanced economies, especially if you United States is this idea of technological change in the substitution of labor with capital or what we broadly think of as automation.

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So I identifying these 2 big macroeconomic changes within countries We draw more of the economics literature to kind of identify, well, what exactly puts individuals in these precarious positions based on these big changes.

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And this is where a lot of we look at what we call routine task intensity of occupations as well as the offshore ability or the propensity of jobs to be relocated to less developed areas.

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So again, the RTI literature has been primarily done by David Tour, who quite literally looks at the tasks within occupation to see what degree they are routine, what degree they are cognitive or manual.

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And then based on this, he constructs this interesting measure that kind of measures the greed to which the occupation is composed of tests that are very repetitive and therefore have a higher likelihood of being automated or more successfully automated.

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Additionally, we look at the propensity of offshore ability of an occupation. So that is like the probability that a specific task within occupations can be outsourced or offshore to another country to be performed by a lot of respects cheaper labor.

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And so based on this, more labor. And so based on this, more recent studies kind of taken these 2 indicators of labor market have taken these 2 indicators of labor market vulnerability and simply tested how to take in these 2 indicators of labor market vulnerability and simply tested how do they affect immigrant attitude?

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And as you would expect, a lot of them are fine that people that are in occupations that's high in routine tasks intensity or I have a high probability ofshore ability or more likely to perceive immigrants as a threat broadly.

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But again, a lot of this literature, the vast majority of this literature, has been primarily studied in European populations.

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So it's fundamentally kind of ignored potentially like what's going on in other regions of the world, but also in terms of less developed countries.

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Which brings us to the second point of the study, which is kind of look at what If you want to look at a more diverse sample of countries, We need kind of understand how something about the macroeconomic environment of these countries would induce this type of process.

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And so other kind of studies within this literature have kind of broadly looked at how country level factors would explain something like anti-immigrant attitudes.

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Where they primarily look at the effects of economic development, unemployment, income inequality. And again, within European countries, they find they have a positive effect on these types of attitudes.

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But again, given what we observe with cross national level correlations, what are the broader questions we are asking is like, well, how does these country-level factors contextualize this process?

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Linking labour market vulnerability to preferences. Specifically through this process of perception. And so this kind of crystallizes into a set of hypotheses we test out.

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Where broadly we think of something like Inkham inequalities with disparities and distribution of income should amplify the effects of labor market vulnerability primarily because you create more competitive economic environments.

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Same in terms of the unemployment rate, because again, something like job scarcity should also induce a degree of heightened competition or at least perceptions of competition that would again amplify these types of effects.

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And then in turn, we also believe that these kind of 2 factors should again amplify the effect of threat perception on people's preferences.

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So if I perceive immigrants to be a friend and I exist in a country with high inequality, high unemployment, that would again lead me to prefer we restrict integration.

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So drawing on these kind of like basic hypotheses. We then kind of just developed this as a conditional process model.

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Again, we can kind of crystallize our main period of argument in this simplify the graphic here.

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Or again, we would argue that economic insecurity should lead to policy preference. All through unobserved mechanisms directly.

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But through an observed mechanism like threat perception. Most importantly, what we wanna test out here though. Is how both those processes, the unobserved mechanism or the observed mechanism is moderated or conditioned by that macroeconomic environment.

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So drawing on this kind of conceptual model, we designed a fairly simple study where again we draw data from the seventh wave of liberal values survey.

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We primarily look at policy preferences using a binary measurement whether respondents prefer to restrict immigration or to completely prohibit it.

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We played around with multinomial models doing this and then really find much differences between them. So I pair of here that it just be interesting to collapse it.

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And then drawing on that measurement model, we create a mediating variable in the analyses that just kind of a normalized threat perception index.

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In terms of the focal variables of the study, we utilize both RTI and optional ability measures.

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So famous economic study by Goose at all kind of came up with metrics of doing this. Cross-nationally.

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Me and another colleague kind of purported this out to new kind of occupational categories using this. So I draw in a lot of that literature and create these binary measures where we use simply like above or below the meeting as a cutoff between high risk low risk.

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In the analyses we look at those 3 contextual factors using the gene coefficient, pre-taxing them to measure Equality, measuring job scarcity, using the unemployment rate, and the development agency for some mess of product per capita.

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And in terms of controls, at the country level we control for the share of foreign foreign population, total migration rate within the country and that the respondent level we control for a host of other factors, specifically relative income, education, immigrant status, and so forth.

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And so in terms of analyzing this model using this data and this design, we draw on what we call a conditional process model, which put in other ways moderated mediation models with paths.

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And so here we just use generalized multi-level models so we can account for kind of that higher level of structure or clustering within the data.

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Additionally, this allows us not only to include random intercepts at the country, but also use random coefficients for some of the focal variables that we want to analyze within it.

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And most importantly, this allows us to do an effective composition where first we can look at the degree to which RTI and observability are mediated by fret perception in terms of its effect on policy preferences.

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But then we can also do the same type of decomposition looking at their conditional effects. So we can see what degree these direct and indirect effects are moderated.

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And so here we just kind of look at the simple indirect effect of routine tasks of tensing an option or ability on preference for restrictive policy.

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And again, with an expectation of right hypotheses, we find that again RTI increases threat perception and in turn threat perception increases preferences for restriction.

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On this similar effect but much smaller effect for offshore ability. I have an interesting finding within the study itself.

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But again, positive effect on threat perception and again for perception of a positive effect. Most interesting though is when we look at the decomposition of effects.

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We take the total effect of RTI and actual ability. And then decompose it into the indirect effects like we're observing here and the direct effects.

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We find that it's probably strongly strongly mediated by threat perception. So threat perception is a key kind of social psychological mechanism that's linking.

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These labour market vulnerabilities too restrictive immigration policy. Where to the jury we find no evidence of a direct effect in the unconditional model.

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We're almost the entire effect or the total effect is a kind of through that mediated process. We is interesting because there should be other types of mechanisms at play that kind of link RTI and actual ability to policy preference.

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And so again, what we kind of argue is that this insignificant direct effect, almost no effect whatsoever, is primarily counted for the fact that we're not looking at across national heterogeneity in the degree of economic competition within countries.

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And so what we start doing is we introduce these moderating effects. So here we're looking at the indirect effect and how that is varying across levels of the gene coefficient of market income.

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You unemployment rate and GDP per capita and then the second set of panels here we look at the direct effect.

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And interesting enough, what we find is that high to moderate levels of increment equality primarily amplify the effect of RTI.

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Whereas the unemployment rate was interesting enough has that amplifying effect both on the indirect and direct effect. And then in turn we find interesting enough that higher level development amplified the direct effect of RTI.

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We tend to think of this as like technological change of this nature. Is primarily concentrated within developed countries, which again would explain why we see these kind of amplifying effects going on.

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Similarly with when we look at the decomposition of the conditional effect of offshore ability, we find something similar except that again with offshore ability we have high to moderate levels of any given quality amplified both of these effects.

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Whereas moderate to high levels of unemployment amplify only the indirect effect and we find development doesn't have really much of an effect on actual ability.

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And we primarily think of that as in terms of the geography of global production, ending in the nature of offshoring being primarily something that's driving labor markets.

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Within developed countries. So what does this help me? So first and foremost, We argue that this is very consistent and again purported within the literature is that that perception is the important mechanism that's driving this relationship between economic insecurity and preferences for restricting immigration.

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Weird enough, we tend to think of that people who are in vulnerable economic positions are almost displacing the blame of that.

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So rather than identifying globalization or automation as the fundamental cause behind their precarity. They displace that blame onto immigrants themselves.

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Which means kind of to combat this kind of idea. We need to kind of reorient what exactly is causing contemporary insecurity.

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Most importantly though, we tend to argue that what's kind of absent in the literature Is this understanding of how macroeconomic environments condition this poll process?

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Which means that when we kind of look at something like economic insecurity and preferences for restricting immigration, it's important to account for the degree of resource, competition, job competition within these countries.

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More broadly in terms of methodology though we tend to argue that this approach is important. Because here we're looking at a very limited sense of contextual factors, but you can broaden this out to look at a whole host of other factors, whether that's the degree that these countries are globally integrated in production networks.

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The type of like different types of policies and welfare systems within these countries. So this can create a broad array where we can start identifying what specific policies or macroeconomic conditions.

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Maybe facilitate or not this process. Thank you.

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Do you want to do a QA? I mean, I'm in a

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Thank you very much.

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Any questions?

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Thank you very much for there. Great presentation. So I have one in my question. There are serene differences, so they call me so-called Let's do now.

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Their defiance of their attack. And now they defined such as some other words. So putting up what they're debating, we'll definitely bring this and do so.

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I guess there was some big difference in it's your content. Well, one thing was involved.

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In terms of like taking the different types of threat.

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Videos and solve them really what we're such a cross. And that's something we kind of looked at initially.

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So again, we've identified these like 3 different dimensions of like prep perception. And what we find, each of them have a very similar type of effect.

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So again, like being in vulnerable labor market conditions or positions. Also increases like looking at just the cultural items or just looking at the economic items.

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And that's kind of one of the key things we were initially looking at with the measurement model.

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Is like do all these different types of threats kind of like hang together. And then compare it with what they do.

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And that's the kind of thing we may look at in a future study is or what exactly leads people who are in a precarious economic position to perceive this symbolic for other culture.

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And again, a lot of that we just had to argue is like this displacement effect. So everything that they think is like wrong with their society or their own personal position, they kind of displace their blame onto immigrants.

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Yeah, I mean, we don't really have a strong explanation of why this leads to like cultural threat perception, but empirically we just think these items do hang together.

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Thank you. Because I have kind of a comment that this is great, but I'm really using it.

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I would suggest being bolder about the I'm listening to you and thinking ideology propaganda but yeah so you're just kind of proofing what I do over anything yeah my point though is that how I would be

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I just refrain it theoretically more as expected because people are being taught immigration is the enemy.

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When I tell my students that in the US is the enemy. When I tell my students that in the US.

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When I tell my students that in the US that I tell my students that in the US that immigration is a.

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I tell my students that in the US that immigration is a major or not major reasons for crime reduction in the US in recent decades.

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Get really positive what they feel about my culture. You know, that's right now. Mexicans are.

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Anyways, I would be just a little over about how we should expect that room as you say just place.

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But being taught to awesome. We'll kind of on that front. There's kind of 2 ideas we've contemplated.

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One looking at party composition in terms of who has political power within a country. And then actually the organizer of this session has this interesting approach to looking at the reciprocity between migration policy and opinion which we think could be potentially driving it too.

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So if governments are enacting restrictive policies that might lead to people who believe like, oh. The problems are caused by migration.

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That's why our government's doing this.

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Other questions? I have one question, a very primitive question brought up. In this RC, it is very common to use World War II Survey, very high quality comparative worldwide.

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Methods, survey research, but

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Is it really almighty to all all kinds of topics that is my some wondering about the very good For example, in the case of this topic, you focused about the, a kind of factors about the labor market.

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But, in the area of immigration, there is a lot of problems related to Cultural problem, a culture factor.

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For example, in Europe, Islamophobia or something like that or This hard work value surveys, European-based research.

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So that kind of point of view is well integrated, I feel that. But in Japanese society, what is most important problem about the immigrants is that garbage problem.

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They understand? Japanese people like to separate various kinds of garbage waste. But most of immigrants from Asian countries don't have a custom to separate garbage.

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They are very important program between Japanese and immigrant right from Brazil or Peru or other Asian countries. That is that kind of factors is not included in one value survey.

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So if you are going to continue your in my opinion, you, are going to, continue your, research more intensity.

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You have to prepare your own. World War I is our way. Well the interesting thing particularly about this literature is a lot of these studies are based on the ESS, European social surveys.

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Primarily used as like study this and it's not till the most recent way of the world values are that even have these items on like different immigration.

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And so one of the things we've contemplated about this is like, well, how do we integrate country-level cultural measures to maybe measure like this disparity or homogeneity of culture within it.

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And yeah, that's something we're certainly exploring in kind of the next steps. Thank you.

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That, thank you very much for our approach to presentations. Thank you very much.

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Then an next step.

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Okay.

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Make any difference.

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Okay. So, Heroi B, my name is Naki Akaida from Japan.

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Today I'd like to talk about this presentation, the very first stage and hopefully that will be choice and international competitive analysis.

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So now let me start with the introduction.

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In this enterprise, the previous international company studies have shown growing interest in freedom of which us because this is a very pivotal aspect of social barrier in the modern society.

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For example, according to Amartya Sam, the freedom of choice is quite central to reading that with R and by adapting this concept he developed the capability approach.

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Moreover, by adapting the must pay value including the freedom of each choice, then Beltail and Ingerheart have developed their approach and this capability approach and and discuss about a human environment framework.

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So, previous studies solicited that the freedom of choice is also related to the locusts of control which is a sense that the outcomes of people's actions depends on the internal factors such as effort and skills or external factors such as fate or destiny.

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So, the freedom we choice is quite important because so in particular, a lot of studies suggests it's the positive impact or That is the important consequences of the freedom of choice on their, for example, subject to very being and the suicide rate.

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So, in addition, recent studies also examined the determinants of the free double we charge. For example, several previous studies have reported that the macro labor factors such as GDP per capita and unemployment rate associated with free WHS.

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Moreover, other studies also succeeded that some individual level factors such as socioeconomic positions including employment and low income are negatively correlated to their freedom of choice.

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So one of the previous studies have contributed to an understanding of the relationship. The there were some limitations. So first, there is a growing body of literature dealing with freedom with choice as an independent variable.

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There however relatively few amount of prior studies have shared right on their determinants of freedom of choice. In particular, that question of how other macro-development factors value freedom of the choice, it's largely untouched.

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The second variant the above literature has clarified that there is inequality of freedom of choice stemming from the environmental status and income.

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So, literally, yeah, small amount of studies also didn't examine their which factors showing inequality of freedom of ties.

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So to overcome these limitations, this study attempts to examine the how welfare policies affect the labels and inequality of freedom of choice.

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Here we can see the theoretical framework in this study. This is study examined the many effects of where we have policies on freedom of choice and the closed-rever interactions of very fair policies and socioeconomic positions including environmental status and income on freedom of which ours.

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So I directly provide the detailed information about the theoretical background of this study and especially in terms of the very fair policies and provides the hypothesis in this study.

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In terms of where we have policies, so especially since it's been under since the seminar works.

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The association between welfare provisions and students arrive became quite operational. In particular, previous studies devoted that the total public social expenditures in his subjective well-being and public social expenditures for unemployment in which it's a subjective regime, especially among the GI.

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The assumptions of these discussions are that the total public social expenditures improve the human capability. And public social expenditures for I environment reduces the sense of economic vulnerability and therefore end up in individuals ability to grant and the control of their life among the disarvantage.

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For these reasons, it is not hard to formulate the following hypotheses. So in terms of the main effect, the hypothesis is one A and one B in is that the total public social expenditures and public social expenditures for I think social expenditures and public social expenditures for high employment increase freedom over

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charge.

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Furthermore, regarding the growth delivery interactions, hypotheses to A and to me mean that the total public social expenditures and the public social expenditures for I employment shrink the inequality of freedom of freedom of choice by improving freedom of choice among the disarvantage.

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So this study examined the hypothesis.

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So now, so I'd like to move on to the data and method. So for the analysis, this study improves a much lot better from the varieties habits and the European party study including 32 countries and 23 years 121 country years and behind 40,667 individuals.

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Furthermore, following the previous studies, the dependent variable in the study is a score of passive freedom.

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So it's renting from one to 10. And the higher part will indicate the higher possible to freedom.

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In addition, a micro-level key variable is a So public social expenditures, especially the total public social expenditures and public social expenditures for unemployment as a percentage of GDP are used.

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So the barriers of these variables are obtained from OECD social expenditure database.

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Individual Deibu, G barrier boards are their incremental status including I employment and the household income at forests.

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Furthermore, the following the analysis of previous studies there depend so we also adopted their deed control barrier boards as forward.

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So for the universities, this study used is that 2 graphics fax models, including for the damage for countries and ears, we thrust out of our standard errors.

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According to your previous studies, by adapting the international compatible start, serving data and this model.

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It's possible to control the unobserved time constant country characteristics. So it is helpful to reduce their omitted omitted variable files.

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Okay, finally I'd like to show the results. So here, we can see the results of the 2 main fixed fax models and including the diamonds for candidates and ears and the control variables.

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So, I'd like to show that result at first related to the main effect. So this table show that the unemployment is negatively associated with free double choice.

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Moreover, The house photo income is positively correlated with freedom of choice. So therefore we can understand that there are an inequality of free double with choice stemming from the improvement of status and the household income.

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So additionally, the in terms of many effects of welfare policies that total public social expenditures and public social expenditures for unemployment have positive impacts on freedom of choice.

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So next I directly showed a result in terms of the growth-level interactions. Especially with, significant So, this table show that the, the dummy for unemployment has significant negative impact on passive to freedom when the public social expenditures for unemployment is 0.

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The crossword interaction of the public social expenditures for eye employment and damning for unemployed.

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It's significantly positive.

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So regarding this result, the as this figure shows, then public social expenditures for I emerge.

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Shrink, the inequality of free double with choice stemming from the environmental status. By improving the passive freedom among the unemployed.

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So next I'd like to show their results in terms of the cross-revement interactions or public social expenditures for I employment and the household income.

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So at first, so we can see there with doubt about this. So household income has a significant positive impact on freedom of choice when the public social expenditures for I environment is 0.

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The cross-level interaction of public social expenditures for eye improvement and household income is no category in significant.

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So yeah. In terms of this result, we can see that this figure So, public social expenditures for unemployment also shrink the inequality of possible freedom stemming from the household income by improving their passive freedom among their low income citizens.

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Now let me summarize our main points. And then first in terms of the main effects of public social expenditures, both the total public social expenditure and public social expenditures for I employment has freedom of the choice for their whole operation.

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So next, the co-signing is a crossover interactions. So especially in public social expenditures for unemployment mitigate in quality of freedom of choice by improving the possibility of freedom among the I.

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Employed and low income citizens. So therefore, hypothesis to be is supported. So one interpretation is that in particular the public social expenditures for I environment is helpful to end up in the economic security and sense of control they arrive among the unemployed and low income citizens.

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By adopting the barrier boards related to welfare policies, this analysis found that the welfare policies may change if their networks and inequality of freedom of choice.

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Did the findings contribute to revealing the new consequences of welfare policies and new determinants of free double vjage simultaneously.

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As a next step so we can consider what about other aspects of behavior policies. So that's all my presentation.

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Thank you for your kind of attention.

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Thank you for good presentation. Is there a question? Hi, and I'll help notice that many countries here Yeah, are like aging societies, right?

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Guess that there are many like required people with a lot of personal And who does not necessarily have been entities with good welfare policies?

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So, how do you see those countries fit into your story? Okay. Thank you very much for the, yeah, important question.

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I think, yeah, different reads, so they're, they're limits of the aging society is this concept.

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And so in terms of there results of They have already required. Yeah, let me see. So retailer people are actually not associated with the freedom of choice.

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Come me up with the past time job. So it's depending on the I think defiance category of work.

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But the based on the impact are shown in dances that I employment or self employed. So maybe deeps are part of the environmental status are very impracial but of course so I understand so what you mean so So social policy is also different if anyone there.

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Hand with those required people for being full times in. So, regions. You know, For example, like older people, they just don't feel like it.

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They just have a different culture. They see freedom of choice definitely. Like, different people are morally involved.

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Like, It happens through coin size. With that duration. It's just here to get somewhere in the field to go. OK, thank you very much.

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Yeah, it's definitely related to the decision because similar studies also indicate there so their opinion was a sense of their for example in the video algorithm and their modernization is related to their predominant job is definitely.

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So as you said, the younger generations and about generations have different sense or impact of their or different mechanisms of the freedom of choice.

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So I'd like to, yeah, analyze more about Jesus. Thank you very much.

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On Yes, I noticed in the beginning of the presentation we were talking about inequality in freedom of choice.

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So this kind of leads me to like 2 questions. One, have you considered like looking at or measuring the gene coefficient that's perceived freedom using this 10 point scale?

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Just to see like how much freedom of choice. Is unequal industry within a country and potentially use that as a moderating factor in your model.

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The second idea too, and somewhat related, is using more of a relative measure of freedom of choice. Specifically using something like a Z for as a dependent variable on your model.

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Just to see whether that reduces the relevant differences. And internally would you expect to Okay, thank you very much.

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Yeah, these questions are also really important, I think. So at the first, I remember the effect of the Geneva was not significant.

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But I also think depending on the, for example, environmental status or different levels of their income, maybe Genei, for example, employment status or different levels of their income, maybe Ginny Coinepin may have a different effect it's possible.

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So I'd like to examine more about their income. Maybe Genei Koepin may have a different effect. It's possible.

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So I'd like to examine more about this issue. Thank you very much.

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Other questions?

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I have a follow-up. In terms of liberty and social welfare, have you considered looking at like pension programs?

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Or like like vocational rehabilitation programs.

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Yeah, so and definitely it's also the important issue I think. Let me see, well. Ii have, I didn't examine the effect of the pension system, but for example other types of developer forces such as welfare policies and where the Providence of, for example, health health has a moderating effect on their retirement.

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So for the retirement people. Their health public social expenditures have just only marked to improve their freedom of the choice so maybe yeah as there some questions that is it so it's also interesting to focus on their retired Italian citizens to analyze their other types of behaviors and policies. So thank you very much.

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I will differently analyze more.

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Other questions?

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Can I ask one question? Your conclusion is very reasonable and and Look very, close to our everyday understanding of welfare state.

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My question is that R square is not so high. About 0 point 1 or 0 point about 0 point 1.

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So this conclusion, this result of out over a analysis is not so stable or reliable. Why, why, this art square is not so high like this?

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Yeah, thank you very much for the, yeah, important question. So far I feel so in terms of the crossover, sorry, international compatible analysis.

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So the R squared is not quite high. So far I have analyzed maybe because so there are a lot of other aspects of their independent variables or the factors inancing their dependent variables.

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So there are huge I won't open up their marketing factors and so on. So maybe this is a reason.

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And additionally, I also think because of their noises among their We have a different account rates or behind the cultures.

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For example, the questionnaire is different in terms of parameters and so on. So it's also there.

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Maybe they're infrared or this result, but yeah, I like to say so What 1 point at 0 point the one might be accepted So, international computer research.

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So because intro-statistics is significant. So. But of course, as you said, we have to improve their X.

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Brain power more. If you answer, like that. The similar question arrived again. Freedom of choice is questioned by the a kind of questionnaire of the world value survey but Freedom of choice, very vague words or terms or concepts of maybe in translated in various languages very diverse meanings or nuances in

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European societies or Asian societies or other societies. So it you maybe it is for future research point to.

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Yeah, consider about the question questionnaire of what values are being. Yeah, thank you very much.

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Yeah, it's definitely the yeah, so important suggestion. So as you said, the concept of the free Wi-Fi choice is a little bit.

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By the region. Yeah, so one other hand, so some studies also suggested there are other types of their indicators of freedom for example economic freedom or some economic freedom or some institutional indicators of the economic freedom or some institutional indicators of the freedom or some institutional indicators of the freedom.

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No, II have some ideas, so to examine there. So if we discuss about their determinants of different types of freedom.

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So how the result is different. So it's also there. Nexus, thank you very much.

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Thank you. Other questions? No, thank you very much for your presentation. How close to, Thank you very much.

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Then next presentation.

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Well, I guess I'm here because I also use world value survey data and also I think endangered because I also use world value survey data and also I think end-time immigration pop at them collaboration and social inequality are highly correlated to the rise of populism.

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So we're somewhat related, not totally irrelevant. So the title is rally around. My name is Shinjiang Pan.

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Assistant Professor of Sociology at Surgeon University at Taipei, Taiwan.

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And my title is Rallying Around Strong leader under the Pastrana War and terrible evidence from the World Battle Survey in Taiwan.

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So there is the imminent like threat of war like everywhere, in Europe and in Asia and under the Shadow Board, can democracy sow the seed of self destruction.

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We have witnessed such strategies, tragedies in world in human histories a world around the world. For many, many times.

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We could elect a democratically elected leader that could distract the democracy that runs in the world, especially under great stress, what would democracy respond to that?

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Specifically, how do people respond to external threat? So they just rally around the flag.

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That is a concept that is defined. The outbreak of foreign crisis boosts a concept that is defined.

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The outbreak of foreign crisis boosts the popularity of foreign crisis boosts the popularity of Democrat leaders. The outbreak of foreign crisis boosts the popularity of Democrat leaders.

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People will quickly gather around their Democrat leaders. People will quickly gather around their Democrat leaders. For it and expect the leader to solve the external threat.

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And many factors conditioned in fact rally around the flak, including partisanship. Like in the United States, we know that Republicans are more likely to show such tendency than their Democrats are more likely to show such tendency than their Democrats and intervention of the Democrats.

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And intervention of international organizations. Like I do like the United Nations, do they quickly respond to the international crisis so that the democracies to not respond to drastically to the external threat and also media coverage.

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Is that widely known to people? And this is less of the problem with the like wives with the white internet coverage as well as the widespread of social media and elite rhetoric.

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How is that external crisis framed? Is it really a crisis to us or is it just small scale conflicts skirmishes maybe and casualties at Like how many people die in such crisis?

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So some prices that already take place sometimes do not. So take a waist. This paper believes that we I believe that rather around strong leaders in democracies, populist leaders here is very likely under the Shadow War.

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When people feel panic, the social side college would just drive them into support there later who is somewhat allowed to pass by the Congress.

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And this is dangerous to democracy because that means leaders personal ideology and decisions would drastically change the course of not only the conflict but also the fate of democracy for the country.

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So also in this paper I present empirical evidence on a younger and smaller democracy under the Shadow War.

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Previously we only have empirical evidence on a younger and smaller democracy under the Shadow War.

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Previously we only have empirical evidence on the United States. So the fact is about international event that evolved the United States in particular the president directly.

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So we know the diplomacy and war decisions are like in the description of the president. Previous empirical evidence almost always focus on the case of the United States.

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We will never check if that story fits in other countries. Especially smaller countries. The United States is unique in a way.

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It's a haremont. It's so big a strong power. It can deal with a lot of an international crisis on its own and but this is not necessary case for many democracies, small democracies.

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And definition of rally, that means sudden military intervention. The president or the leader of the democracy gets to just make a decisions like that.

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Without the approval of the Congress. And second major diplomatic actions, science treaty, initiated negotiation.

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Second, third, like dramatic technological developments. This speaks to pretty much like, 90 seventys, you know, the deploy of a nukes and some admittings.

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Lastly, major military development in ongoing wars. So, not yet tested on younger and smaller democracies like Taiwan.

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And also in many, I think it may many met small and middle-sized countries in East Asia like Japan, South Korea, Singapore and the Philippines.

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So in this whole literature many critics I come up with that first focus on the United States where hasmatic democracy is capable of unilateral aggressive actions.

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And the definition of rallies, we can review them again. Among the 4 5 conditions conditions to divide value around the flag, there is only one condition.

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That smaller and misized democracies can possibly use. That is the major diplomatic decisions in domestic politics.

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For the rest of the conditions, like countries like Taiwan, Japan, South Korea. We cannot possibly afford the rest of the conditions.

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So the second critic is only care about either ongoing or existing foreign crisis, which are rare events. Throughout human history, war is a rare event.

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It does not happen all the time so that we have sufficient observations to do analysis. But oftentimes we have international prices.

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And we have conflicts of tensions, threats. Like what we have right now. Well, right now I'm in East Asia.

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In Eastern Europe, a war is an ongoing event, but it is not an ongoing event in East Asia right now, but we do currently have an ongoing tension.

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The threat of war. So. So United States is also a unique case like in initiate more wars than after World War III than any other countries.

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So, but for small democracies, we cannot afford an initiated war and we do not initiate a war to begin with.

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And after decades of peace, what will possibly respond to that? So. So, and then the last critic is established democracies like that that's less as opposed to the risk of democratic breakdown.

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Like oftentimes we talk about the rise of populism in the United States, in European countries.

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It is likely that the publicism can threat the quality of democracy. But it could be lethal to young democracies.

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To end democracy. So never create a democratic breakdown is likely for younger democracies. Like Taiwan and maybe maybe even Japan and South Korea when the pressure is so big so that's why it's worthwhile to analyze younger democracies.

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So the case of Taiwan that international events that involve Taiwan and particularly the press in direct party and oh so there's a drastic dramatic droply focused on Taiwan so that is clear that is China's claim of the contested sovereignty issues of Taiwan.

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A versus, visa V to China. So support the populist later. So entire establishment and later.

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So entire establishment and authoritarianism is one of the most important trades. Entire establishment and authoritarianism is one of the most important traditions is one of the most important traits for populism.

309
01:01:08.000 --> 01:01:15.000
That means that passing by the Las Vegas are strong leaders regardless of what the Congress would think and checks and balances.

310
01:01:15.000 --> 01:01:29.000
Oh, fail, parallel, the pass by the checks and balances in the system. That is very likely to happen despite decades of democratic development in Taiwan.

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01:01:29.000 --> 01:01:37.000
So We want maybe it's likely to compromise democracy just because we want to survive and feel so threatened.

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Social psychology. So we use the World Vale. I use the World Villa Survey and here's the If I'm variable, having strong leaders who does not have to bother with pardon in elections.

313
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That is a classic trait of populism. And then it's surprising that 700, and 60, 72.5 people believe that.

314
01:01:53.000 --> 01:02:08.000
Yeah, why not? How is dangerous? See, democracy has been taking root in Taiwan for the last like 4 4 decades.

315
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Plus that is very scary. And concerns for war, very huge, 7 3, 74, 3.6%.

316
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Very worried about Taiwan who evolved, even involved in a war. And we use I use a battery of controls attitude toward democracy attitudes towards China and political information demographics.

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Here's the result. Concerns for war.

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Possibly. Increases the likelihood to support a populist later. Let's pass by the parliament.

319
01:02:46.000 --> 01:02:55.000
Let's pass by the election. Just to support a leader like that when they were super worried about the war and they do this.

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This is social psychology that shows there is a subscription that would trade democracy for like a leader. Just get it over with, solve the problem for us.

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For all of us. And we find that frequent of political talk, like mail, males, males and college college degree would be negatively related to this.

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So inform people, females in they are more likely to be more rational to defend democracy. So the conclusion is concerns for war induces the rise of a strong leader to pass by a populist strong populist later.

323
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Even in democracy in the United States history like Roosevelt has been elected for 5 tough terms just because of a war.

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Americans supported that and American Constitution went through a revision just because of Just because some people describe as imperial lest a count.

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Actions and during the war and Peace of war plays a role in the sustainability of democracy Democracy is not taken for granted after 40 years.

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And democracies fall victim of the threat of war. I cannot emphasize enough, do not blame the victims.

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Small democracies are medium-sized democracies like Taiwan, in South Korea, a witter victims.

328
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For 2 to bear the threat of war. It is not, it is, is not as that is to blame.

329
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Thank you.

330
01:04:50.000 --> 01:05:03.000
Thank you for interesting. Presentation. Question. Any question?

331
01:05:03.000 --> 01:05:20.000
I mean, very interesting idea, especially in context of a case study. But one question I had was In terms of like leveraging the world values survey, have you considered including other countries in the analyses and then looking at like age of democracy.

332
01:05:20.000 --> 01:05:27.000
And was seeing like whether that had like a significant effect on people with supportive populism. In multiple time.

333
01:05:27.000 --> 01:05:44.000
Yeah, thank you so much for the question. Yes, I do think about that and I find that the land in the macro level, and I find that the land in the macro level, the length of democracy is not necessarily correlated, and I find that the land in the macro level, the length of democracy is not necessarily correlated, possibly correlated with

334
01:05:44.000 --> 01:05:52.000
the length of democracy, is not necessarily correlated, possibly correlated with democracy is not necessarily correlated, possibly correlated, possibly correlated, possibly correlated with the satisfaction with democracy.

335
01:05:52.000 --> 01:05:58.000
So many for many countries that have been doing democracy for a long time, but their people are not happy about it.

336
01:05:58.000 --> 01:06:02.000
So, I guess in the end of the day, it's people's attitude towards democracy that determines the democracy, in their country.

337
01:06:02.000 --> 01:06:05.000
And I do. Come up with more global data on this. It's not yet complete. Like on here,'s not yet complete.

338
01:06:05.000 --> 01:06:20.000
Like on here there's a Taiwan, Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan and Germany is an ally here.

339
01:06:20.000 --> 01:06:33.000
You see, Japan is super worried about war. Like almost 90% super worried this is the country with the highest racial like just like Philippines.

340
01:06:33.000 --> 01:06:41.000
It's people is less likely to support less people less likely support for populist leader to pass by the Congress and leader.

341
01:06:41.000 --> 01:06:57.000
So I would say Japan is very robust. Against the external threat. To defend its democracy. But whereas you see Taiwan and Philippines, they are like Pretty shaky.

342
01:06:57.000 --> 01:07:04.000
They're more likely to shaken up at their democracies. Due to the external threat.

343
01:07:04.000 --> 01:07:19.000
Because they're so worried about it. And, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong, they're like close to the regression line and they're not that dramatic.

344
01:07:19.000 --> 01:07:30.000
But still, there's slight tendency. And we know, of course, like Singapore and Hong Kong are not Faldima, full-fledged democracy.

345
01:07:30.000 --> 01:07:43.000
There are somewhere in between democracy. They are hybrid democracy, right? Like there is never party turnover in Singapore and Hong Kong is now under the club under China's control.

346
01:07:43.000 --> 01:08:03.000
So, but South Korea is an interesting case that it's worries about war a lot. And then it's still like It's still like suppressed the percentage of people supporting populist later under 50%.

347
01:08:03.000 --> 01:08:16.000
So yes, I would say in the case of East Asia, I believe your theory of life that the duration of makes a difference.

348
01:08:16.000 --> 01:08:22.000
But not that big.

349
01:08:22.000 --> 01:08:26.000
Other questions?

350
01:08:26.000 --> 01:08:31.000
Thank you very much. And we're very interesting there and this role and study. So I have 2 questions.

351
01:08:31.000 --> 01:08:43.000
So the whole marketing in the democracy. So we need to calm down when we have their concerns. Tomorrow.

352
01:08:43.000 --> 01:09:11.000
So each kind of their other providers so you want to come down. Citizens. And then so second question is that there was related, I found some results so in terms That's right.

353
01:09:11.000 --> 01:09:18.000
There come down. So what we're using jobs is Oh, thank you very much for your questions.

354
01:09:18.000 --> 01:09:42.000
Are frequent political talk can be a little bit tricky because on one hand the more people talk about it they're supposed to be more important about the the situation they're more likely to come down have more confidence but on the other hand we cannot help notice a lot of the transformation war coming in right like well according to the variety of

355
01:09:42.000 --> 01:09:54.000
bureaucracy data set that China is the country that issues sending out the largest amount of disinformation across Chinese speaking world as well as East Asia.

356
01:09:54.000 --> 01:10:22.000
So frequent political talk can be pretty tricky. Tricky. For example, like my mom, she constantly get misinformation from China to like drinking bleach to kill kovat something like that so I mean yeah she's constantly exposed to political talks in formations but they're like bad information misinformation disinformation

357
01:10:22.000 --> 01:10:36.000
you name it. So that's why education level matters. Because that enables them to get exposed to more diversity, greater diversity of information.

358
01:10:36.000 --> 01:10:43.000
But this is indeed important. I guess I get this result because they're pulled.

359
01:10:43.000 --> 01:10:49.000
I have a question about the mail. Is it? And our war.

360
01:10:49.000 --> 01:11:03.000
S. Male males are less up yes males are less likely to support publicist leader. Wow.

361
01:11:03.000 --> 01:11:14.000
. Si expect the opposite interesting. I'm not sure about the case in the United States.

362
01:11:14.000 --> 01:11:33.000
I don't know if there is a gender difference in in the case of the United States. General and men are more likely to require freshman power viralism to be I associate all those things with populist here or populism is definitely the grave.

363
01:11:33.000 --> 01:11:46.000
But in that case I have I will say that maybe because men are exposed to great risk of war. If a war should break out, it is men most likely.

364
01:11:46.000 --> 01:11:55.000
To be drafted to fight a war. So if they're exposed to a greater pressure, it's a greater risk.

365
01:11:55.000 --> 01:12:03.000
It may be likely that they get a hold more. They're more interesting getting a hole, making sure the decision is correct.

366
01:12:03.000 --> 01:12:18.000
Making this sure is not for the populist leaders. To get things. Problem having is that by picturing strong people as someone who goes into You're saying the logic is stronger than it was our report.

367
01:12:18.000 --> 01:12:35.000
Interestingly, for in the case of United States, you're right. Like a strong populist leaders like, they're more likely to make determined decision to go to war.

368
01:12:35.000 --> 01:12:40.000
But for small democracies, it could be quite the opposite.

369
01:12:40.000 --> 01:12:45.000
It could be the Piccadilly. But it could be, but I'm not yet sure.

370
01:12:45.000 --> 01:12:55.000
It takes more data to further look into the details, how people think about what a strong leader mean in time of war.

371
01:12:55.000 --> 01:13:04.000
I just, I cannot hear strong humor as other than militaristic aggressive Oh, provocative imperialists.

372
01:13:04.000 --> 01:13:11.000
I don't like jamming or I think it's shown here as about those things. But these are like offensive view, right?

373
01:13:11.000 --> 01:13:22.000
Like you initiate a war against in other countries that that is more likely a case for the like strong powers but that's not the case for young democracies.

374
01:13:22.000 --> 01:13:32.000
For a young democracies like Ukraine or Taiwan, then we are strong leaders like our steadfast on defending our own country.

375
01:13:32.000 --> 01:13:38.000
That's how loose, yeah, it's more defensive view about what's wrong leaders should be.

376
01:13:38.000 --> 01:13:44.000
Yeah.

377
01:13:44.000 --> 01:13:58.000
Please. Okay. The red line is local leading off of Oh, oh, sorry, I should have explained it.

378
01:13:58.000 --> 01:14:07.000
The.solid.is the point estimate. And the 2 arms stretching from the dot. Those are confidence intervals.

379
01:14:07.000 --> 01:14:15.000
So whenever the confidence interval touches the probability of 0, that means it's not a significant result.

380
01:14:15.000 --> 01:14:28.000
Star, oh stars being said those results are significant you see the confidence role the arms do not touch 0.

381
01:14:28.000 --> 01:14:45.000
Excuse me for the rest of the for the rest of controls like a conceptual war is the different variable it is significant but for the rest of the controls, only 3 of them are significant.

382
01:14:45.000 --> 01:14:51.000
And I've been sharing it with my agenda. It is already on its program manager and Dr.

383
01:14:51.000 --> 01:15:03.000
And the we asked about their national identity. Yeah, to see where they identified the how they manifest themselves.

384
01:15:03.000 --> 01:15:11.000
So it's. It's subjective perception.

385
01:15:11.000 --> 01:15:17.000
Sure.

386
01:15:17.000 --> 01:15:27.000
Other questions?

387
01:15:27.000 --> 01:15:55.000
A question for me is that the I was first, was persuaded that, A threat of war is One of the important factor of routing populist leader but I wonder there might be other other factors.

388
01:15:55.000 --> 01:16:13.000
2. It is not significant but this table shows that increase Chinese immigrants is high. High up bread. Hi, Bres and I'm a Thai researcher.

389
01:16:13.000 --> 01:16:33.000
At the site of the Thai society there have been very long tradition of running Republicans data but there was no there have been scarcely hardly any threat to war.

390
01:16:33.000 --> 01:16:45.000
Maybe the most important problem for them is threat of military power or threat of poverty or something like that.

391
01:16:45.000 --> 01:17:00.000
So, Is it? Is it really the threat of war is most important factor for routing for this power.

392
01:17:00.000 --> 01:17:05.000
That is my question.

393
01:17:05.000 --> 01:17:18.000
Yeah, I think The advantages of using like Well, data set like world value survey is that it's credible and it's collected on the global scale.

394
01:17:18.000 --> 01:17:29.000
But the downside of it is that we don't get to put as many variables as we want to comprehensively evaluate our question.

395
01:17:29.000 --> 01:17:44.000
But there's one, if I could, possibly interim, evaluate, include one more variable that will be the war memories.

396
01:17:44.000 --> 01:17:54.000
Like have they ever lived through a war in their lifetime? I believe this factor would critically matter is critical.

397
01:17:54.000 --> 01:18:11.000
I have analyzed the data for concerns for war and also there willingness to fight. And it's very interesting that for South Korea and Taiwan It is the middle age people, the major source of battle force.

398
01:18:11.000 --> 01:18:17.000
That like from 30 to like 50 they're most likely they're more willing to fight a war than any other age group.

399
01:18:17.000 --> 01:18:30.000
But it is in Japan. That it is the people over 60 that are most likely willing to fight a war.

400
01:18:30.000 --> 01:18:36.000
Over 60. I mean, it's grandpa more willing to do Benjamin than any other age group.

401
01:18:36.000 --> 01:18:50.000
I think you have something everything to do with your peace constitution. Right. So. Yeah, maybe you can like settle the issue for me.

402
01:18:50.000 --> 01:19:03.000
Why is it in Japan it is people over 60? Who are more willing to defend Japan? I'm following your logic people who have probably experienced World War II.

403
01:19:03.000 --> 01:19:20.000
They should be less interested for Yeah, supposedly. And I agree, except also those people who The emperor who was a god.

404
01:19:20.000 --> 01:19:24.000
Yeah, that makes a lot of sense because in the case of the United States It is very simple. The trend is very much like what happened in Japan.

405
01:19:24.000 --> 01:19:33.000
It is for the people who went through like what happened in Japan. It is for the people who went through the Cold War.

406
01:19:33.000 --> 01:19:41.000
In their for their formative years they are more likely to trend the United States

407
01:19:41.000 --> 01:19:53.000
So very interesting, like those who live through war, the threat of great threat of war, the threat of great threat of war and who have living with war, that's right, great threat of war and who have living memories who even have a living memorized war and who have living memories who even have a living memorized war and who have living

408
01:19:53.000 --> 01:19:56.000
memories who even have a living memorized war, they're more likely to defend their living memorized war, they're more likely to defend their country in the United States and Japan.

409
01:19:56.000 --> 01:20:09.000
But not in South Korea and Taiwan. So. Yeah, that's One finding that I find one thing that I find interesting that the data shows.

410
01:20:09.000 --> 01:20:17.000
I just think those 2 countries you just know. Programs you mentioned at West. Chrominist cultures in the US that Japan.

411
01:20:17.000 --> 01:20:30.000
And now how does it work? Ask ourselves. Intend to state.

412
01:20:30.000 --> 01:20:45.000
Yeah, that's the socialization theory, right? You pick up early, so. You have people grow a strong sense of defending their own valuable way of life.

413
01:20:45.000 --> 01:21:15.000
Thank you for your answer. But in the case of Javan society, Er. People who went to in the war as a soldier is 90 years or or more so it is difficult to explain the leader in Japan by threat of war.

414
01:21:17.000 --> 01:21:20.000
So, it is, difficult to, explain, it is difficult to explain, letting Polish leader in, Japan, by, threat of war.

415
01:21:20.000 --> 01:21:36.000
And that, this is a In the case of Taiwan, there The internal war after the World War II is very important too, maybe like gaming down and ordinary people.

416
01:21:36.000 --> 01:21:50.000
And sometimes I have read that at some kind there was very tragedy, tragic incident in after the World War II.

417
01:21:50.000 --> 01:22:04.000
Do you include the in general war into this this term of world war. Oh I use a proxy like mainlander.

418
01:22:04.000 --> 01:22:17.000
If they identify themselves as menander. That means they have a strong sense of belongingness to their It's coming from China.

419
01:22:17.000 --> 01:22:23.000
That's a proxy. That's the proxy I can possibly get from the data.

420
01:22:23.000 --> 01:22:36.000
Yeah, they must be like connected, closely contacted to their families, their distant families, relatives back in China and that is a strong indicator to their party.

421
01:22:36.000 --> 01:22:47.000
As well. So yeah, they're more likely to. Support it also controls for cultural trades.

422
01:22:47.000 --> 01:23:03.000
That they are more influenced by the Confucius teachings that they're more obedient submissive to authority, political authorities.

423
01:23:03.000 --> 01:23:07.000
And thank you so much for your questions.

424
01:23:07.000 --> 01:23:12.000
Other questions?

425
01:23:12.000 --> 01:23:24.000
Then, thank you for, Excellent presentation. Compose to. And we have.

426
01:23:24.000 --> 01:23:43.000
Okay. Are not more 20 or 20 min if you have a question or comment or

427
01:23:43.000 --> 01:23:52.000
To each of the presentation. Or

428
01:23:52.000 --> 01:24:18.000
Property some kind of hypothesis integrating through a presentation is it is possible. Peace.

429
01:24:18.000 --> 01:24:23.000
No.

430
01:24:23.000 --> 01:24:42.000
If you have no idea. We will, it is better to stop here now. Thank you very much for attending this session and approach again to the older presenter.