WEBVTT

1
00:00:00.001 --> 00:00:03.990
 welcome, everyone. Let's start the session.

2
00:00:04.010 --> 00:00:17.060
It's a pleasure to meet you. Chair this session, together together with Hussein God Zagar, who helped me to help

3
00:00:17.170 --> 00:00:28.789
to facilitate the panel we've got here 5 exciting scholars presenting their work, and we also got a

4
00:00:29.360 --> 00:00:39.580
distributed paper that you can check on the app. So let's start with Sn. Cubes from

5
00:00:39.640 --> 00:00:49.579
University of of Rhodes College. Sorry from the United States religion and youth in the Middle east. please. The floor is yours.

6
00:01:00.930 --> 00:01:21.150
So thank you very much for coming at this hour. this is a research product at its infancy. So I should note that at the start I will be talking about religion, youth in the Middle East. And my research question basically starts from Islamic parties. So what is happening is that Islamic parties have been winning. Elections have been the main opposition parties.

7
00:01:21.150 --> 00:01:39.360
for the last 2 decades all over the Middle East. So anywhere with a star. It's you know, is is where they have been gaining power, and the literature has been addressing this quite a bit. So there is quite a literature on why, how, when these parties are remaining, what I find very puzzling, though, is in the same countries?

8
00:01:39.360 --> 00:01:58.049
The youth is becoming less religious. So while basically, Islamic parties are winning, the youth is becoming less religious. And I know that this graph is kind of like hard to read. So I'll just, you know, like, try to explain it. So anything that is a gray column is basically a survey from air parameter in 2,005.

9
00:01:58.050 --> 00:02:11.940
Anything that is striped is 2,010, and then anything that is a black column is basically the current one, the latest one, as you can see, and these are different Middle Eastern countries everywhere except Iraq. That's the one exception.

10
00:02:11.940 --> 00:02:40.360
Youth has been becoming much less religious, and I should note what I mean by that. I don't mean that suddenly youth is becoming atheist. That is not what I'm meaning. What I mean by becoming less religious is that they are less likely to attend, for instance, mosque services, that they are less likely to interpret religion in a more strict way, so that they are much more, you know, flexible in their religious interpretations. That's what I mean.

11
00:02:40.360 --> 00:03:03.769
other than that the majority of our Middle Eastern youth remains religious. I should note that. So what I'm saying is that there is this decrease. And on average, what what I'm seeing is there's about 21% decrease in religious engagement in the region. So in the last 2 decades. So there's a significant decrease in that. And the reason why I want to explain this is because

12
00:03:03.770 --> 00:03:14.290
this is a new generation. Right? I mean, the news is full of Gen. Z. On news, and that they are basically this new generation with different values, different, you know, perspectives.

13
00:03:14.290 --> 00:03:39.290
and according to the World Bank, they are making about one-third to half of the of the regions's population, meaning they will become a political force to be reckoned with. So I want to understand why this is happening, why they they are becoming less religious. so quote unquote and in terms of case selection. What I'm doing basically is, I look at Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, and there are 2 reasons why I'm

14
00:03:39.290 --> 00:03:57.879
looking at these. So firstly, the Islamists have one, and let government in these 3 countries. So this is kind of like the puzzle right? That, like youth is becoming less religious in places where Islamists are winning. That is the paradox like, why is this happening? And the second reason why I'm doing this is.

15
00:03:57.880 --> 00:04:11.359
these 3 counties have different focal systems. Egypt is a multi regime. Morocco is a monarchy. Tunisia is a republic, so politically they are different regimes, and the same thing is happening where youth is becoming less religiously engaged.

16
00:04:11.370 --> 00:04:32.949
and in terms of to give you in some numbers, and the numbers are from the era perimeter. So in Egypt on average, back in 2,011, basically in the 2,011 survey youth defining themselves as not religious was 2.7 to date of its 18.4. So there's a 6 time, you know, increase

17
00:04:32.950 --> 00:04:57.499
in Morocco in 2,011. It was 3.8. Now it is 22.4, meaning five-time increase in those who are defining themselves as not religious. In Tunisia it was 24 back in 2,011. Now it is 45. So there is doubling in Tunisia in terms of those who are defining themselves as not religious. So that is why I'm looking at these 3 cases

18
00:04:58.110 --> 00:05:06.389
in terms of the literature I'm consulting. I look at 3 different literature. One basically is the religious economy models

19
00:05:06.390 --> 00:05:30.229
which looks at why people are becoming more religious in the Us in particular. So what what I think is, if a literature is explaining why people are becoming more religious. It should also explain why they are becoming less religious. So I'm basically looking into that literature. Another literature I'm looking at is called the consequence-based support for democracy in the airport. What they basically do is

20
00:05:30.230 --> 00:05:57.309
think about why people are supporting democracy or not supporting democracy, and what they are finding is a lot of times. For democracy runs with your personal experiences with democracy, meaning what you are getting from it, how it is affecting your life? Or how is it not changing anything in your life that this is? and so I'm borrowing this idea that religion might be also something that you basically understand from your own personal experiences.

21
00:05:57.310 --> 00:06:21.170
And then the third literature I'm looking at is public opinion surveys that? Look at religiosity because really, just is not one thing right? you might be basically religious in self-identification, but not in behavior. You might never go to any religious services, never pray at ever fast. And so on. So I'm basically looking at these different nuances of our religiosity. And what that entails basically

22
00:06:21.540 --> 00:06:49.449
in terms of. And this is where it's really it's its infancy. So I will really appreciate if you have any comments about this. This is a working hypothesis. So I should emphasize this. So basically Islamist incumbencies. When Islamists came into government, they came before this the 20 years before. This was all about changing, and that they will be transforming these countries that they basically under them, the countries will really be completely changed, and lives will be better.

23
00:06:49.450 --> 00:07:14.449
But they came into government. And when you look at their policies the policies remained very much morality focused rather than structural change focus. But I mean by this is they basically focus on, you know, things like age, religious education, the TV channels having having moral codes of behavior, but not necessarily the economy, not necessarily unemployment, not necessarily. These big structural authoritarianism, for instance, in the region

24
00:07:14.450 --> 00:07:44.220
and babies their incumbencies, despite all these promise of change, remained very small in scale. If you will. The second point I'm thinking through basically is, then you basically become part of the government. You become an accommodationist. in the 80 s. 90 s. A lot of literature has argued that the youth is supporting Islamist because they basically are representing some sort of anti. You know, government anti-system stance. That's this is what was appealing.

25
00:07:44.270 --> 00:08:12.029
But when you become part of the government, you become basically accommodationist as well, and that might be actually on the country, repelling in a sense, the youth. And as a result resulting in decline in personal piety and distrust in Islamism. And the third point I'm thinking through basically is that these experiences should be basically differ, depending on each country and their unique experiences.

26
00:08:12.030 --> 00:08:37.029
So a bit that I'll just talk about the different. You know, countries that I mentioned, and I'll keep it very, very you know. basic. So in Egypt, 52 to 2011. There's a milky regime. The Brotherhood comes into power after the Arab spring, but is overthrown. And now the milchi regime is back. But what has not changed actually ironically, is that both the military and the Brotherhood have used

27
00:08:37.030 --> 00:08:50.490
religion in their governance. In a sense, while the Egyptian multi regime has used to the alas! The Islamic University to issue religious addicts from time to time to support itself.

28
00:08:50.490 --> 00:09:15.489
And then the Brotherhood has, tried to, you know, integrate more on religious lows in the Constitution writing process. But in the meantime, what was missing was the situation that the youth was finding itself, which was, had different problems than religion. in in in their lives, meaning the economy. And these are some just numbers, the economy being fluctuating, unemployment remaining around 30%.

29
00:09:15.490 --> 00:09:24.529
And so they had basically problems that were not adjust by neither the military regime nor the brotherhoods government.

30
00:09:24.550 --> 00:09:43.479
And I know this is again very small. But like. I'll just go through the You know the basics of this. So this is. The youth is being asked. This is from the Arab barometer. So One thing that they all agree on is that the economy is is bad, and they are not trusting the government Islamists or religious leaders.

31
00:09:43.480 --> 00:09:55.649
It is remaining around 60% in all across this distrust. It's not as high as you will be expecting it to be. So. I should note that. And there's one difference between religions. youth.

32
00:09:55.650 --> 00:10:08.139
And then you're defining itself as non-religious. And the religious youth is slightly more has a more positive attitude towards basically the government Islamists and the economy. So this is one note to make.

33
00:10:08.270 --> 00:10:17.849
And then and this is coming from world value survey. So I basically look at 3 different dimensions of religiosity. So the first one is.

34
00:10:17.860 --> 00:10:36.449
people are asked, are you religious or not? Or are you not religious? Right? I mean self-identification like, if someone asks you, how do you define yourself? And in terms of that, amongst the Egyptian, you self? identification goes from 10 to roughly 31% in a decade.

35
00:10:36.450 --> 00:11:04.950
So so people are defining themselves as not religious. And then in terms of the the second one, religious belief is interpretation, meaning when you basically ask people whether they can, you know, deny something that is very clearly stated in this case, for instance, better suicide is justifiable or not, something that is very clearly banned right in the religion, so that better, you can not justify that or not.

36
00:11:04.950 --> 00:11:21.839
they basically are, there is not much change in that in terms of religious belief in terms of religious behavior. Again, better people are going to the mosques regularly or not. Again, not much change. So there is change in how people self identify in Egypt, in youth.

37
00:11:21.880 --> 00:11:52.110
but not much change in belief and belonging in behavior. and then coming to Morocco. So Morocco is the king is the. It's a monarchy, of course. The King is the commander of the believers, and in 2,011 the party for justice and development. The Islamist party has Vaughan. They basically led coalition governments for about a decade or so up until just recently, really. And what has remained very stable is that they basically have been very much accommodationist of the regime.

38
00:11:52.110 --> 00:12:16.440
And they basically have been demanding obedience in the name of religion. The King has been doing that as a commander of the Believers party for justice and development has been, you know, demanding that in the name of religion, again, the problems are very similar in Egypt. you have, you know, fluctuating economy. Unemployment amongst the youth remains about 22% so it is quite high.

39
00:12:16.440 --> 00:12:33.809
And again, for survey results like the youth is agreeing that the economy is bad, that they are not trusting the Islamists that they are not trusting the religious leaders, that they are not trusting the The government very similar to Egypt, where things are differing basically is

40
00:12:33.810 --> 00:12:47.060
from 2,013 to 2,018. There is a very clear increase in this trust, and then from 2,018 to today. There is a slow decline in the distrust, and this is something to be thought about

41
00:12:47.060 --> 00:12:54.049
in terms of religiosity. Again, when people are asked whether they are religious or not.

42
00:12:55.300 --> 00:13:23.659
Sure I'll do it so. And then they basically self identify those. Youth was self-identifying as not religious goes from 12 to 35. So quite chipling, and then, in terms of religious belief. it goes from 86 to 60, and then weekly mosque attendance declines from 84 to 45. So there's a very clear chant in Morocco in religious disengagement.

43
00:13:23.720 --> 00:13:49.389
and then And then, lastly, Tunisia. Up until 2011. Tunisia, of course, is an up there. It's an up there. It's the Arab spring takes place today. It's a fragile democracy. If you are basically following the news. There's a lot happening. but the Islamist party there. But what has not changed is the kind of the status quo that things are changing, but not really changing, that the structures pretty much are staying the same

44
00:13:49.390 --> 00:14:11.650
again, economy is in in shatters. In that unemployment remains about 35% amongst the youth. So quite high levels of unemployment in terms of again survey results. Youth is thinking, like Egypt, like Morocco in Tunisia. They also think the economy is bad, that they are not trusting the government Islamists or religious leaders.

45
00:14:11.650 --> 00:14:35.640
And what's interesting and different from Egypt and Morocco is that both religious youth and non-religious youth agree basically on their distrust, which is very interesting. Why, they are agreeing that so something to think about again in terms of religiosity. So the self-identification goes from 35%. So it already was very high in Tunisia that a lot of youth was self-identifying as non-religious.

46
00:14:35.640 --> 00:14:41.069
Then to 52%. So half of our Tunisian youth is

47
00:14:41.070 --> 00:15:06.060
defining itself as not religious. Some decline in religious believe and not much change in religious behavior, though. So what I'm basically trying to think through is better, you know, forcing religion, you know, and focusing on religion only by governments at the expense of socio-economic well-being and of failing to offer alternative interpretations, because at the end of the day, if you're at the State behind you, you're only in

48
00:15:06.060 --> 00:15:23.459
offering one interpretation of religion amongst many different interpretations. So a better that is actually leading to a secular backlash or not. As I said, this is a very much for a new research in its infancy. So I very much welcome any. You know recommendations that you have for readings and other ideas. So thank you very much.

49
00:15:38.000 --> 00:15:39.149
Oh, you have him and my.

50
00:16:01.480 --> 00:16:03.090
can you share this screen on?

51
00:16:07.050 --> 00:16:10.200
Hi, Jose! Can you hear us?

52
00:16:18.710 --> 00:16:20.530
Can you share the screen?

53
00:16:25.060 --> 00:16:27.080
I'm not sure if he can hear us.

54
00:16:32.700 --> 00:16:34.650
I'm not sure that it is online.

55
00:16:37.730 --> 00:16:41.510
I can see someone else. But is it supposed to be?

56
00:16:43.410 --> 00:16:51.430
We have a file, though she's not mine. But if you want you can. It's supposed to be this person.

57
00:16:52.260 --> 00:16:54.120
She is not online.

58
00:16:54.650 --> 00:17:04.279
Garcia Sanchez Garcia. Yeah, then we just if you want, you can. If you have the chair, you just saw that. So then you can click on this one.

59
00:17:04.320 --> 00:17:05.779
So in this case

60
00:17:14.230 --> 00:17:17.090
perfect? No.

61
00:17:18.680 --> 00:17:19.590
and then

62
00:17:20.920 --> 00:17:39.329
perfect. So thank you. We're going to move to our next scholar. sis Mir. Sorry, h, I'm from Kadira's University in Turkey, plying between the secular and the pious communities and ethnographic case. Study on Muslim young women in Turkey.

63
00:17:41.270 --> 00:17:42.950
Thank you very much.

64
00:17:43.170 --> 00:17:50.070
and I am a new Phd. Student. And that was my mitsis study.

65
00:17:50.080 --> 00:17:51.649
So, okay.

66
00:17:52.080 --> 00:18:15.109
this study presents the K results and analysis of engagement with the cultural practices of pious me as a woman based on an ethnographic case. Study of woman-only music band in Istanbul, Turkey. It highlights the cultural participation of these women as culture Maker is and examines the construction of personal and social lives of young women as

67
00:18:15.130 --> 00:18:20.149
culture makers in Turkey's current, social and political climate.

68
00:18:21.100 --> 00:18:24.330
 I don't know it, does it.

69
00:18:29.650 --> 00:18:31.039
Oh, yeah, okay.

70
00:18:32.470 --> 00:18:52.689
I asked. How the upper middle class, pious Muslim young women react and translate and position themselves in the fear that is created and formed by them as active participants through contemporary political stances in Turkey, and how they in turn and message their own class membership.

71
00:18:54.220 --> 00:19:16.129
Pious Muslim women in Turkey have long been the focus of religious discourses that regulate their daily lives, emphasizing their roles and representatives of religious communities, and the importance of maintaining family ties. Additionally, they are subject to discourses on acceptable behavior. For Muslim women, often shaped by the secular community, too.

72
00:19:16.260 --> 00:19:35.620
these discourses and compensing public conduct, attire and child-rearing practices sort of legitimize the boundaries between Secularism and religiosity, gender roles and the distinctions between what is deemed halal. which means permeable and haram which means forbidden

73
00:19:35.670 --> 00:19:59.790
rising. A sociological question on the relationships between the religious women and the discourses generated by the secular and religious communities would be crucial for any cases not all over the world. But when specifically looking at the context of Turkey, I think it, it becomes even more worth a war to do a study. Since the establishment of Republic of Turkey in the early 19 hundreds.

74
00:19:59.790 --> 00:20:14.119
debates surrounding religiosity and Secularism have been quite intense. Turkey's top down secularisation policies have created significant social and political tensions between religious and secular groups.

75
00:20:14.790 --> 00:20:34.030
The rise, the power of conservative right, justice, and Development Party has shifted the 80 year old balance in Turkey and changed it. In this context I focused on the women who have increased their economic capital and become the part of the previously secular, dominated cultural sphere with the support of the Gdp.

76
00:20:34.090 --> 00:20:42.390
Today I am going to share briefly some of the findings of the field work that I conducted 4 years ago, under the horizon, 2020 project

77
00:20:44.030 --> 00:20:53.990
 I used qualitative data collection methods, primarily ethnography. And I also conducted semi-structured and in-depth interviews.

78
00:20:54.100 --> 00:21:07.609
I analyze the capacity to challenge how participation and community production are carried out and transformed to disappear, in which young people exist while maintaining their status within the religious community.

79
00:21:07.770 --> 00:21:15.330
The purpose of this method is to follow the extended case rather than the examined microstructures. To gain a comprehensive understanding.

80
00:21:16.220 --> 00:21:29.799
the informal setting of the selected case study enables me to conduct ethnography, and I participate in and and improvisation nice, in order to observe the relationship between the music group and the audience.

81
00:21:29.800 --> 00:21:47.109
During the concert evenings I kept fieldwork diaries, the field work notes contained observations, and so self- reflections regarding to regarding the concerts and other meetings. I went to concerts and several cities in Turkey for 3 years and and analyze the collected data using. And we both.

82
00:21:47.710 --> 00:21:50.579
I know I'm giving information about the field.

83
00:21:51.200 --> 00:22:09.619
The concept group is an independent music group that performs just only for women. They have played in cafes, music holes, congress centres, and other cultures, centers since 2,018. The group consists of a total 25 5 women, ranging in age from 20 to 29.

84
00:22:09.620 --> 00:22:23.509
Their audience consists of women of different ages from various regions of Turkey. While preparing for concerts, they usually practice in cultural centers located in some of Istanbul's more conservative districts.

85
00:22:23.640 --> 00:22:34.290
Occasionally the core group may also invite the gas musicians to play during the planned improvisation night. However it is, guests are often from the same French networks. Friendship networks.

86
00:22:34.400 --> 00:22:57.650
The membership of the core group consists primarily of university students, while with a few people who have only completed the high school and actively and are actively employed. One thing they all have in common, and is musical experience that began in either high school or university. The members of the group also share the same religious beliefs.

87
00:22:57.860 --> 00:23:08.790
Which is Islam and social. Sunni Islam? Actually the social status overall. They all come from upper middle class families who support education of young women.

88
00:23:10.270 --> 00:23:36.339
 The group's concerts are held in Istanbul's more conservatives neighbourhoods. Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, conservative people have traditionally resided in these districts, they sometimes also choose neighbourhoods developed. After Gdp came to power in terms of understanding of groups, dynamics, and interaction with the audience, the forms of gatherings were worth analyzing as well as the settings were

89
00:23:36.340 --> 00:23:48.050
the music group performs. It was so essential to comprehend the gathering forms for understanding the strategies used to reach their audiences. The concert group performance appears in 2 forms.

90
00:23:48.050 --> 00:24:14.649
concerts and improvisation Nights. These 2 forums are different from each other in terms of the size of the event, interaction with the audience and distance between the group and the audience. The concerts are performed less frequently throughout the year and require a great organization, budget, rehearsal, and location, whereas improvisation nights are done more frequently in smaller settings, such as cafes where the group interacts with the audience. More

91
00:24:14.790 --> 00:24:43.659
thanks to my real work. I had the approaching to visit numerous cultural centers built by Gdp municipalities. These new cultural centers created by the Gdp. With large financial resources in order to establish its dominance in a cultural space, often hosts the Gdp Zone meetings and symposiums. Now it is expected by the Government that the content of the cultural activities that can fill these huge spaces should be created by the conservative, pious youth.

92
00:24:43.950 --> 00:25:04.349
Although these music groups use of these places can be explained by the pragmatic reasons, such as providing concerts, places for free or accessing the audience more easily. I also argue that these cultural and spatial policies of the Gdp on the cities are corresponded by these Pious young women

93
00:25:05.090 --> 00:25:24.049
in concert, the audience joining in on the songs by stomping their feed and dancing, or recording some of the instrumentals of the performance on their phones, but never singing, because this is forbidden under the Islamic law, at least, since we believe in Turkey. The vocalist usually warns the audience against himself.

94
00:25:28.060 --> 00:25:50.980
 The most interviews with this statement that Muslim women in Turkey desire to have a setting of gathering created by themselves. The slogan of the group is, if we have foods during the day. In our homes we also have music in the evening. Outside this slogan raises in the question of how, of how getting together to make music differentiate from any informal gathering forms.

95
00:25:51.130 --> 00:26:09.439
the unique relationship that the group members develop between the experience of singing of stage on stage and the pleasure and the pleasure emerges here in response to most predators aimed against them. Women in this country in general argue that there is no contradiction between these feelings and their faith.

96
00:26:09.440 --> 00:26:27.220
and that they find no problem between expressing themselves and being visible as a Muslim woman, but, according to Islamic law, in Turkey's unique idea, expressed the passion as pious Muslim women in front of a mixed gender audience

97
00:26:27.220 --> 00:26:48.959
is completely haram the needs for the self-expression of this woman and the Islamic law creates kind of dubbed and confusion in the group members. However, despite all these doves. These women decided to pray the space to make music where only women, in order not to push the borders dromb by the religion and tradition, and also to protect their inner peace.

98
00:26:49.060 --> 00:26:56.470
Pnar. He reminds us of the Borges drawn by Islam, and says she pays attention to these limits.

99
00:26:56.500 --> 00:26:58.450
Can I just remote water.

100
00:27:03.490 --> 00:27:06.790
 yeah.

101
00:27:07.750 --> 00:27:18.499
According to Norsey, a leader of religious community who played a vital role in the revival of Islam in Turkey, the permissible Islam in both ways and forbidden. The formidable

102
00:27:20.030 --> 00:27:35.619
Muslims are not required to step outside the boundaries of the circle and engage in forbidden activities when they can enjoy a multitude of permissible activities, nor should they, for the permissible sphere as a legal field. But I will use the term hel escapes

103
00:27:35.730 --> 00:27:43.599
to emphasize the spatial aspects, and to describe the new and alternative settings created and reshaped by the intermediaries.

104
00:27:43.930 --> 00:27:46.199
These settings allow

105
00:27:46.400 --> 00:28:13.709
individuals to have found within the boundaries of Islam, based on their moral imperatives and conceptions of ethics. I also use the term hell escape to describe the process of creating a space where the group members can express themselves on a stage and fulfill the audience's entertainment needs without crossing religious boundaries. The evens held within the Hell escape can be seen as an opportunity for both the group members and the audience.

106
00:28:13.840 --> 00:28:39.929
Hattija self-estefa, identified as Muslim feminist activist what was the group former former guitarist during the group's formation process? She supported the soloist idea of organizing events that would empower Muslim women in the music and performing arts, however, in heritage, decided to leave the group when she became and uncomfortable with the Hellescape concepts embraced by the other group members and audience.

107
00:28:40.100 --> 00:29:03.379
As a result, the motivations of group members for joining the group we write greatly, while some members, we, as it means the so of self-expression and inspiring women who have yet to express themselves, others seek the incorporate the benefits of modern living into their lives while adhering the religious guidelines attempting to do so within the hell out framework.

108
00:29:03.960 --> 00:29:26.710
although the perspective that women's involvement in music and the fuel is a field of political struggle, was significant in the group's formation. It is no longer a permanent argument for them. The shift is due to in part of the concert's concerns about how we are perceived within the conservative community, and they desire to align with ideas of being appropriate. Muslims.

109
00:29:29.010 --> 00:29:30.859
Course,

110
00:29:32.640 --> 00:29:54.839
Members of the group frequently interact social groups that are environmentally distinct from them, such as secular people from their universities and musicians. Networks. Religion, on the other hand has a significant effect, who people pick to be in their inner circle. One of the participants stress religion when expressing her criteria for choosing her friends.

111
00:29:56.330 --> 00:30:08.650
When pious Muslim women want to criticise their religious communities while also protecting them from non-religious critics who are frequently weed as a threat, they face a unique difficulty.

112
00:30:08.660 --> 00:30:18.569
They want to fight ideas and actions that promote misogyny in the in one's community, while also challenging Secularists right wheel points on that community.

113
00:30:18.570 --> 00:30:43.540
For religious women who question their communities, male dominated thinking and behaviours. This challenge is quite difficult. Some interioris claimed that religious women's critical wheels on gender were faced with a strong position, causing a marginalisation within the religious community. It was important for the group to express that feeling that there is a significant gap between themselves and the culture and beliefs of their parents. The differences include

114
00:30:43.540 --> 00:30:48.440
that religious interpretation altering daily life and response.

115
00:30:48.470 --> 00:31:08.909
I claim here that the borders between a secular and religious lifestyle are flexible. Practising the secular lifestyle generates an internal change in the religious community that we see in Turkey, women with high scars walking across the university campuses with their boyfriend's wife flirting with them, which was almost impossible to see 20 years ago.

116
00:31:09.110 --> 00:31:11.830
 so okay.

117
00:31:12.610 --> 00:31:41.860
these women strategically position themselves and to increase their visibility in an environment where family tradition, religion, politics, and secular lifestyle are deeply interwined, while their friends may be drinking their beer at pub they choose to remain, and they say I will attend. They non-prey. When I get home in the evening you can have your beer. They prefer not to share the vacation photos with their boyfriends on social media, or to avoid their families and conservatives, circusing them

118
00:31:41.860 --> 00:32:06.610
in doing so, they aim to maintain a secular lifestyle. While preserving their reputation within the religious community, they recognize that the social capital gains from the religious networks will benefit them in the future. I do not claim that here, adopting this tactical position, signifies a significant social change by rather that individuals make strategic decisions in their daily lives.

119
00:32:06.610 --> 00:32:13.949
create comfort to build images that enhance their mobility in public and social spheres, and expanding their opportunities.

120
00:32:14.410 --> 00:32:29.840
Pious Muslim women are subjects of religious discourses that regulate their lives, imposing upon them duty to serve as representatives of the Muslim community, and emphasizing their unique responsibility for maintaining family ties.

121
00:32:29.840 --> 00:32:59.250
does the responsibility towards themselves and religious peers and families become interwined for religious men and women. I argue that these young, upper, pious Muslim women, in contemporary Turkey adopt virus positions within the discourse on secular and religious ideas of womanhood constantly reconstructed their own subjectivities. The self representation, tactics, and social sphere are analysed as a result of balancing acts between the ideals and assumptions shaped by both

122
00:32:59.250 --> 00:33:01.320
secular and religious communities.

123
00:33:01.470 --> 00:33:09.259
The young women who define themselves as pious Muslims come together in public spaces with the

124
00:33:09.620 --> 00:33:40.710
young people from different social cultural backgrounds. These women practice a form of piety while maintaining secular lifestyles and their own in a way. according to the findings of 3 year. Ethnographic field work. Young upper middle class, pious Muslim women in Turkey, with a higher education background, have a strong relationship with the secular community in secular dominated areas, such as education and cultural settings in Turkey. They also participate in traditional and religious practices with the religious community, including their pious peers and families.

125
00:33:40.710 --> 00:34:05.170
The characteristics of lives of these young women do not generate the scores of reactions against authoritarianism. Instead, I observed that their disagreements with the earlier generations and arguments within their own communities, and peer groups regarding religion and tradition are linked to their culture practices and the advantages of belonging to the pious middle class in Turkey, while the cultural production practices of this young woman

126
00:34:05.170 --> 00:34:17.420
promise a kind of freedom and significant change in their individual lives, or they lead the positioning process that is always mindful of their connections with the ruling government, and both secular and religious societies.

127
00:34:17.620 --> 00:34:31.219
These young women are careful not to jeopardise their social economic capital without abandoning their families, who pay for college tuition, or to the societies and the networks that will influence their carriers.

128
00:34:31.220 --> 00:34:48.630
careers when they enter the workforce, or the opportunities provided by the government in the power they create certain spheres of personal freedom. They achieve this by engaging with the actors they encounter on a daily basis, and by utilizing these scores and imagination. Well, thank you so much for listening.

129
00:34:51.950 --> 00:34:52.970
Thank you.

130
00:34:53.580 --> 00:35:09.380
Thank you. let's move, then, to our next, scholar, said Yah Mohammadi, from the University of Montreal are conceptualizations of social justice in Iran between religion and politics

131
00:35:11.630 --> 00:35:12.770
the time myself.

132
00:35:18.180 --> 00:35:18.860
Yeah.

133
00:35:39.040 --> 00:35:40.749
good evening, everybody.

134
00:35:47.840 --> 00:35:55.290
So let's start. My presentation is about the conceptualization of social justice in Iran between religion and politics.

135
00:35:55.650 --> 00:36:00.970
and I put in my presentation some keynotes. And I'm going to

136
00:36:01.140 --> 00:36:14.049
first focus on the presentation out outline, and after that I'm going to read a shortage that I provided. So I'm going to give a brief introduction, and after that the importance of social justice in Iran

137
00:36:14.090 --> 00:36:21.840
social justice as a transition from my religion to politics, which is the the core topic of my

138
00:36:21.970 --> 00:36:25.230
research. And

139
00:36:25.430 --> 00:36:34.859
first, I'm going to mention a historical president that was observed in the earlier Islam, and after that.

140
00:36:35.130 --> 00:36:46.380
in the context of Iran, I'm going to mention 2 2 changes to 2 shifts, the first move and the second move. And I'm going to explain more. And after that conclusion.

141
00:36:46.980 --> 00:36:48.000
so

142
00:36:50.210 --> 00:36:53.020
as an introduction. I

143
00:36:53.920 --> 00:37:08.099
so because it's a a part of my my thesis research. So which which is an ongoing investigation. So my thesis considers alternative understandings of social justice in Iran.

144
00:37:08.120 --> 00:37:21.680
at Normative and in individual scales, and the subsequent implications of these views on their religious religiosity and of individuals in the context of Iran.

145
00:37:21.890 --> 00:37:29.690
This talk, however, focuses primarily upon normative interpretations of the concept of social justice.

146
00:37:29.770 --> 00:37:38.310
As I would be delighted to share with you some of my thoughts on this subject and the scope of this ongoing investigation.

147
00:37:38.450 --> 00:37:55.759
So my focus is on the normative part. Not because I'm I'm going to make some in-depth in interviews with just a few individuals, to understand their understanding of social justice. Now, on the on the normative part.

148
00:37:55.870 --> 00:37:57.400
the

149
00:37:57.840 --> 00:38:00.259
as a summary of

150
00:38:00.840 --> 00:38:05.539
this presentation. The underlying idea is that the

151
00:38:05.770 --> 00:38:26.139
There has been a shift from a religious to political conceptualization of social justice in Iran over the last 4 decades since the 1,979 Revolution, the shift has distanced this concept from its social, economic, and worldly function.

152
00:38:26.330 --> 00:38:32.130
explaining it in scatological and political perspectives

153
00:38:38.190 --> 00:38:39.380
so

154
00:38:40.280 --> 00:38:48.899
quickly about the importance of social justice in Iran. The concept of social justice has figured Prominently in Iran's history.

155
00:38:48.930 --> 00:39:02.399
including 2 revolutions and a number of social movements over the past 100 years, and so, and continues to hold a central and importance at both religious and political horizons.

156
00:39:02.520 --> 00:39:12.569
Alongside this social and political context it also occupies a pivotal rich niche in Islamic and Shi'ite intellectual thought.

157
00:39:12.800 --> 00:39:23.879
 Khomeini's movement embodied a new approach to understanding the interplay between social justice and Islamic principles

158
00:39:23.890 --> 00:39:27.869
in the present day. Nation State.

159
00:39:35.780 --> 00:39:43.800
Okay, now, but generally about the transition. I'm talking about social justice at a transition from religion to

160
00:39:43.820 --> 00:39:45.740
politics!

161
00:39:45.840 --> 00:39:50.969
I believe this shift is intended in 2 ways.

162
00:39:51.290 --> 00:40:00.850
I mean in the context of Iran, for sure, I believe this shift is internally 2 ways, reconceptualizing and re-theorizing the

163
00:40:01.030 --> 00:40:23.869
social justice from a rhetorical and political perspective. And the second move is reinterpreting the it's associated concepts, for example, the concept of the poor or oppressed, or, as we say in Persian and Arab Mosas affin.

164
00:40:25.390 --> 00:40:33.350
Okay, now, I'm gonna explain more precisely about this first, about a

165
00:40:33.870 --> 00:40:35.700
historical precedent.

166
00:40:36.910 --> 00:40:44.929
To illustrate the first aspect of this change, I mean the first move which is

167
00:40:45.350 --> 00:40:59.329
a shift that existed in the history of Islam. So I will briefly a book, a comparable development in the history of Islam, in order to draw a parallel between

168
00:40:59.440 --> 00:41:02.210
existed historically

169
00:41:02.250 --> 00:41:07.510
as a model what existed historically as a model of trend or necessity

170
00:41:07.530 --> 00:41:17.110
from the point of view of political power in the Muslim context, and what was observed in the wake of the Islamic revolution in in Iraq.

171
00:41:17.500 --> 00:41:19.380
So I'm gonna

172
00:41:19.780 --> 00:41:28.799
focus on 2 explanations of the a book which is a hierarchy and egalitarianism in Islamic thought.

173
00:41:29.200 --> 00:41:31.920
 Our!

174
00:41:33.360 --> 00:41:44.610
The loose Marlowe examines elements of the egalitarian vision of early Islam, based on the interpretation of certain verses of up the Quran.

175
00:41:45.810 --> 00:41:47.630
the

176
00:41:47.750 --> 00:42:09.829
that that support this strong theological assertion that in God's eyes all believers are equal, based on the Islamic vision of human equality. Within the Omaha all believers are deemed religiously equal, regardless of social distinctions wrought by a racial gender class and economic differences.

177
00:42:10.000 --> 00:42:16.970
Here is a summary of of the book. This book, hierarchy and egalitarian in Islamic thought.

178
00:42:17.290 --> 00:42:20.350
gathering the and examining.

179
00:42:21.250 --> 00:42:22.189
I'm sorry.

180
00:42:23.080 --> 00:42:32.259
A very corpus of literature from Arab and Persian. Words from the 8 to thirteenth centuries.

181
00:42:32.500 --> 00:42:44.170
Marlowe explores the tension that existed between the traditional egalitarian ideas in early Islam and the hierarchical impulses of the classical period

182
00:42:44.460 --> 00:42:52.340
the literature, shows that while the initial orientation of Islam was distinctly egalitarian

183
00:42:52.610 --> 00:42:59.990
in religious and social terms, the social aspect of this egalitarianism was rapidly undermined

184
00:43:00.180 --> 00:43:12.140
by the political success of Islam and the integration of hierarchy are social ideas from older Middle Eastern cultures into the new state.

185
00:43:12.540 --> 00:43:19.129
although the memory of its early promises never entirely disappear.

186
00:43:19.360 --> 00:43:25.669
and vestiges of the ideal survive in many parts of the tradition.

187
00:43:25.940 --> 00:43:29.309
Social eggheads and legalitarianism

188
00:43:29.430 --> 00:43:47.880
soon became associated with political subversion. And various attempts were made to dilute its influence. So you see here kind of justification and explanation to to justify this

189
00:43:48.110 --> 00:43:52.779
distance from this egalitarian idea of early Islam.

190
00:43:53.960 --> 00:44:04.780
So now a parallel that I believe that happened in the in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran.

191
00:44:04.960 --> 00:44:06.320
So I

192
00:44:07.510 --> 00:44:11.979
observe this in 2 2 different phases. First, about the first move.

193
00:44:12.320 --> 00:44:16.019
which is the the focus, is on the

194
00:44:16.030 --> 00:44:33.539
a different explanation and understanding of this of the concept of social justice, justice itself. First, we can, we can refer to some Islamic scholars like Farabi, that explain in different ways social justice.

195
00:44:33.700 --> 00:44:41.150
a witness also that the interpretation of a number of Islamic scholars. Social justice is understood in an egalitarian manner.

196
00:44:41.290 --> 00:45:03.410
For instance, justice, as seen by Farabi, like Aristotle, primarily is equitable distribution of common goods and honors, consisting security, property, and social standing. A secondary meaning of justice is human beings. Virtuous action in relation to others.

197
00:45:03.610 --> 00:45:09.330
and irrespective of the type of virtues involved. Thus.

198
00:45:09.630 --> 00:45:17.329
in the ancient or mid, or medieval discussions on justice, the concept.

199
00:45:17.510 --> 00:45:25.750
this, the the social aspect, was a prominent. There is also a redistributive aspect of justice.

200
00:45:25.850 --> 00:45:27.360
Social justice has

201
00:45:27.510 --> 00:45:39.340
that so it refers to relational, distributive, and redistribute retributive justice. So it's the in the in the idea of Farabi.

202
00:45:40.600 --> 00:45:41.470
Now

203
00:45:43.840 --> 00:45:46.760
we focus a little bit later

204
00:45:47.010 --> 00:46:06.410
a market of of examples testified to the fact that a very distributive sense of social justice was advocated before and after the 1979. Revolution in Iran! Nevertheless, far from focusing on what social justice is, I mean the definition.

205
00:46:06.410 --> 00:46:32.899
defining it and defining its indicators, it has been turned into political rhetoric. Thus we find that social justice plays a central role in mobilizing citizens at the time of elections, or during social movements or revolutions, such as during the 1,979 revolution, and in in a very different form or a different way. During the 1,906 constitutional revolution.

206
00:46:33.460 --> 00:46:39.489
I mean, it existed the notion of social justice that it did in a different way in a very different definition.

207
00:46:39.690 --> 00:46:46.510
And when it comes to defining social justice, the focus is on distributive justice

208
00:46:46.620 --> 00:46:49.559
in a very straightforward egalitarian way.

209
00:46:49.710 --> 00:46:50.480
so

210
00:46:50.920 --> 00:46:55.289
I mean it is less defined and much more used.

211
00:46:56.620 --> 00:46:57.880
The second move.

212
00:46:58.780 --> 00:47:03.239
that, I think, is a kind of new finding

213
00:47:03.320 --> 00:47:06.930
for me at least. so

214
00:47:07.970 --> 00:47:09.670
the second move is that

215
00:47:10.030 --> 00:47:13.060
 redefining

216
00:47:13.440 --> 00:47:15.670
and reinterpretting some

217
00:47:16.020 --> 00:47:18.410
associated notions

218
00:47:18.440 --> 00:47:20.550
for concepts, to social justice.

219
00:47:21.810 --> 00:47:23.449
to highlight. The

220
00:47:24.600 --> 00:47:30.889
the other approach to moving from religious to political understanding of social justice. I think that the

221
00:47:31.030 --> 00:47:42.280
failure of the Iranian State to establish social justice in one way or another had led to attempts to justification and explanation

222
00:47:42.320 --> 00:47:45.369
through religious and political grounds.

223
00:47:45.390 --> 00:47:51.290
As I pointed previously, I shall try to clarify my point by giving an example.

224
00:47:53.220 --> 00:48:09.799
Okay, we see here the foundation of the Oprahist, or disadvantaged, or Mosazzafan It is. This is one of the first foundations that was made after the aftermath of the 1,979 revolution

225
00:48:10.240 --> 00:48:12.889
just less than 3 weeks after

226
00:48:13.480 --> 00:48:16.910
So on February 20, eighth.

227
00:48:16.950 --> 00:48:19.589
1979, less than 3 weeks.

228
00:48:20.860 --> 00:48:21.720
Sorry.

229
00:48:23.530 --> 00:48:25.980
Have 2 min. Okay?

230
00:48:26.870 --> 00:48:45.490
And that's a 3 weeks after the Pahlavi regime was out ousted and revolutionary forces seized power. One of the first foundations of a new political of the new political regime. The foundation of Up, the operaist or Masazzafan was created on the order of the the revolutionary leader.

231
00:48:45.590 --> 00:48:48.920
This Foundation's main mission was to

232
00:48:49.010 --> 00:49:01.369
confiscate all the mobable and immovable assets of the Pahlavi dynasty and its branches and agents, as well as those linked to the to this dynasty for the benefit of the operist.

233
00:49:01.410 --> 00:49:02.420
But poor

234
00:49:02.730 --> 00:49:09.770
Workers and economically weak employees through housing and employment, etc.

235
00:49:10.590 --> 00:49:13.580
The first. our main objectives

236
00:49:13.610 --> 00:49:18.089
of this foundation is to help eliminate the weakness

237
00:49:18.100 --> 00:49:29.619
and the probations of disadvantaged regions, and increase the capacity capacity to improve the material, spiritual and cultural standards of living of the oppressed.

238
00:49:30.210 --> 00:49:40.699
However, in 19, in 2,019, just 4 years ago, there is a move. There is a change. The supreme leader of the Islamic Republic

239
00:49:40.760 --> 00:49:46.459
indicated a new definition of this central concept as follows.

240
00:49:47.410 --> 00:50:17.090
they misunderstand it. It is the at the beginning of the code, so that they misunderstand the uprest and say that they are in very people, or more recently, the vulnerable classes. No, the Quran does not define the operas like that the Quran says, the operas, the means, the imams and leaders of the human world. This is the meaning of the compressed. Those who will

241
00:50:17.350 --> 00:50:24.110
be the inheritors of the earth and all the creatures of the earth. Mosasaf means

242
00:50:24.960 --> 00:50:35.039
the one who is the owner of the words, inheritance! Who is God's caliph on earth who is the imam and ruler of the human world

243
00:50:35.070 --> 00:50:36.230
and of the coach?

244
00:50:36.450 --> 00:51:01.739
So briefly? Conclusion. I need to conclude, in addition to political groups and the scholars advocating Secularism as a political philosophy, and the secularization of this State and society in Iran, I observe a tendency to politicize and instrumentalize religion and concepts that have been debated on the basis of Islamic and Shiite interpretations

245
00:51:01.780 --> 00:51:04.470
and and understandings. In other words.

246
00:51:04.550 --> 00:51:12.499
with the crisis of instantiation. Of these notions, the Iran and political system continues to maintain

247
00:51:12.630 --> 00:51:14.630
them in its rhetoric.

248
00:51:14.910 --> 00:51:18.590
providing explanations and justifications from related

249
00:51:18.610 --> 00:51:20.260
for political ends.

250
00:51:21.520 --> 00:51:22.439
Thank you.

251
00:51:33.100 --> 00:51:37.490
Perfect. thank you. Sid, again. All right.

252
00:51:37.650 --> 00:51:47.279
let's move to our next scholar, Ruth Carr and Shay Weineapple, from Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel

253
00:52:03.440 --> 00:52:04.980
should not.

254
00:52:06.290 --> 00:52:06.990
Okay.

255
00:52:07.200 --> 00:52:08.710
Hello, everybody.

256
00:52:08.840 --> 00:52:17.129
I'm glad to see you here in a remote Australia. It's repeating that my co-presenter, Dr. Shai. Why Naple could not come.

257
00:52:18.550 --> 00:52:22.830
so I hope the chair will be. Give me 5 more minutes. Okay.

258
00:52:23.070 --> 00:52:29.450
a request.

259
00:52:30.020 --> 00:52:37.800
So topics are discussion in our presentation. First research methods and sources.

260
00:52:37.990 --> 00:52:55.089
Christian mission definition. Christian mission during the Ottoman period in Palestine Jewish Responses to missionary Activity in Palestine Christian Mission during the British Mandate Period Christian Mission after the establishment of the State of Israel.

261
00:52:55.730 --> 00:53:10.590
The ambivalent attitude of the government towards missionary activity, counter missionary activity, and Ngos and conclusion. This is a somewhat more historical paper than the others.

262
00:53:12.230 --> 00:53:33.839
So research methods we actually used historical, critical, method, historical geography, interviews, field research, primary sources found in public and private archives around the world, and additional sources like research books and articles, newspaper clippings.

263
00:53:34.850 --> 00:53:37.800
So the Christian Mission, first to define

264
00:53:37.810 --> 00:53:51.690
Christian mission includes all persons and organizations whose purpose is to disseminate the gospel throughout the world. It is the believer's response to the command of Jesus.

265
00:53:51.820 --> 00:54:06.859
Go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything that I have commanded you.

266
00:54:07.780 --> 00:54:15.970
So here, for example, you can see some Franciscan missionary missionaries in California.

267
00:54:16.300 --> 00:54:17.730
and the

268
00:54:18.650 --> 00:54:30.969
I think that the missions and the rule of pentagonal and penetration. One of the questions to be posed when discussing the initial stages of missionary activity in a region

269
00:54:31.040 --> 00:54:34.380
is the order of arrival of penetration.

270
00:54:34.630 --> 00:54:52.710
penetrating colonial agents like, even in Australia, the Western Powers applied every conceivable mode to enter a new area adopting the all rule, Pentagon, five-sided penetration represented by 5 representatives.

271
00:54:53.090 --> 00:55:12.019
missionary commercial representatives, scientists, military adviser and console. What was the order of penetration and of missionary in in particular, in different countries and in Palestine, Holy Land. As a unique case

272
00:55:12.060 --> 00:55:15.490
we discuss this important question elsewhere.

273
00:55:17.120 --> 00:55:27.600
and one of the questions to be posed when discussing the initial stages of missionary activity in the region is the order of Sorry. Yeah.

274
00:55:28.160 --> 00:55:55.219
A fundamentalist denominations relating to liberal and modern theological thinking. Many conservative Protestants came to embrace fundamentalism, which held, among the other things, the Scripture should be taken be taken literally as divinity inspired and accepting a Messianic interpretation of the end of times, including the return of the Jews to Zion.

275
00:55:55.880 --> 00:55:58.590
Here, for example, you have an

276
00:55:58.640 --> 00:56:13.799
map of the spread of Pentecostalism in in the whole world, and there is a huge movement and a total of 333, 9 million. And this is not an updated number, even

277
00:56:14.440 --> 00:56:34.320
converting the Jews to Christianity, has always been an objective of Christian missionary activity, although none coerced conversion of to Christianity was uncommon throughout history. Individuals who did convert were ostracized socially and culturally by the Jewish community.

278
00:56:34.520 --> 00:56:48.039
Motivations for conversion ranged from genuine change of faith to the desire to gain access to certain privileges or acceptance by the surrounding non-jewish society.

279
00:56:48.340 --> 00:57:11.140
So here I start to talk about Palestine, first in the Ottoman period, 1,839 to 1917 the target audience of Christian mission organizations were Muslim citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Although missionary activity was forbidden. A commissioner who was engaged in such activity risked the death penalty.

280
00:57:11.200 --> 00:57:17.769
For this reason the Christian missionary effort became focused on Christian Arab

281
00:57:17.910 --> 00:57:29.080
Arabs of other churches and denominations, such as Roman Catholic, Greek, and other orthodox Armenian Christians and Jews, and not Arab Muslims.

282
00:57:29.220 --> 00:57:45.009
In the eighteenth century the Anglican Church began to develop new theological approaches regarding eschatological prophecies about the salvation of the Jewish people in the length of Israel as a precondition to the second coming of Christ.

283
00:57:45.310 --> 00:57:53.900
It included the final conversion of the Jews. Thus, in 1,809, the London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews

284
00:57:53.940 --> 00:58:00.010
was founded opening branches in Jewish communities around the world, including Palestine.

285
00:58:00.760 --> 00:58:21.929
By the mid nineteenth century the Lgs. Has established several institutions in Palestine, including Christchurch and the English Mission Hospital in Jerusalem, as well as other branches across the country. So one of the reports you see here, and its mission focused on the Jews of Palestine at the beginning.

286
00:58:22.140 --> 00:58:35.540
So here you see some of the Jews, and how they looked in the nineteenth century and the First Church early missionary activity among women. Jewish craft also work in Jerusalem. They used to teach them.

287
00:58:35.910 --> 00:58:47.369
The Lj. Crashed church in Jerusalem was the first Protestant church in the Middle East, and it was built between the years 1,849 and 57.

288
00:58:47.540 --> 00:59:09.470
So here is Christchurch in Jerusalem, which exists until today, and you can visit if you come. And they. They used Hebrew letters, Hebrew sentences to attract Jews to the so a church, as you can see here, Zotas, so the honey, for example, you cannot see it very well. But

289
00:59:10.160 --> 00:59:27.480
in Christchurch we see the trend also reflected in other missionary organizations, a deliberate absence of Christian symbols and a great emphasis on Jewish symbols, so that Jews would not be a deterred from entering the Church.

290
00:59:27.560 --> 00:59:32.650
It is designed to make them feel more like being in a synagogue.

291
00:59:33.250 --> 00:59:37.760
So here you can see the special distribution and map that we designed

292
00:59:37.880 --> 00:59:46.769
of British and German Missionary societies in Palestine, Pre World War one, and mainly in several concentrations.

293
00:59:48.180 --> 00:59:57.310
Dr. Solemnitline, of my former Ph. So then, studied Jewish attitudes and responses to missionary activity in Palestine at the end of the Ottoman period.

294
00:59:57.330 --> 01:00:04.000
and you can see you find responses on one side, banning combat

295
01:00:04.040 --> 01:00:08.799
and competitive to polemic, accept, help and convert.

296
01:00:08.850 --> 01:00:17.570
So it actually helped the Jewish community to be more proactive in several spheres.

297
01:00:17.740 --> 01:00:20.829
The condition on which a Christian missions

298
01:00:20.860 --> 01:00:43.140
operated changed significantly with the British occupation of Palestine in 1,917. Many tasks performed by missionary organisations were now taken over by the British authorities, however, various missionary organisations, mainly Protestant open branches throughout Palestine. The Jewish community strongly opposed missionary activity, and thus

299
01:00:43.140 --> 01:00:52.589
a relatively low number of Jews converted in this period. This led the mainly Protestant missionary efforts to be directed towards

300
01:00:52.720 --> 01:00:54.320
Christian Arabs.

301
01:00:55.050 --> 01:01:14.709
Among the various fundamentalist churches which established mission in Ottoman, in British mandate. Palestin was a Southern Baptist Convention, convention, based in and Atlanta, Georgia. It is the largest Pakistan body in the Us. And operates 4,500 mission churches with 50 million

302
01:01:15.560 --> 01:01:23.550
followers worldwide. An important ideological principle of the Baptist is a separation of Church and State.

303
01:01:24.070 --> 01:01:36.629
A key missionary figure was Reverend Dr. Robert Lindsay in Oklahoma, who had work in Palestine in the 1920 s. And 30 S. A. And

304
01:01:37.090 --> 01:01:44.630
after the end of the World, Second World War, Lindsay was sent to Palestine by the Southern Baptist Convention, and

305
01:01:44.640 --> 01:02:02.219
appointed pastor of the Baptist community in Jerusalem. Lindsay decided to focus on Baptist mission on Jews rather than Arabs, and he changed the name of the Baptist Mission to Baptist House, so that not to deter Jews from entering the church.

306
01:02:02.460 --> 01:02:06.530
So here you can see the Baptist house in Jerusalem.

307
01:02:07.050 --> 01:02:20.229
and he also bought a farm in Israel, and established something similar to a kibbut, which would provide a home for Jews who had converted to Christianity

308
01:02:22.150 --> 01:02:30.629
the establishment of the State of Israel in 1,948, and the mass immigration of Jews in the early years of the State

309
01:02:30.740 --> 01:02:46.280
was seen by many Protestant denominations as the fulfillment of Biblical prophecies, leading Christian missionary organizations to act more vigorously in Israel. With some success in converting more Jews.

310
01:02:46.950 --> 01:02:52.490
Shortly after the State official declared its independence, government authorities

311
01:02:52.660 --> 01:03:10.499
had to decide how to face Christian missionary activity. Certain Foreign Minister officials could contended that Israel must maintain its character as a non-theocratic state and poison to the generally so unsuccessful effort of the missions

312
01:03:11.110 --> 01:03:29.520
countering this, some politicians and officials of the ministry of philosophers argued that the state of Israel had been established in order to preserve the Jewish people and Jewish value against which the Christian mission efforts were directed.

313
01:03:30.210 --> 01:03:50.299
The flight and expansion of of Palestine in 1,948 war meant that Christian population decreased from 140,000 to 34,000 remaining in Israel after the world. Piston missionary organization increased the activity among the Jewish population in Israel.

314
01:03:50.300 --> 01:04:00.830
This was perceived as a threat to the religious and national identity of the Jewish State, especially among religious and ultra-orthodox Jews.

315
01:04:01.240 --> 01:04:17.400
So in the 1950 S. The London Just Society changed the organization's name to another name, Itak, in response, and between 48, and 62. The Anglican Church gave the British Mission Hospital in Jerusalem to the Jewish Hadasa Hospital

316
01:04:17.440 --> 01:04:19.550
a also.

317
01:04:20.210 --> 01:04:43.139
Here you can see the English Mission Hospital, established in 1,896, outside the walls of old the old city of Jerusalem. And actually now it became, since the hospital is not working anymore. It became the Anglican International School. So some figures to show the extent

318
01:04:43.310 --> 01:04:50.049
and actually the rise of missionary activity from the Ottoman period

319
01:04:50.150 --> 01:04:56.709
you can see the Protestant, Catholic and Russian orthodox activities

320
01:04:56.830 --> 01:05:06.670
to the mandate period, which is 1817 to 48, and then from 48 to 67 in the State of Israel, and

321
01:05:06.940 --> 01:05:10.179
from 67 to 2,000.

322
01:05:12.340 --> 01:05:27.579
So during the Ottoman mediative period, there was a visible impact of by the missionary enterprise on the development and infrastructure of the cultural lines of of Palestine. It found expression in the spheres of transportation.

323
01:05:27.680 --> 01:05:37.329
communication, craft, industry, land, purchase, building and architecture, the introduction of modern technology and agricultural settlements, training.

324
01:05:37.350 --> 01:05:41.939
new agricultural methods, etc. This was some positive.

325
01:05:42.060 --> 01:06:00.070
The impact of the missionary activity in the social and cultural arena, as well among the Abs and Juten as first of education, adult education and women's education, language, press and printing, culture, health, welfare, food and dress.

326
01:06:01.210 --> 01:06:05.649
So here you can see a division. Can you see it?

327
01:06:05.900 --> 01:06:07.670
A division?

328
01:06:07.970 --> 01:06:12.510
The different functions

329
01:06:12.690 --> 01:06:22.889
during the 4 sub periods that we are discussing so direct missionary centers, education, self-supporting Institution

330
01:06:23.030 --> 01:06:28.890
Institute, medical services, community facilities, churches, and Worldville.

331
01:06:30.330 --> 01:06:49.499
So to go to the ambivalence again, the Israeli Foreign ministry estimated in 1,967, that there were only 600 Jewish converts of 2 Christians in the country. The ministry of religious affairs believed that the number of conversions was in the thousands, but noted

332
01:06:49.500 --> 01:07:15.999
that many of those who converted officially had done so in order to facilitate their emigration, and consequently had left the country until 77. The religious parties in the Israeli Parliament held less political power, so the Government could try to apply a clear, liberal approach in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, which required freedom of religion

333
01:07:16.280 --> 01:07:25.339
in practice, a development adopted bureaucratic measures led by the Ministry of the Interior to restrict Christian missionary activities

334
01:07:25.760 --> 01:07:45.500
as part of their pro-colorations between the State and Alt orthodox organizations. Thechnicity in 77 enacted 2 sections in the panel code which banned missionary activity that involved any material benefit as well as missionary activities. Among Minos.

335
01:07:45.650 --> 01:07:56.180
However, since 1 77, all Prime ministers of Israel, from the Likud party have maintained close relations with American evangelical elements.

336
01:07:56.200 --> 01:08:03.220
most of which support the state of Israel in Zionism, although they also support missionary activity in Israel.

337
01:08:04.250 --> 01:08:20.790
Jewish circles in Israel have feared that successful missionary efforts would threaten the religious and national identity of the Jewish State. Ours, Jamal stated that the response by the Israeli authorities to missionary activities has been ambivalent.

338
01:08:22.010 --> 01:08:27.399
On one side the state of Israel wishes to avoid damage to foreign

339
01:08:27.480 --> 01:08:45.020
relations with Christian countries which support Israel. It also desires to maintain freedom of religious. However, the State has also sought to restrict missionary activity under pressure from the religious political parties represented in the Kernacet.

340
01:08:45.380 --> 01:08:55.280
the Israeli Parliament, the main opposition to the Christian missions by ultra orthodox Jews. Here you can see a picture of one of the

341
01:08:55.730 --> 01:08:57.390
demonstrations.

342
01:08:57.530 --> 01:09:13.420
and I'll talk only briefly, about 2. First of all is our children Fund. The Aladdino Fund is a non-political child welfare organization established in 53 to provide additional and informal education to the children of new immigrants.

343
01:09:13.460 --> 01:09:31.629
and to help them to integrate into Israeli society the fund built youth clubs across the country, and was a fact of greatly reducing the success of the missionary activity among new immigrants Eladeno received funding and support from the Israel ministry of religious Affairs.

344
01:09:32.170 --> 01:09:41.609
So this is The some brochures and the contribution box of fuel adeno.

345
01:09:42.080 --> 01:09:49.730
and another one, which is a little bit more extreme, called Theadlahim H. 2 brothers.

346
01:09:50.030 --> 01:10:10.360
You can see that symbol, another. It was found in 1,950 by ultra-orthodox rabbies, and with the initial aim of resisting the imposition of secular education for the children of immigrants from Muslim countries. In 1,959 the organization began to separate.

347
01:10:10.430 --> 01:10:14.790
operating a militant mode against missionary activities. Well.

348
01:10:15.320 --> 01:10:22.750
so here you can see one of the B. Shows the mission disaster to the Israeli nation.

349
01:10:23.390 --> 01:10:39.510
Also we found a phenomenon like our son of the Baptist Church in Jerusalem in October 89, and how the orthodox protests against the mission in Alad, which was a new city at that time.

350
01:10:40.240 --> 01:10:41.690
and

351
01:10:42.990 --> 01:11:02.550
in March the twentieth 23. Actually very recently, because of the the composition of the Israeli Government, now a auto-orthodox members of the Nesset, Moshe, Gafni, and Yakov Asher submitted the mission law. They are trying to

352
01:11:02.730 --> 01:11:17.689
proposal to new to the new Israeli Parliament, according to which missionary activities in Israel would be considered a criminal offence. So actually, we are back to the Ottoman period more or less.

353
01:11:17.830 --> 01:11:33.679
The bill caused an uproar. In many Christian countries around the world. Israeli per minister. Benjaminitano addressed the bill, and wrote in Hebrew and English, that we will not advance any law against the Christian community

354
01:11:34.390 --> 01:11:44.570
to conclude. Authorities of the State of Israel have shown a mixed response to missionary activity. Government officials

355
01:11:44.600 --> 01:11:52.679
cultivate ties with Christian countries, churches and missionary organizations. Other government officials

356
01:11:52.850 --> 01:12:06.609
strongly oppose missionary organizations, activities and demand. They be deported from Israel. Some of the activities was and is led by

357
01:12:06.690 --> 01:12:11.289
political parties as well as Ngos. Thank you.

358
01:12:22.820 --> 01:12:30.150
Perfect. Thank you. Oops. Thank you, everyone. so I'll open

359
01:12:30.270 --> 01:12:34.290
to questions in the floor, or even among panelists.

360
01:12:43.750 --> 01:12:47.360
I should also double check if we still have

361
01:12:51.200 --> 01:12:52.440
Jose.

362
01:12:54.630 --> 01:12:55.600
No?

363
01:12:55.890 --> 01:13:01.849
 Well in. Yes, one question. Let me just get them.

364
01:13:13.230 --> 01:13:23.249
Thanks to all the presenters for your presentations. It's been a journey to different countries.

365
01:13:23.250 --> 01:13:48.250
I think that there is a transversal element across all your presentations. And this to me. This, with the role of transnational communities in a change occurred in the different countries from the first presenters to the last. Of course, we can take into account. Different

366
01:13:48.250 --> 01:14:12.040
communities are living abroad, maintaining strong ties, not only social ties, but also economic and political ties with the counters. And these, of course, matter and affect, maybe social change and the perception people. And in the first guys.

367
01:14:12.040 --> 01:14:24.889
young people and other women. And in the last 2 presenters, different social groups interact with the local context. Thanks.

368
01:14:28.640 --> 01:14:30.370
Any comment on that.

369
01:14:34.690 --> 01:14:37.180
Thank you for deserving.

370
01:14:38.420 --> 01:15:08.289
Now, maybe. Yeah. Yeah. So thank you for the comment, yeah, absolutely like the transnational comedies player, though, I think, like, there's also a lot of political learning across countries that the youth is learning from each other. I mean, in my cases they are all obviously Arabic speakers, so there's, you know, not much language barriers in terms of like the social media, and all that. And people learn from each other. I think there is that so? and that is, you know, like emulating what is success or what is not successful in their strategies as special social movements. So yeah, thank you.

371
01:15:13.860 --> 01:15:19.320
Listening to the interesting lecture about the the women in Turkey.

372
01:15:19.970 --> 01:15:29.940
young women, it reminded me, and you may be interested also of a book I read like 1020 years ago

373
01:15:30.070 --> 01:15:45.179
by a Turkish woman called Selma Ekrem. Now the book is called Unveiled Unveiled. and she was the daughter of 2 daughters of the Governor of Jerusalem.

374
01:15:45.300 --> 01:15:55.119
The Ottoman government of Jerusalem between the years 1,906 and 1,908. And then they went back to Turkey.

375
01:15:55.280 --> 01:15:58.790
and his name was Akram Bay.

376
01:15:58.860 --> 01:16:00.580
So Selma Akrim

377
01:16:00.690 --> 01:16:09.490
now, after they came back, her sister was an avid Muslim, and she married a Muslim, and she

378
01:16:09.700 --> 01:16:13.839
sort of practiced whatever is needed in Islam.

379
01:16:13.990 --> 01:16:22.860
and Selma herself emigrated to the United States, and she became very secular and free.

380
01:16:22.870 --> 01:16:28.860
And this is what the book is about. I think if you don't know it, you should read it, but also

381
01:16:28.900 --> 01:16:32.709
for the others. I think it will be but very interesting to read the book.

382
01:16:39.600 --> 01:16:48.579
Yes, so York stalls from the University of Los Angeles. I have a question to the presenter with the paper on the Turkish women.

383
01:16:48.740 --> 01:17:17.150
 it was very interesting. It was also very fast, so I don't. so I don't know if I understood everything, but if I understood correctly, you you mainly focused on the individual strategies of these women. So so how they manage to to work around these norms.

384
01:17:17.430 --> 01:17:33.460
But my, so my question is, do you also see? A a general change across all these women, you know, are these new strategies that weren't there before? Is there some liberalizing in here? Is there something different?

385
01:17:34.850 --> 01:17:40.930
Actually, I cannot say that there is a really big change.

386
01:17:41.110 --> 01:17:56.939
And also some of the surveys, like really big surveys, like conducting once per 5 years in Turkey about being conservative. Being religious

387
01:17:56.950 --> 01:18:24.020
in Turkey, it shows that no, there is no like secularization among the youth, like among the pious youth, actually because they specifically in a part of the survey, asked to pious women in Turkey, pious people, pious youth in Turkey, but there is no like like how to say secularization, or like they just.

388
01:18:24.180 --> 01:18:35.440
they just don't become like non-religious. Not at all. But we can say that after the Gdp came to power

389
01:18:35.440 --> 01:19:00.969
they just can utilize the all the economic capital and cultural capital that they gain after the, you know, participating to public space after they lifting the Hatscarf ban. Especially so they are changing their lifestyles, but they are, you know, Facing with some challenges, with the

390
01:19:00.970 --> 01:19:28.329
assumptions of the secular people on the Muslim women, and also the the sanctions of the religious community, too, among again to on the Muslim young women again. But I am seeing that they are answering to these assumptions in order to enhance their space in public areas, in the cultural and social settings.

391
01:19:28.330 --> 01:19:39.519
But no, I don't see any changes. I mean, this is not my the research question. But in my field work I didn't see any like big changes on the secularization.

392
01:19:39.670 --> 01:19:41.099
They they just

393
01:19:43.140 --> 01:20:02.339
it. It is good to have a you know a question if you just do your first presentation when you're like. Thank you. That was no, thank you, because I do have a question. That was my first question, and I won't forget that. Thank you.

394
01:20:03.370 --> 01:20:08.020
I also have a question that I'm going to be the second one.

395
01:20:08.150 --> 01:20:14.510
I have a question for you and also for Sn.

396
01:20:14.660 --> 01:20:17.540
well, for for Aj.

397
01:20:17.550 --> 01:20:32.360
so do you perceive any sort of online activity or online interaction of these women in. I don't know any sort of interest. Cultural interests, music.

398
01:20:32.360 --> 01:20:40.579
anything. You' this square. Yes, I'm asking this, because recently I've read a paper precisely making this point where there is

399
01:20:40.580 --> 01:21:05.459
online active, a lot of online activity that sometimes it's not projected in life experiences. And like, you want me to share the link or stuff. Or just you're just asking things. No, yeah. And I'm just asking, and I can, yeah, what kind of of of they have? Yeah, they had in and during the pandemics. But no, they don't do any more. They just, you know, just in person. They just go there and

400
01:21:05.690 --> 01:21:21.270
to the concerts. But they have the Instagram pages, and not just after, I think after that band, a few like little bands in the Turkey, not in Istanbul, but in other cities like that emerged.

401
01:21:21.440 --> 01:21:31.910
They have like Facebook pages and the Instagram profiles. I guess I don't use them. But I can just check and tell you what's going on there.

402
01:21:32.440 --> 01:21:51.009
Yeah, for me, it was just interesting in terms of protection. Yeah, there is also there is also like some interviews and the news about them in the BBC BBC Uk. And you can check them. I can just share with you. I mean, it is an animalizing out here, but I can just share

403
01:21:51.150 --> 01:21:52.440
what you like.

404
01:21:53.170 --> 01:22:01.000
Thank you. And for us. And I was just also wondering if by any chance you explored

405
01:22:01.310 --> 01:22:13.759
from my understanding, we saw this sort of disidentification, right? With religion. We showed some data on sort of a political dynamics. But

406
01:22:13.790 --> 01:22:31.650
if by any chance you you could see augmentation or or the growth in other kind of collective activities, either cultural or any other sort of of activity that might give us some clue on what's happening, because then

407
01:22:32.400 --> 01:22:37.429
it's possible that it's going somewhere else. So if you have any

408
01:22:39.920 --> 01:23:09.229
yeah, I mean there is more level is like I didn't mentioned here. But there's in terms of questions in terms of gender and sexuality and marriage. There's quite a change that they basically are much more, you know, like love marriages like more, more more in, you know. Fear of that. So there is that, you know, like, in terms of more private lives, and then much more egalitarian in some meals, you know. so there is some small, not like big, but like small changes that I'm seeing. I also looked in terms of

409
01:23:09.330 --> 01:23:19.049
Also, like what? Like political activism, because post activism is so authoritarian in these settings, they don't. And they they kind of like, have

410
01:23:19.190 --> 01:23:32.080
lost faith in institutional politics, a lot of them. So they don't think like anything that they will do will change anything. And then you look at the immigration numbers in numbers of people who want to youth who want to emigrate. And it's like 70%. And up

411
01:23:32.480 --> 01:23:38.320
so like, it is like. They are deeply unhappy with how politics is done, and they don't see a solution happening

412
01:23:38.880 --> 01:23:49.689
in at the institutional setting. So there is some political activism in that. But like it's not, and they don't think that they can not change it. So instead, they want to leave and be done. Yeah.

413
01:23:50.310 --> 01:23:53.300
thank you. Thank you is.

414
01:23:58.770 --> 01:24:03.910
yes, I just have a comment on the Iran paper.

415
01:24:04.560 --> 01:24:10.370
So I thought that was really interesting to see that the

416
01:24:11.320 --> 01:24:19.050
the interpretation of social justice seems to change. I just wondered. So you said you would want to make

417
01:24:19.170 --> 01:24:20.390
it

418
01:24:20.490 --> 01:24:24.920
in-depth interviews with some people, and

419
01:24:25.360 --> 01:24:39.199
I was not sure how that would actually help your your research, because if you I mean your your thesis is about your overtime big changes in the interpretation of social justice.

420
01:24:39.310 --> 01:24:43.460
So if you then do a few interviews

421
01:24:43.570 --> 01:24:55.000
sort of one shot at 1 point in time. I guess you will not be able to to show that your hypothesis is correct. I guess what you would need would be some kind of

422
01:24:55.240 --> 01:24:57.149
the corpus of

423
01:24:57.390 --> 01:25:06.739
of texts that show that that this change that you hypothesize is actually there. So I just wondered if you have any reaction to that.

424
01:25:14.170 --> 01:25:28.970
It works. Okay, thank you for the comment. In fact, my research is not really on the normative understanding of social justice. It is on the individuals, interpretation and understanding of social justice.

425
01:25:29.040 --> 01:25:41.729
and as a motivation to take distance from the institutionalized religion in Iran. It is the the title of my topic, but there is no way that I

426
01:25:41.860 --> 01:25:51.190
cannot focus on the normative part to just explain what's social justice in Iran about

427
01:25:51.400 --> 01:26:00.519
in the normative, I mean interpretations, and after that. by making him in depth, in interviews with individuals.

428
01:26:00.680 --> 01:26:02.830
a number of individuals. I can

429
01:26:02.850 --> 01:26:20.929
understand better this distance which leads people to take distance from that framework which is. But it's not necessarily. It is from just from taking distance from the institutional and religion in Iran

430
01:26:21.040 --> 01:26:25.510
by a way of social justice, by the understanding of social justice.

431
01:26:29.980 --> 01:26:31.490
No question.

432
01:26:32.610 --> 01:26:38.720
I would like to ask what I'm Israeli and

433
01:26:39.070 --> 01:26:48.039
you said about the Palestine. And if you can explain us the differences that one's

434
01:26:48.600 --> 01:26:49.850
the

435
01:26:50.090 --> 01:27:08.069
the changes, because the Palestine at the ancient time was for Jewish, and now the name of Palestine is one of the conflict. Inism. If you can explain us the the changes in the East, we for not too much, but

436
01:27:09.700 --> 01:27:17.379
I think this is a topic for another session, and another lecture of at least 1 2 h.

437
01:27:17.510 --> 01:27:21.070
but in general, I mean Palestine.

438
01:27:21.130 --> 01:27:26.700
During the Ottoman period, which began. It was a 500 years

439
01:27:26.790 --> 01:27:32.560
rule of the Empire, from 1,517 to 19

440
01:27:32.690 --> 01:27:34.300
17,

441
01:27:34.560 --> 01:27:45.119
and it was part of a very big empire which included North Africa and the Middle East, and even parts of Europe. The Balkan, for example.

442
01:27:45.460 --> 01:27:52.579
And then you know that after the First World War, actually the Middle East was divided

443
01:27:52.650 --> 01:28:15.410
between the conquering powers, the Western conquering power powers. So France, for example, got a mandate in Lebanon and Syria and Britain, United Kingdom. They got a a mandate in in Palestine and in Iraq, and

444
01:28:15.450 --> 01:28:26.530
they were also partially a ruling Egypt from 1,882 already. So then all these States got their independence.

445
01:28:26.810 --> 01:28:35.020
and in 1,947 the United Nations decided to divide

446
01:28:35.090 --> 01:28:41.279
what was called Palestine, historic, and Palestine. which was in the early

447
01:28:41.310 --> 01:28:46.079
history a Jewish State to

448
01:28:46.630 --> 01:28:50.890
2 States, then Arab State and the Jewish State.

449
01:28:51.090 --> 01:28:59.960
This was the United Nations decision, which was not accepted by the Arab surrounding States.

450
01:29:00.100 --> 01:29:09.090
So we have a situation that's 7 different Arab States just

451
01:29:09.800 --> 01:29:21.160
from started a war with the Jews who are in Palestine in the Jewish state. and this the results of the were very tragic, as you know.

452
01:29:21.250 --> 01:29:38.080
because there are many are refugees who were promised by the armies who actually invaded that just leave, and then will throw the Jews into the Mediterranean, and then you can come back.

453
01:29:38.290 --> 01:29:39.999
This did not happen.

454
01:29:40.030 --> 01:29:56.220
and so parts of this area was conquered by a part of the what was supposed to be the Arabs. It was also conquered by the Jewish state, and the Arabs had to

455
01:29:56.430 --> 01:30:09.369
run, or because of the war also, and some of them went to refugee camps in Lebanon, in Jordan, in the Gaza Strip.

456
01:30:09.700 --> 01:30:12.259
And we have this conflict

457
01:30:12.350 --> 01:30:21.990
until today. It's a very big problem which, first of all, I'm not optimistic.

458
01:30:22.320 --> 01:30:26.539
but I cannot talk about it in such a short time, Sally.

459
01:30:28.450 --> 01:30:35.420
Just one comment about the 2 papers on your papers, and that I was thinking

460
01:30:35.520 --> 01:30:47.400
it. It will be very interesting if you continue your study on Turkey now. because Egypt and the findings of your study on Egypt and the Morocco

461
01:30:47.420 --> 01:30:54.860
were very different from health study on Turkey. So is this because of the policy of er the one

462
01:30:54.980 --> 01:31:10.140
that is, is Islamicizing the the country, because I was several times in Turkey, and I saw, even in the most remote places, I was even all the way to the Kurdish Akari and to South Turkey and north.

463
01:31:10.150 --> 01:31:15.790
that Black Sea in every corner of the one built a mosque.

464
01:31:16.490 --> 01:31:25.829
So I think maybe the findings of your study on the women and the young women has also to do with that with the general

465
01:31:25.960 --> 01:31:28.730
Islamization of society in Turkey.

466
01:31:28.940 --> 01:31:37.289
and it will be really interesting to combine if if you do, a combined study. Now on on what happens. And compare.

467
01:31:40.670 --> 01:31:53.240
I actually have a paper on Turkey and Religiosity, which is a yeah, I do in a different, you know, from a couple of years ago. So yeah, but which is basically about like

468
01:31:53.890 --> 01:32:08.499
that I mean the joke Ib is we have for Turkish. Islam basically is Friday mornings are Mecca Friday nights are Las Vegas so like that there's this, you know, like new understanding of, you know religion that is emerging. So that's the one sentence version of it.

469
01:32:08.950 --> 01:32:10.700
So yeah, thank you.

470
01:32:10.809 --> 01:32:11.559
Yeah.

471
01:32:13.260 --> 01:32:18.690
perfect, very interesting interaction. any more questions.

472
01:32:21.309 --> 01:32:23.870
Yes, a couple of questions

473
01:32:23.910 --> 01:32:26.860
I you to

474
01:32:27.150 --> 01:32:31.810
at you. Ok? So I have a question for Echin for for us, and

475
01:32:32.219 --> 01:32:36.109
which is quite the same, and a question for Ruth.

476
01:32:36.240 --> 01:32:41.720
which is about the classifications. I mean that when we

477
01:32:41.830 --> 01:32:59.450
talk about kind of individual understanding, or when we talk about non-religion, is it kind of it as a as a large group. Okay? So which that many subgroups can fall into this category category of non-religion, or

478
01:32:59.490 --> 01:33:07.210
 I mean that not religion or not a non religion. People can be

479
01:33:07.260 --> 01:33:09.709
divided into different categories. I mean.

480
01:33:09.910 --> 01:33:13.169
have you been interested in just

481
01:33:13.620 --> 01:33:16.150
taking kind of more?

482
01:33:16.620 --> 01:33:18.400
Precisely

483
01:33:19.000 --> 01:33:30.329
if there are any categories how they and identify themselves into the large category of non religion or individual understanding? Can we just make categories.

484
01:33:30.910 --> 01:33:32.209
and

485
01:33:32.670 --> 01:33:40.259
that the question quickly for Ruth is that when we say that diverse responses

486
01:33:40.420 --> 01:33:41.709
to

487
01:33:41.780 --> 01:33:45.690
missionary activities again.

488
01:33:45.750 --> 01:34:02.619
it is very general. Okay, diverse diverse responses can be, say, what are these diverse responses? And what are those different missionary activities? And can we make kind of any connection between what type of activity and what kind of response.

489
01:34:04.850 --> 01:34:29.699
Sure. in terms of classifications of non-religious. I should look at 3 different types of religiosity. In a sense, one of them is self-identification. Better yourself by them. Why is religious or not? There's a very clear decline in that, but not really in terms of religious interpretation. So people are still, you know very much, you know, kind of like adopt very, you know, kind of like orthodox in a sense, interpretations

490
01:34:29.700 --> 01:34:37.940
and in terms of religious behavior. Better. You go to mosque. prey fast, and so on. People seem to be divided on that one.

491
01:34:37.940 --> 01:34:41.709
So Those are the 3 layers I'm looking at. So thank you.

492
01:34:43.799 --> 01:35:06.689
my study was like, as you see, more focuses on how they interpret the religion they religion, I mean how they live. Their tradition, the the religion, as a tradition. So I in the heart of the Jesus, I asked them, and I interpret it

493
01:35:06.690 --> 01:35:36.250
that I ask them how they self-identify? I mean how they identify themselves like such as like modern. I mean, I had like subtitles, as as as far as I remember, it's not here, but it was modern. They were calling like conservative, like wailed pious, or just Muslim or feminist Muslims.

494
01:35:36.270 --> 01:35:53.860
So I just had subtitles like that. But they I think, are like going far away from Calling themselves as Islamist because of the you know how it sounds like after the

495
01:35:54.100 --> 01:35:56.189
what's happened in the Us.

496
01:35:56.210 --> 01:36:17.920
And they more called like modern Muslim and sometimes pious. But they say that. Okay, I'm not enough pious, because you know that I don't use like like Black's car, or I just use like, so you know how to say, like, it's, it's just yeah, it not the job, but just

497
01:36:17.920 --> 01:36:29.989
small. Just cover their hats and stuff. That's why they just call modern, but none of them call themselves as non-believers. So all of them were just Muslims.

498
01:36:30.020 --> 01:36:31.550
Yeah, that's the answer.

499
01:36:33.600 --> 01:36:39.149
So talking about the diversity. I think I already

500
01:36:39.360 --> 01:36:45.489
spoke about it, that the main opposition to the missionary activity

501
01:36:45.550 --> 01:36:48.330
comes from the ultra-orthodox Jews.

502
01:36:48.630 --> 01:36:54.149
and there are Ngos as well. Some of them are more militant, some of them less monitored.

503
01:36:54.290 --> 01:37:01.530
the rest of the Jewish population in Israel the traditional they are not alt orthodox.

504
01:37:01.750 --> 01:37:10.369
so they malice, except they are not very happy, but they accept their activity.

505
01:37:10.690 --> 01:37:14.630
and I think that it very much depends

506
01:37:14.820 --> 01:37:23.810
on the power because we are a democratic country, and we have a lot of problems of very many small parties.

507
01:37:24.030 --> 01:37:31.580
And sometimes you have a coalition that even if the religious parties are not very big.

508
01:37:31.980 --> 01:37:37.010
they have to sort of even sometimes, like, I say, blackmail

509
01:37:37.020 --> 01:37:43.419
the government to do different things like this law that was suggested very recently.

510
01:37:43.560 --> 01:37:51.940
and Netanyahu is in a big problem with his coalition. So he said, no, but he may

511
01:37:52.130 --> 01:37:54.840
may behave differently. We don't know.

512
01:37:55.170 --> 01:38:04.749
So this is more or less, I think the situation there is a for example, there is a very interesting group called Messianic Jews.

513
01:38:05.100 --> 01:38:09.349
They are not. They don't call them such Christians, but they believe in Jesus.

514
01:38:09.570 --> 01:38:23.579
so you can see that they are growing slowly around the country. Most of them are Jews. They even go. They serve in the Israeli army, and they consider themselves as Jews, but they are Messianic Jews.

515
01:38:23.620 --> 01:38:26.220
and there is some.

516
01:38:26.420 --> 01:38:31.340
Some groups are very opposing to their activity as well.

517
01:38:31.550 --> 01:38:43.410
So there was even one incident where a mine or something, a bomb, was set in one of the apartments of Messianic Jews family.

518
01:38:43.650 --> 01:38:47.159
So it's a life is complicated.

519
01:38:50.350 --> 01:38:58.800
Well, I think that we will end here. I'll just ask again, like some applause for the panelists.

520
01:39:01.150 --> 01:39:10.000
Thank you. Also, one of the the online attendants. Thank you all for the interesting presentations. And thank you again.