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There's a lot in a line, one or 4. Meetings. Yeah.

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Very good afternoon to all of you. Including those who are present online.

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The system now is policing and punishment in global perspective.

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The topic is definitely one of Noise was coming up by the presenters.

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Though directly Policing is not connected with management but in the Rosses of criminal justice administration police as one of the limbs of criminal justice administration definitely having its role and how it is in the operation, the policing.

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Impact on punishment in global perspective we have 4 presenters. Fast one, Natal. Department of Police.

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Litality in Braille. The second, barriers to accessing the criminal justice services in post Apart from South Africa, Rplexan on the policing system.

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Hard one from Online

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Quentest Dutch Last arms deal up page Youep it. Commentarya Elish Sorry Mexico And the last one.

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. J. Do deciphering the Phoenix police and criminal justice in the face of authoritarian temptations.

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She'll start with the past, it is picker nuttle. Everyone will be given 20 min for presentation.

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And after all we'll finish we'll go for Go send answers to each one separately and then we may have some concluding remarks from me and Honored.

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So let us start with Not all the determinants of police. Vitality in Brazi.

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So nettle please.

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Okay, it's not just go for it.

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So, I just. We'll begin to just say good afternoon or good morning or good night.

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So everyone. I'm Adiya Jeani Natal. I'm now a postdoc of the Priest Research Institute of Shenfoot and here today I will discuss the issue of police locality in Brazil.

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And as many as you know, Brazilian police locality is, well, worldwide, no. It's a country with historical background of slavery, introductory regimes and asymmetric relations of power.

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And it becomes as no surprise that with a background like that, the violence has became the language and the instrument for authorities.

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And today we will delve into the phenomenon of the police killings in Brazil. And we will try to understand a little bit better about the dynamics, the trends, variations, and especially how police brutality and mortality is related to other factors.

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So I will start. By examining the national level data. As we can see here over the past decade Brazil has witnessed a disturbing trend of Brazil has witnessed a disturbing trend of increasing and police killings.

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The numbers have rising almost 200% in one decade, suppressing levels there are already very high. And these are just absolute numbers and there is also the rate in some marks there.

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And, we need to consider this. We need to consider the country political landscape to understand this trend.

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So we can see here the country political landscape to understand this trend. So we can see here at the bottom of the chart There is a timeline that I identify those presidents in office during those years.

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So we begin here with Duma Housa first and second term for 2,011 to 14 and then on 2,016 she was in pitch.

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And this period when I have horror, we already have the beginning of increasing, but this were the lowest point in our decade.

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And then going further we have Dumaroussev removed from office and Michelle Temer assumed as the President.

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And notably during his years in office. We have an escalate of police mortality in the country.

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And Tamar, this new president, he has a new agenda for the country. Particularly regarding to public security.

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Particularly regarding to public security. He adopts a more rash approach and especially particularly regarding to public security.

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He adopts a more rash approach to public security. He adopts a more rash approach and especially he adopted a more rash approach and especially he point military personnel to key positions of power regarding public security.

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Then in 2,019 we have both on our gerbils tomorrow at Solomon office and as the president and he has a platform.

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Oppalent support for police use of that deadly force. And even during the Coronavirus pandemic period when other violent crimes were dropping during the decrease of mobility.

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We had the numbers of people killed by the police remaining considerably high. So this this frame suggests that the political scene has a significant influence on the use of force by the police.

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And but it's crucial to remember that in Brazil police forces there is established and they are command at a local state level.

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So, Brazil is a federative country. We find the 7 states and go up with 27 governors.

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With considerable autonomy. And they are responsible for public security and in those states. They are responsible primarily for the main police forces.

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We have at state level, the military police who is responsible for preserving the order, food patrol and crime prevention.

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And also another police force that is the civil police that is responsible for investigation. Our focus here on this research and everything that I talk from now on, it's only about the military police.

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The military police acting in dirty during office hours. So this is our focus mostly because 84% of the police killings happen in this contest.

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Military police officers in Duri. And the map that you can see here, it's you have the divisions of the 27 states and this slide shows the average rate of people killed by the police by the military police on Dudi over the decades.

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So this is just, average number for the whole decade. But we can see here that there is significant variation.

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And that police letality, it's not distributed uniformly in the country. So this varied through space and time.

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And we want to understand a little bit how this variation occur or what would help us to explain this variation and that's why we need to consider some contextual factors and variables.

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So my main research question here, it's very simple and straightforward. I want to understand what are the determinants of police letality in Brazil.

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What variables help us to understand the numbers that I just showed to you? So I understand that we need to consider ideally I would need to consider several factors.

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Historical legacy, the social structure of the country, the characteristics of the police force in self, situational and political aspects.

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All this could influence the use of force by the police. So we will explore some of these elements that could shape this reality, but of course we don't have variables to measure all of this.

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So there are limitations here. But even so, based on the existing literature and available data, we developed some several hypotheses to be tests through inferential models.

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So I will work with 3 main hypothesis to explain the police locality in Brazil. The first is what I call a structural hypothesis.

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This perspective suggests that the police use of violence is a fact No, yeah, fact, specific segments of the population and especially in contests of economical social and racial inequalities.

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This means that the leads we use the police to control and subjugate groups. They are considering threatening or to their class social racial interests and in this aspect I would expect to find a positive relations between police lethality indicator and variable such economic inequality, unemployment, the presence of non-white population.

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The second hypothesis is what I call the TREAT hypothesis. In this perspective, the incidence of police locality will reflect a threatening and violent contest.

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So when the police think or feel that they are acting in a violent environment, they were more trying to use the violence as a response, let's say so.

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So police Latar would be more like a consequence somehow or a reaction to a criminal violence contest against the police in self or against other citizens.

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And in this sense, I would expect the police locality would be associated with high levels of criminal violent numbers such homicide, drug traffic, robbery and also with police victimization.

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So when you have police officers being attacked, also they will expect more police locality. And the third and hypothesis and final hypothesis is the police call ideological one.

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So in this perspective, I will analyze the influence of national governors and national politicians and also governors at a local level on the use of deadly force by the police.

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So in this hypothesis I will expect that politicians there are more linked to a left or central left orientation would would have would show less lowest number of locality and also the ones who have a more repressive harsh type of agenda would show also high levels of lettuce.

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So regarding the methodology. I will, we. We are working, I am talking, we because this is a bigger research.

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I'm just collecting one part of it. This is a Brazilian study but there is another researcher doing a Philippine study in the same, in the same framework.

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So we discuss all the methodology and the hypothesis together, of course. So we are working with a database with repeat observations.

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So I have 11 years. A recorder for 25 fixed unities, the present states. So I have 2, 197 observations.

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And in statistical terms, what I'm proposing doing here is a time series cross analysis. So I'm symmetennialist combining spatial and temporal dimensions to the same model.

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I'm using Moose Progression Data Modeling and this was performed using our studio with a packets that handle piano data and with random effects and all the variables were standardized to make the compares more easy.

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So let's. Dive into the results. Oh, I'm sorry.

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I just, I always skip the variables just because I would talk about all of them more in detail.

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With the results, but if you have questions after I'll be glad to talk about it. So let's prove formalize some of those results.

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Our model they incorporate. Variables that relate to the structural, the threat and the political hypothesis that I just showed to you.

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I list all the variables that I test here, but the final model that I'm presenting just exclude those who know who has no effect to reduce the noise so I'm just the final order just consider the results of this who had it's a specific significance.

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So regarding the model one regarding the structural hypothesis. Our analysis include population that is just a proxy for Bernardization just to see if police equality is more common in more urbanized states.

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Also economic inequality. There is genie index. And racial composition of the state. In this case is the percentage of white in the population of its state.

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And, unemployment rates. And in this model, the only relationship that I found was with unemployment.

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So this means that There is a relationship between economic crisis and the police locality. Police tend to kill Mark people during times of economic instability.

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And on the other hand, population density, inequality and racial demographic did not present our relationship with the police locality.

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And this week some of the more traditional structural arguments. Regarding the track hypothesis as my model number 2 we found that the high rates of violent bets and drug trafficking are significant associate with the police locality.

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So many and many of the and also like firearm carrying and carjacking are not. I try to use other data but I don't I didn't have data for all the states for all the years.

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So this is our just one that I have to cover my whole period. So these 2 type of crime violent deaths and drug trafficking, these are very linked to the actions of organized crime.

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So in this sense, there are elements to consider the police locality of course in contests where the organized crime is present and is violent or is in the moment of violent actions.

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In this contest, police officers may feel more insecure or more willing to use okay I'm just so.

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I'm more willing to use lethal force and the. So I'm more willing to use lethal force and anticipation for violent actions.

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And also police totality could be a deliberate strategy to control and to to control organized crime and detriment of investigations strategy and the due process.

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Also police victimisation that the military police officers kill variable also does not show a relationship. This indicate the police letality could not be explained by the police officers reactions to attack that they may suffer.

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And a number of police officers per capita also don't show an effect and this would indicate that police being under staff.

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Or feeling outnumber also don't make them more violent. And the final hypothesis, the political ideological hypothesis, we incorporate variables such the governor party ideology if the governor is from a left-wing party and per capita public security spending, governor platform and the presence of Jerry Bolsonaro and

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office. So our results indicate that here at state level, the ideological orientation of the governor parties if it belongs to a center left party does not affect police totality.

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So party's programmatic agenda does not necessarily guide the actions of donors in a sense to create more control of police violence and police actions.

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On the other hand, public security spending, much of money that each state is spending on public security has been strongly associated with police lethality.

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In a positive relationship. So this means the lethality is higher in states with more significance and well-pricaptist spending on security.

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And this indicated that the governors spend most of security precisely the ones they are that commend the police to act more violent.

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So, okay, we know that they spend money, but we don't know exactly how and to try to capture this, I use a data about the governor plans.

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So every candidate in Brazil to run for office they need to present a plan to governor to cover and I analyze those documents with their help of a great research assistant.

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Thanks, Milady. And I classify all those documents concerning the infrastructure, human resources and the agendas if they are presenting a more repressive or more preventive approach.

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I give points to several aspects and then I create a score to classify those governor plans. And the result shows that.

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The golfers that were elected with a well structured platform for public security. They promise they have plans to bear resources, equipment, vehicles, new unities, technical improvements, better pay working conditions.

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Those governments who worry more, let's say, about those topics. I related, I have results of more police locality.

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So this means that politicians who worry about those issues are precisely the ones who worry about those issues are precisely the ones who worry about those issues are precisely the ones who are worry about those issues are precisely the ones who worry about those issues are precisely the ones who are about those issues are precisely the ones who are the more oppressive or who show more oppressive

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type of policy. And when it comes to the type of platform as comes as no surprise that the ones who has more repressive platforms and plans that mention crime fighting, creating repressive unities, doing a lot of police operation and also have a language, a very repressive vocabulary.

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They have high rates of police letality also. And the more the governors that show a more preventive platform community police, reduce of vitality, control of the police through police and bootsmen, goes to reduce homicide, a very preventive vocabulary.

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They are not associated with lower levels of vitality as I expect this indicate a challenge to really control totality even when you when you have a platform for this.

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And finally, the presence of Jerry Bolsonaro in the presidential office implies high rates of police locality.

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This is due to this his punitive position, tolerance and consensus to the police to act violent. Finally, just in general, the just our square of our regression analysis shows that the Model 3 explained around 41% of the variation in police totality which shows the importance of the variables that included the model.

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Of course there are a lot of limits here and a lot of challenge. I understand that this is a partial nor exhaustive model.

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This is a natural limitation of this type of analysis and also because many relevant variables could not be operationalized or I don't have data about it, but it's still, I think we have results to show some of the variables they are important.

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And this shows that this police locality is a motor dimension event and the regression analysis reaffirm this is a much casual that have structural situation and political variables that could contribute for the situation the way it is.

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So my my time is about to end so I just thank you very much for the attention and I welcome any kind of feedback, insights questions, everything that you can have regardless research because I didn't publish it, so there's time for me to change all things.

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Thank you.

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Okay.

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Thank you, Dr. Nuta. Our next presentation. So I think you have already shall start.

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Okay.

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So. But. Oh, okay.

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I'm sorry.

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Oh good afternoon everyone.

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And make out of your hand from Watter Sisulu University in South Africa. We title of my presentation today is barriers to accessing Criminal Justice Services in South Africa.

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Are used policing as an entry point because there is no way I was able to eat just in one clip.

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Consider all the criminal justice systems one can do it for correction one can do it for the for the court but because I've been working policy for a long time.

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Yeah. The point I want to make here are what I've really done here. Is more like an overview of the situation in South Africa and for us to see the progress that has been made.

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Says the democratic era in 1994 as we are away, South Africa just came up from it from 1,994.

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A new dispensation was born and we expect that a lot of changes should have occurred.

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You know particularly in the democratic issues like policing and all that Yeah, without boring you about the background, information about the country, the country of course is where there is inequality one of the unequal societies in the world.

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It has one of the most comprehensive and we are proud to have very progressive constitution. But.

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He's finding this constitution is assumption that the state provides citizens with equal access to criminal justice. Which is foundation of democracy we all know but still what extent is this true We know that in the South African past We never talked about equality to justice, of course.

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Was racialized. But with the new democratic dispensation. That is an It does a given assumption that yes, things should be different.

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So, there are a few things as I mentioned. I didn't do further regressions, analysis, empirical or that.

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This presentation is actually meant to foreground further studies we want to do. Just trying to give just worth your appetite on what is going to come in future in in couple of months or years to come we put it up there but this is just a scoping is that scoping over view.

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Based on what exists in literature. So currently what we know about access to police system in the country is that there is availability.

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Of course, more police stations have been. Built and you could see police. Yeah, service in terms of you know personnel and What you need as far as policies concerned.

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But Going with that is limited access. And inequality. Presently there is no equality in the sense that people are treated differently but this time around not on racial ground.

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Mainly. But now another variable quizzes the economy. I mean socio economic status somehow kind of plays an important role.

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And how the police listens to you. Previously during apartheid it was racialized black white but now is another way again so It appears we are not yet out of the wood.

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Because it's like a substituting something with something else.

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And then there's also poor quality where there is access. Many people do complain about how they're treated.

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I've done quite a number of studies with my students. About how the police receive You know, complain and air complaints from complement at the church office.

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Front office what happens especially with regard to the GBV rape and other other kind of

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Cases and then We have found that mostly citizens and willingness to engage the police. Engage the police, people have problems.

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They have they are victims but they are reluctant to call the police because of what they think police will do.

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Perhaps police will not help them. I was even surprised yesterday when I spoke to some colleagues from the US.

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And one other one from the UK. But, we actually believe that in the developed countries that police is more friendly than in the developing countries.

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No, that is the same everywhere. So I was a bit shocked. Now, having known what what is prevailing The South African past criminal justice system.

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Before the end of apartheid in 1,994. Was actually was racialized.

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And it was colonized policy structures because what we had after colonial period in 1948 was I budget I said.

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I system of governance and policing was a parted in a sense that there was what we call policing the people and policing for the people.

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The color, people of color we are police. And the police was for the other race group.

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So like policing the people and policing for the people. So this is a concept that one can really explore more.

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I've explored them in my literature previously. And now we still have a greater system and also limited access to criminal justice into some categories of people, the bloods, the Indians.

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The colors and the others while some other groups like the privileged you know, white group. Then had the better access and the better listening is.

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Okay, so this was a program of what they existed, but today What do we know and what has really changed?

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Has anything changed? Well, we found that, yes, the demographics have changed. No doubt about that.

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We just looked at the demographic. You see that there are more people other than the whites now.

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In the high action of Police structure. That one is given so the demographics, both in number, both in positions and everything.

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There is a great change. We cannot deny that.

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It is now minimally ratio. In the sense that I don't think. Rochelle or race is a serious issue as far as the pollution is concerned now.

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Remember the majority is now at the ham. Of a face so before it was the minority that was at hem of the police structure, by its majority black.

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So, could not be an issue. But I know there might be some underground something like that but it's not really seen very strongly and there is No segregated police structure again like because there is no group area act again.

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People live anywhere that you can live anywhere, you can live anywhere. You'll act again. People leave anywhere.

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You can have your house anyway, unlike before. Meaning that there's no police station for a different group.

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And another police. For another group, you know, because of or as a result or function of where you live in.

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But previously that was the case. Where definitely you cannot go into the other police station to make complaint because you don't belong there.

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So now, there is nothing like that again. There is no segregation. So that has changed.

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But what has not changed? Policing principles. I will just talk minimally about certain in terms of certain categories of people.

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Providing more services to certain categories of people. Previously in Apache time it was policing 4.

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The privileged population. And policing the Less privilege population. That's what I call in my most of my studies.

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That was my coinage. But presently there is still something like that but as I mentioned at the beginning of this presentation It is now being replaced by economic status.

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Where the more you are privileged, the more you may have the ears of the police. Than the other, yes social categories like the the lower income people So that has not changed.

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It means the principle and the ideals of the principles of policing. Has not really fundamentally changed if we really look at the equality and acts of assets too.

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To the police service. Has they changed to me it has not? What has What has happened now is they flip.

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Of race then economic situation so it's like in the main. I don't think anything has really changed fundamentally.

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Because of what we say. Well, there are sudden barriers, things we scoped out to be barriers in, there are 3 of them.

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One is system barriers. Then we have clientele barriers and what we call social climate barriers. Within the system barriers i mean this is the barriers that we found to really be as a function of the police itself.

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The police organization itself. Some of the things that really make people make police unapproachable. This is not being used.

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People don't even get there. One is the police system's internal contradictions and paradoxes.

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You know, this can be unpacked to quite a number of things. The system is like a system against ISAF.

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Internal contradictions. I don't want to go into magazines here or whatever, but we know that no system can survive.

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When there is seed of his own destruction within it. So the police unfortunately has that. There is, you know, sometimes lack of a spirit decor, you know.

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Inside has discordance and a lot of things happening. The police organization is police professionalism and culture.

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We know the in heritage culture of police against the people and people against the police. Is still there and how the police is organized, the professionalism.

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Similarly, there seems to be the professionalisation of police is under table and has been on the table.

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But I am not sure that that has really happened the extent the people wanted to be so there's also commodification of policing.

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Promodification here, please, I wouldn't want us to understand it as a You buy police with money.

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No. I'm using a different concept of commodification when I looked at the literature. This is about I'm not going to reification as well, but this is looking at a service.

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As something you can exchange for favor, but not just of cash. And that's where it comes when someone of a high economic status works into the police, for instance.

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I mean the police officers see their service as something you know you want to do favor to. That person done a poor person worked in.

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So it's like, this my profession is commodified. But not that they're collecting money, I'm not saying that.

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But now it's kind of the service becoming something you can use again for you decide who you can use again for you decide who you favor and you decide who you favor and it's like you decide who you favor and it's like having it as a commodity but not necessarily selling it.

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I don't want to be quoted. That's police corruption, there's police corruption, there's police lack of trust and the preconceptions of trust and the preconceptions about the citizenry.

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Definitely the police never see the citizens in most cases as being cooperative, especially, you know. Assisted the police during investigations.

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I've done a quite a number of a lot of work on that. People would decline even coming to the court.

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To support the police in evidence leading and things like that and So the police most times see the ordinary citizens as not cooperative partners you know but they see them as those that don't want them to make progress.

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Then police lack of capacity and police lack of capability. These are 2 different things. Capacity in terms of numbers in terms of personnel with the capability in terms of who does what, the functions.

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Discover that there have been complain about. Maybe people not being qualified. People being put in positions because of some criteria and then because of that we have lower capability.

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Apart from the problem of capacity, which you know happens to relate to the numbers and the the infrastructure.

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That are required. And then the police excessive use of powers also. Some of these are things that actually keep people far away from.

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The police and these are things that reside with the police.

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Besides those, then we have what we call clientele barriers. The clante barriers are What actually reside in the people themselves?

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And this includes the citizens socioeconomic status. Confident, maybe confident or may not be confident to approach the police because you feel your reach or your port so it's a fact.

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Also, citizens location, rural urban deck, the rural and urban dichotomy. Police service has been a little bit dismal, maybe I have to be kind of economical with the word here.

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A bit not as good as it is in the urban area in the rural area, maybe because of a number of reasons in the urban area in the rural area, maybe because of a number of reasons that we can unpack.

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But definitely the people in the rural area, maybe because of a number of reasons that we can unpack.

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But definitely the people in the rural areas don't the presence of the police as they should. And there is utter negligence of people in the countryside.

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Of course, I have not seen not only in South Africa, but in other countries in Africa, perhaps in Asia, where police headquarters is located in the rural area.

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Have we seen that? We've not. So it means that not only availability, access and everything.

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So some people have to travel kilometers and miles and miles to go to the city to even make complain.

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There is locational disadvantage in that sense. So those are discouraging factors and citizens gender and maritime status.

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Whoa, this one especially it becomes very emotional and pathetic when we speak about on married females.

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Approaching the police to complain about a sexual harassment, rape or things like that. You know, it doesn't really go well for them.

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Because of OK, because of the stereotypes and all that. So the single people, especially girls, women, sorry, find it more difficult to.

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To approach the police because of those notions and that compared to males. Negative experience with police apart from the appetite experiences of brutality and audit.

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People, many people don't never have their good experience in terms of the outcome. Of their complaints and how the police treated them, whether police was welcoming and all.

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So then preconceived notions and attitude towards the police, a lot of people themselves. Whether police is doing well or not, we never believe in the police just because they don't like police.

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And, limited knowledge about constitutional rights to access the police, a lot of citizens. So to say, perhaps don't understand, they don't know their right, that the police is being paid to protect you but the police is there to assist you that the police is there to listen to you.

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You know, so a lot, especially the illiterate ones. See if the police has been a different structure that is not meant for them.

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How, the truth is that the police is there for everyone. And then in the final, you know, micro social climate, this one relates to our social environment is the macroeconomic system the commodification and cost of accessing the system.

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The political climate and orchestration of an arrangement of people, including the party affiliations. Well.

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I know there are some people from South Africa here, so we know the party, the role of party affiliation.

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In the in either accepting or not accepting the what the police is doing so it's highly politicized as well and that's also This determines to a large extent whether one will be friendly to, you know, a kind of conservative police are now.

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The rise and proliferation of private policy and alternative systems. Especially in the urban sector. People tend to see alternatives and most times decide to not go close to the police if they are having problems or security issues.

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So there is another issue that one can unpack but What is on ground now is that the service has been Oh, supposed to be rendered by the police now.

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I've been taken over by some private agencies except What the strategic ones that are connected to the state.

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Like the criminal prosecution and all that those ones still remain the purview of the police and the state then the social identity machine and primordial considerations, nepotism, ethnicity and racism.

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Also People tend to be comfortable with people. Of the same skin. Cola, the same religion.

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If you know that the the divisional police officer there or the station commander you want to know What color is he?

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What religion does it go to your church or the mask or the you know you want to know some things about so that gives you confidence or lack of it.

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In approaching. So it's like those primordial considerations also tend to be barrier. And people tend not to really be confident with the police unless they are actually, They know some of this, variables.

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So you conclusion, I'll say that, This is the, this is a scooping and we just did with my students.

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Were able to gather some Information I would just kind of primary scoping not detailed because we are still analyzing the data that will support these.

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And even go on into our plan is also to further this by, you know. Bringing in survey empirical data.

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To support some of this but already we have the scoping background. That is quite general in in nature but quite informative about what is going on.

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So you don't expect any data or any information or whatever at this level. So it's work in progress or less.

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So the bottom line is that Today Not much have changed. So we've seen changes in some areas.

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But the equality. Of access. To a criminal justice system, the police as the entry point. Is yet five-faced.

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We have not reached there yet. But the government is working hard to get there. Everybody is trying to contribute towards that, including the academia.

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But we hope that we are going to get there. A sudden point. Thank you.

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Oh, sorry.

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Oh

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Okay.

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So now.

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Oh, So now Disconnected. Online. Dutch. Is connected.

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Not yet. So, I am aware. Thank you very much. Yes, that is myself tech support and then this laptop.

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Hi that again. So currently not. So the third presentations maybe we have now.

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At Biddo. Who is I think present here or online. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So we have to be played for Austria.

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We can we can wait and see if the third presenter will come up on the zoom or we can go straight to the video.

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Was there online anyone? Not connected at all. Yeah, that one is there.

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So joined, yeah, we did have some time.

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Yeah. Yes.

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Okay.

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Maybe. Yeah, the commentator, for the Policy, and kill a pimp out of it area.

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Oh

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And I sent a lot back to the military, for the most Meantraskin, will the street of Ferrell.

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Luebo, a status con mass, that those MOREYPES, PORCADA, Seng, BY, Como, Horima on Dos Ponto Quatro, Okay.

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Matter Roso, on the quadrome where to sporkata sing Mila Vitentes.

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And, Barra, Bye, yeah, on, Sergio, where it is foreign intervention police help for It'll provide you, is the TRism where this foreign Prevention Policy or the same millibetan.

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48,

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They're Kien, in Laszani, in the for those young Komiskii Biokan, the Limeri Suitees.

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Sinemargo, Comin Strommento Della Policy, Akam, Miyi, Eli for Ottawa Adolf, Lazi, LIFFERENCUS, VERISTIAN MESSERVICK as is this

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tantis in a lamentable polial. Yes, the su-groupus is telling formatus for Masures, the Policy's, Disperses, KCLAVE, and, BEMANDERING, KUBYER, in the fence.

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Dion Nor. He told those those police he is a stern. One of the Criminalis who ensues this put as in S 2 is Loki Ledima intermented or assemble a lusso polisial, is to trial or dispose of like Alice, they'll Then it's the same

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deal. Bolsonarism. Is the seed la Cohen, Thepolitika, Construita and Tornwalla Fi, Eliatica Policy Al.

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Okay.

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He is like, There's the middle of a CN, Tosio, Chenta,occo, Cone May or if we can elbows on a possibility that the Coldablain was the in the contest to the last segue, the public, in rehearsals seeing Quantin.

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. The killing them to the instrumental VISTAkondo are possibly ARMA-controlos Oppository's Politicus.

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Where do Pond Lazaviere has oligarchy as Politicus. You have post a foster for the last year on the auto.

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Flexivism will assess Filarente, Megustar, Yeah, more than that.

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In SCntario is more important a monitoriard livelous Seonneville as the Zionist Odyssey Alice in Maria, Online Planet, But, I see Mum.

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Can't lose your status.

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Or do. But, The year spara in Kermitar La Litimida, much of the rashes.

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Thank you.

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Thank you now. We'll start. So I suggest there is other person. Yeah.

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Perhaps not even just die if

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There you come to.

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So I suggest as serially presentation being done.

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The paper wise The presenters can be asked cause sense and I would. Suggests that we can start with presentation of not all on determinants of police lethality that in Brahil.

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So open to floor for questions and answers.

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I will request not all to come and Yeah.

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Hi, first I really enjoyed your talk. I was watching online. I was wondering so over you look you look over a very long time period and I'm sure that.

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That's like. So you're looking over a very long town period. Now I was wondering in part what else is changing over that time period and mostly if Michael D data exists for these police shootings in Brazil and if there's any other way to try to understand what's going on.

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With the dynamics to meet the Incident Staff while they're increasing. And what's happening at the local level.

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Well, I use, II decide on that time frame mostly based on the political elections.

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So I want to be able to include, mostly based on the political elections. So I want to be able to include at least 3 election period for governors and the political elections.

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So I want to be able to include at least 3 electoral period for governors and also for president because the elections happen So I don't have yet the last year, the numbers for the last year, so I plan to publish this when I reach the data from so I have 12 years with those of action period.

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We do have, let's say, good data on police killings in Brazil because of the they have in some states they are obligated to publish this data but not necessarily in the same way.

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But what I did to grab this data, I used some of the same data that HOTRY goes to present from the forum that is related to Goodens Republica, but I petitionate all the states from the law of excess of information in Brazil to get data on police killings and because I want to detangle military civilian police and on and out

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of 30 and the others are from Albert sources. And the, the, I can only reach into state level data.

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I cannot go further more local than that not for the whole country not for the whole period. So that's a limitation in my research because I'm just analyzing things at state level.

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It means that the dynamics does not necessarily happen at state level would be better if I could. Focus on big cities, small cities and do this type of comparison but unfortunately And up to now and I don't think that I would have this type of data and let's say no less in the next 5 years and especially not looking

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back. So that's a limitation when you do this. This type of research in this period. But it's still it's a lot comparing to I'm in this research project that compare Brazil and Philippines in the same aspects.

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We're trying to tackle the same aspects and it's much more harder to find data on Philippines comparison to Brazil.

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So we do have enough, let's say, to do something. But there is several questions that I would like to make, but I could I can without data in that level.

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So the next step for this research, what I'm doing now, it's the qualitative part.

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So this was the quantitative part. So the qualitative departments that I choose some of the states that have different dynamics through time.

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So I choose one state that was has a huge increase of police locality. The only state that has a huge decrease and low stability and high stability in those numbers and then I'm visiting those states and also doing some online interviews to understand what happened during this period in each stage to understand the local dynamics.

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That's the only way that I can go further as an qualitative aspect.

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Yeah. Additional question. So Russell, North Carolina State University. With the spatial analysis part of it, did you notice any differences amongst the 27 states during each of the different regimes both as a president and the governor.

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So I know you had the map where it showed the total over the entire time, but was there any sort of distinctive changes in terms.

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Yes, yes. So I find different I am. I found different dynamics. I could actually, a group, I thought about doing this is another possibility is to aggregate the states because there is another possibility is to aggregate the states because there are some other possibility is to aggregate the states because there are some states there are stable during the whole

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period. So with low levels, high levels, also it's a little bit like real regime is always high.

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Increased a little bit but it was already high so it was let's say there is a high stability lowest ability but there is some states that have different dynamics.

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So most of the, there is just one state that went down. There was super high and went down.

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And this is for me it's a focus of interest and that's why I'm doing this.

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Qualitative research in this state. And the same thing with a state that went really high.

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There was a Mapa that he shows there. It's I already almost finished Amapa and the political dynamic there explained a lot at least at the qualitative aspect for all the interviews that I heard, they changed the policy there in that state and that's why I went up and of course the national scenario also helps us to

325
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understand so now I'm trying to untangle the political relations of every governor to know which governor aligned with Bolsonaro or have that or they adapt somehow the discourse when they understand the wave of because they are not necessarily right-wing politicians by but when they see the wave going towards one direction they want to go towards the same

326
01:14:03.000 --> 01:14:18.000
direction or get the vote and to get the popular appeals so so that's not that easy not only to search for the parties but you have to understand a little bit of the local political dynamics to know exactly what drive them towards one another direction.

327
01:14:18.000 --> 01:14:27.000
So I'm also very interested to understand the only state that. Were able to get the numbers down.

328
01:14:27.000 --> 01:14:37.000
For me, this also should be a focus we are at the same way that we look to to increase we have to search and look for the decrease to understand how control is.

329
01:14:37.000 --> 01:14:42.000
If there is a way to control this, how could this could be made?

330
01:14:42.000 --> 01:14:52.000
Okay, thank you. Matter, that was a wonderful presentation. Yeah, please I want to know in the course of your neutral review.

331
01:14:52.000 --> 01:15:13.000
Did you come across any society, country? Police attorney was ready to sing. And, what do you think that they did differently if you came across such, literature.

332
01:15:13.000 --> 01:15:22.000
My mother one is what do you think should be the policy direction? At the end of the day with your study.

333
01:15:22.000 --> 01:15:29.000
To be able to reduce L rise in trend of hospitality in passing. Thank you.

334
01:15:29.000 --> 01:15:46.000
So like from the top of my mind I cannot we focus a lot on increasing and high numbers Most of the data on police locality are just available for the countries with the biggest problem, let's say.

335
01:15:46.000 --> 01:16:05.000
So we have more data about Latin America that we have from other countries. And the US, I know that there is a huge challenge because while the level of police forces so it's not only about that there is also a lot of political interest and not to publish that but it's also a lot of political interest and not to publish that but

336
01:16:05.000 --> 01:16:22.000
still. There are moments, let's say, I will not say that countries at all, but there are moments, even the Philippines, the country that my colleague is researching when we want to do this research because we want to compare the effect of the data in Bolsonaro in both countries because we want to compare the effect of

337
01:16:22.000 --> 01:16:31.000
Data in both countries because they also have a war on drugs because they also have a war on drugs that was very specific and the numbers of police that was very specific and the numbers of police killings increased drastically and the numbers of police killings increased drastically in the first 2 years of police killings increased drastically in the first 2 years

338
01:16:31.000 --> 01:16:50.000
of the debt governor and then went off. Because he already made what he promised and kind of so there is like this wave and then some type of backlash let's say but no I don't have to think a good answer for if there is a decrease but this is something that for me it's very interesting.

339
01:16:50.000 --> 01:17:16.000
And the second question was directions. I understand that politics plays an important role. So when you have and somehow my data also shows that when you have politicians that have this agenda also shows that when you have politicians that have this agenda, this will show that when you have politicians that have this agenda, this will have an impact, a direct impact in the way that

340
01:17:16.000 --> 01:17:33.000
the police officers act and in the field. I interview 2 former governors in states that and I asked directly about them how to control that if you are in power how do you centralize them and they said that it's much more harder to control than and they said that it's much more harder to control than to release.

341
01:17:33.000 --> 01:17:51.000
If you want to like to say, OK, do it whatever you want. It's much more easy and their response is much more quickly than when you want to do do all the way around when you want to control you have to show that first of course every case you have to take a public stand you have to show that we will not accept

342
01:17:51.000 --> 01:18:10.000
this type of solution. You have to implement some measures and how Rodrigo already showed that in Brazil there is some states there are starting to work with the body camps and this has a huge impact and control and decrease of police totality and other forms of police brutality.

343
01:18:10.000 --> 01:18:28.000
So there is this in this aspect politicians could go towards, but it's not only about the first thing is how the position itself if they think that they have political benefits for a rush or a type of violence police.

344
01:18:28.000 --> 01:18:39.000
It's almost impossible for us to do something else. And when they think that they have political benefits for a violent police, it's harder.

345
01:18:39.000 --> 01:18:47.000
And that's the case in some parts of Brazil and some moments specifically, I think.

346
01:18:47.000 --> 01:18:56.000
Yeah, okay, hello. Thank you for the one cool presentation. So the question would be, are there any government reports in Brazil?

347
01:18:56.000 --> 01:18:58.000
So the question would be are there any government reports in Brazil recording. So the question would be, are there any government reports in Brazil recording police lethality?

348
01:18:58.000 --> 01:19:07.000
Any government reports government statistics recording police brutality? Unfortunately, there's some government statistics according to police brutality.

349
01:19:07.000 --> 01:19:23.000
Unfortunately, some states, they produce data and they put it on their websites. Some states are obligated by states law to do this to publish but they don't combine this there is no national authority that combined those information.

350
01:19:23.000 --> 01:19:31.000
There is some national database that they are struggling to create these for a long long time. So, they are struggling to create these for a long, long time.

351
01:19:31.000 --> 01:19:37.000
So, but there is that's why civil society plays an important role and also academics. So the data that I use and also academics.

352
01:19:37.000 --> 01:19:43.000
So the data that I use and the data that I use and the data that I use and the data that Hodeigo as a video that Ho Digo Azerbaijan shows is from the 40'clock, it's from the 40'clock at the later the Seguransapublika

353
01:19:43.000 --> 01:19:51.000
that is a social, it's a civil society organization, but they collect data from all the states and they release this in a report and very organized every year.

354
01:19:51.000 --> 01:20:03.000
So and they have data about a lot of other things, not only about the police letality but other rates of criminality.

355
01:20:03.000 --> 01:20:16.000
So it's, let's say for the lack of activity in the national level, this activity was delegate or somehow it was this space were occupied by civil society.

356
01:20:16.000 --> 01:20:26.000
But based on state produced data they don't have their own stats but they rely and they combine them and they make sure that it states.

357
01:20:26.000 --> 01:20:38.000
Release this information so it's Every year they go and do the same thing. I don't know.

358
01:20:38.000 --> 01:20:52.000
Okay. You know, structural hypothesis. Pointed out poor determinants economic social and inequality.

359
01:20:52.000 --> 01:21:02.000
In your study. Come on these 4 detail minutes. Quickly even more in Princeteau to that.

360
01:21:02.000 --> 01:21:12.000
Least letality in my study. I'm on this part of it. Is more impact. In the hospitality.

361
01:21:12.000 --> 01:21:22.000
Yeah. Economics social resilience inequality. So which is more influencer to the mind some activities of the police.

362
01:21:22.000 --> 01:21:40.000
Well, the only one that shows at least in the model that shows an impact was unemployment. Unfortunately for a racial aspect for the racial variable, the only data that I have for the racial variable, the only data that I have for consistent for all the racial variable, the only data that I have for consistent for all these years for all states.

363
01:21:40.000 --> 01:21:44.000
The only data that I have for consistent for all these years for all states, it is the racial composition of states.

364
01:21:44.000 --> 01:21:53.000
So if it's a majority of whites of what's the composition of whites, because in Brazil we have a racial diversity composition.

365
01:21:53.000 --> 01:22:05.000
So we have whites that will not be considered whites in other parts of the planet, but in Brazil it would be considered white because people who are, OK, that.

366
01:22:05.000 --> 01:22:13.000
Descendants of Portuguese and Spanish. Indigenous people and black people. So this is the racial composition.

367
01:22:13.000 --> 01:22:27.000
So it was the percentage of white in the population what they're considering. Ideally, I would like to have data about the percentage of black people killed by the police, but I don't have this for all those years in all states.

368
01:22:27.000 --> 01:22:36.000
I have this for just 4 few years and just for few states so I cannot use this in a model unfortunately.

369
01:22:36.000 --> 01:22:44.000
Okay, I have a couple of questions. I mean, the presentation, all 3 presentations were agreed. And they are interconnected.

370
01:22:44.000 --> 01:22:55.000
So there are questions that. Cross the topics but the first one is about the metaphorology. You talk about the final data and then you cross over 3 periods of 23 different presidents.

371
01:22:55.000 --> 01:23:12.000
I mean actually the mayor was an interim so but But it's important to understand that. And then you cross over several state elections and also of course there is There is a question of whether there is a composition effect in the planet.

372
01:23:12.000 --> 01:23:20.000
Because you are putting several, I mean several electoral process throughout together and then the I mean the train is going up anyway.

373
01:23:20.000 --> 01:23:28.000
So what is the exact I mean, what is a variable that is explaining this, whether it is a composition effect?

374
01:23:28.000 --> 01:23:52.000
Which will be a problem in the panel. Or there is the other that was important was a budget but budget has a really interesting issue because he's counterintuitive for the Mexican case, what we have tested not only I mean police killings but on their reduction on crime is As far as you start increasing budget in the middle, I

375
01:23:52.000 --> 01:24:01.000
mean, around the long term. They will we will have a reduction. In the crime trends. I mean it's not immediate.

376
01:24:01.000 --> 01:24:08.000
I mean it has to, I mean it has to take Take some time, but at the end you will have an effect on the reduction of strength.

377
01:24:08.000 --> 01:24:19.000
Whether you have a right-wing state governor or a center and 2 cases of left wing governance are like the moral storage.

378
01:24:19.000 --> 01:24:27.000
But this is an issue that is important to understand in the topic because that was one of the variables that was really important in the whole model.

379
01:24:27.000 --> 01:24:38.000
So what is the I mean is that is the variable I mean associated with other variable properly electoral trends or something else.

380
01:24:38.000 --> 01:24:50.000
Or what can be explaining that. Just, just another just simple thing. I mean, 1 point that needs to be clarified is What exactly is police killing?

381
01:24:50.000 --> 01:25:00.000
Because There is a legal definition. For instance, in the international definition of diseases, there is the definition of legal killings by police or by the military.

382
01:25:00.000 --> 01:25:09.000
And so there is some data from Brazil, but it's not complete. Is I mean. Is not complete for a final attack etc but there are so many indications that You have that.

383
01:25:09.000 --> 01:25:22.000
And but that relates to the issue of what they encounter between the police and the person that is killed. Whether this is legal or not legal, this is an issue that I like you to.

384
01:25:22.000 --> 01:25:31.000
Don't say a little more up to that. And the final one is that this, I mean, please.

385
01:25:31.000 --> 01:25:43.000
As he mentioned to and as Rodrigo was talking about I'm not I don't want to go into the but this model of police culture but it's it's we I mean it's it's insider.

386
01:25:43.000 --> 01:25:56.000
Is whether either political electoral issues are pushing this political culture to be predominant or what is it expected to discount?

387
01:25:56.000 --> 01:26:09.000
Okay, so concerning the time variable variant variable, I'm not using, I have data for tree electrode periods, but I'm using early for each year.

388
01:26:09.000 --> 01:26:24.000
So I have 1211 observations, 11 years for each state. So I have, it's not one column for each year, but I have like, it's not for tree, it's not one column for each year, but I have like 11 columns for every state, let's say so.

389
01:26:24.000 --> 01:26:40.000
And so that's and the panel model, the software know that that's the same state over 11 times so there is this pet dependence let's say he knows that that he's comparing the state with itself.

390
01:26:40.000 --> 01:26:54.000
True time. That's why it's a piano. Every unity is fixed. So every state is be considering and in relation to itself during the whole period, be considering in relation to itself during the whole period.

391
01:26:54.000 --> 01:27:03.000
That's why it's a considering in relation to itself during the whole period. That's why it's a panel like every one of them is one unit, let's say, true time.

392
01:27:03.000 --> 01:27:20.000
And so the software know what's the variable of time and space. So in that state and so all this pet dependence is already being considering in because as a panel model concerning budget I have I have information of the per capita as, I have information of the per capita as I have information of the per capita as pandering so it means that the amount that's

393
01:27:20.000 --> 01:27:27.000
the only the way for me to compare the states among themselves. And the only information that I have is the more they spend.

394
01:27:27.000 --> 01:27:35.000
More police letalia. It's associated with police Italians. It could be the case also that affect other types of criminality.

395
01:27:35.000 --> 01:27:56.000
Okay, says I didn't I wasn't searching for that so that I was not exploring this dimension budget the relation between budget and homicide or robbery or I'm just using the dispersion trucks of not explained but at least you understand this dynamic so what I found in this relationship is the ones that are more willing to spend

396
01:27:56.000 --> 01:28:16.000
money on public security are the ones that have high rates of locality. So I'm not saying that it's necessary a consequence in a way that as much money they spend more they kill but I think that's most more the case that the once they are spending money with public security who are worry about this topic who are investing in

397
01:28:16.000 --> 01:28:23.000
are the ones who has this type of agenda. That's for me that's the explanation that makes more sense.

398
01:28:23.000 --> 01:28:34.000
Concerning the police killings, what is this exactly? It's not, it's not a judicial classification because this you would depend on the final results of say that there was a homicide that was intentionally unintentional.

399
01:28:34.000 --> 01:28:50.000
Just all the people who lost their lives and has a police officer as a perpetrator. I don't know if those those those deaths are justify or not.

400
01:28:50.000 --> 01:29:03.000
It was self-defense. If they like a murder someone and called what I don't have this level of detail to what I don't have this level of detail to detangle this, to know what the contests of detail to detangle this, to know what the contests of each betangle this, to know what

401
01:29:03.000 --> 01:29:06.000
the contests of each bet. What I know, it's this is a contest of each debt.

402
01:29:06.000 --> 01:29:18.000
What I know is a lot because when you have the rate for the population you know compared to other countries is high and especially I didn't put this data on it but when you compare the ratio of people cue by the police and police officer skill.

403
01:29:18.000 --> 01:29:38.000
You see the the graphic that I show the increase is even more steeper because you have less police officers being killed especially in the pandemic time and then but police continue to kill so you know that there is it is disproportionate so it is abusive right this I can assure you that is the puse but I don't have the

404
01:29:38.000 --> 01:29:47.000
legal classification to know which case was what even because I don't even trust about the whole process of judging all the situations.

405
01:29:47.000 --> 01:30:17.000
So and it's and the question of police culture. It is important and it's part of this dynamic but I understand it's almost like a prerequisite is something that is already there but does not explain the, how this varied through time.

406
01:30:33.000 --> 01:30:42.000
Let's say or they are more this is the I would use this as a prerequisite.

407
01:30:42.000 --> 01:30:49.000
I think the schoolist culture is there and it could be actually it could be like trigger in some moments and could be more controlling others.

408
01:30:49.000 --> 01:30:52.000
I would not say that this does not play the role. I think it plays a role but does not explain variation in a short time.

409
01:30:52.000 --> 01:31:03.000
It plays a role but does not explain variation in a short time. In a 10 years period I could not use this to explain this variation.

410
01:31:03.000 --> 01:31:08.000
I could not say the police culture in Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina or other states are that different.

411
01:31:08.000 --> 01:31:20.000
I will have to do a other type of research to actually compare both of them and probably a more qualitative type of research to compare different police cultures in the same country in different states.

412
01:31:20.000 --> 01:31:28.000
Yeah. Thank you very much for this wonderful presentation. Man is on the

413
01:31:28.000 --> 01:31:55.000
Kind of analyzing based on who ease or who was in power because that sounds a little bit and you have to be a little bit careful there even taking into consideration a processor Mendoza's, That meant about the killings that are legitimate and the ones that are legitimate.

414
01:31:55.000 --> 01:32:05.000
And as you did not. Separate operationalized is killings to mean as mean that you concentrated.

415
01:32:05.000 --> 01:32:18.000
The ones that are. Legitimate. Let me use that word. You know, killings that's the one that perpetrator does, petrol because There was no just cause.

416
01:32:18.000 --> 01:32:28.000
Right? So this will really give us a very clear if you can do it. If you can do that, a is going to really be nice and nicer.

417
01:32:28.000 --> 01:32:53.000
So that we really know whether the police. Increasingly be killing people that when nobody deserves to die. Anyway, but whether police have been killing legitimately, if you like, I don't want to be quoted or really, you know, perpetrating the killing of innocent people so to say we have to really try to look at that

418
01:32:53.000 --> 01:33:08.000
now Also, with regard to budget. But sometimes the outcome of a budget. May not reflect immediately. Okay, sometimes it takes 4 or 5 years.

419
01:33:08.000 --> 01:33:20.000
So if you now say that There is high risk of police brutality now. Because this president is in power.

420
01:33:20.000 --> 01:33:28.000
That could be kind of over generalization. And, er, it could be unfair and there may be an interpretation error.

421
01:33:28.000 --> 01:33:42.000
I don't really know how you interpret your result actually but that could be interpretation error because When one governor has one president has been there for 4 years Then another one continues.

422
01:33:42.000 --> 01:33:54.000
And suddenly The camera now drops. In the in the succeeding regime. And now we interpret to attribute that Cambridge.

423
01:33:54.000 --> 01:34:04.000
To the efficiency of the president of just coming. We may really be a little bit wrong there because you cannot hold the regime.

424
01:34:04.000 --> 01:34:12.000
Performance to constant. You know, unless you have a variable that you can use to hold a constant if you don't have that.

425
01:34:12.000 --> 01:34:24.000
I will advise you to be a little bit careful. In such pronouncement and interpretation to see. During the time of the, is it, Bon, was it, was his name?

426
01:34:24.000 --> 01:34:41.000
That the crime rate went up? No, the police brutality went up and now during this person's time it comes out it can't it will sound very political because there are a lot of factors that makes it difficult for you to hold a regime change constant.

427
01:34:41.000 --> 01:34:51.000
But they can just be at the face value. Of interpretation. I say when the space was in powers but I advice where you arere interpreting it.

428
01:34:51.000 --> 01:35:03.000
You have to really go give very strong logic. And get yourself out from. Political entanglement because people will misinterpret it.

429
01:35:03.000 --> 01:35:09.000
Okay, so that is my own just comment because I know I see some of this kind of interpretations.

430
01:35:09.000 --> 01:35:16.000
I read a lot of them. I review so many and then I question. Them to say no, you can tell me.

431
01:35:16.000 --> 01:35:25.000
That because this person is in power that's why the police brutality has kind of without really singing what you know the trend.

432
01:35:25.000 --> 01:35:31.000
In the in budget usage and a number of other factors. Thank you.

433
01:35:31.000 --> 01:35:43.000
So quickly responding this. If, okay, I can. Okay, okay, good, good, okay, good, good, okay. It will be free.

434
01:35:43.000 --> 01:35:47.000
Yeah. It will be free. Yeah. So, okay. I won't answer this.

435
01:35:47.000 --> 01:36:00.000
I'll answer after. Because in my past, Alright, thank you.

436
01:36:00.000 --> 01:36:19.000
I'm ready for the questions now. Thank you, Prov. Thanks for the beautiful presentation. Actually, what I want to comment you on you know what I observe as being very responsible in terms of what we see, what conclusions we draw from our, I mean you also demonstrated it in your presentation.

437
01:36:19.000 --> 01:36:40.000
You were in careful with your purification, quantifying each word for example let's talk about communication you say well you want to be careful not so I think That's for me, a takeaway from, this, is panel that you know as we're such as we must be responsible.

438
01:36:40.000 --> 01:36:52.000
Like the use of words and now generalizations. Thank you very much for that sir. However, I have Just 2 comments and observation about your presentation.

439
01:36:52.000 --> 01:36:58.000
My name is Laneri Kudego or Bafe Miyagi University, Nigeria.

440
01:36:58.000 --> 01:37:09.000
Beautiful presentations are like I said I there are many issues you have thrown up which like you also give as a caveat that well, this is more like a scoping review, which of course we should expect to bring up a lot of issues.

441
01:37:09.000 --> 01:37:19.000
But what was coming to my mind was I mean as representing that All this, I mean, things that are internal are not.

442
01:37:19.000 --> 01:37:26.000
Very different. Like I think you also mentioned in the form other part of Africa. Some of these issues actually are what we grapple with even in Nigeria.

443
01:37:26.000 --> 01:37:35.000
The issue of, assess, I mean, the inequality in terms of urban rural access to policing or just even in urban areas.

444
01:37:35.000 --> 01:37:45.000
There are also inequality like you rightly mentioned, economic issues about policing. And of course, this means to the issue of communication.

445
01:37:45.000 --> 01:37:57.000
I wish we were trying to avoid to talk about Bodhin. Of course, Park home in Nigeria, we have issues with that whereby the rich seem to be the only ones who have access to police, even in the abandoned areas.

446
01:37:57.000 --> 01:38:07.000
You could have a celebrity who will have a truckload of police following him or hand to events, whereas a whole community might not even have a presence of police.

447
01:38:07.000 --> 01:38:17.000
So these are things that are there. Lastly, since you said, well, You are looking at issues that you now want to specify a horn.

448
01:38:17.000 --> 01:38:22.000
Going forward. I would suggest, if you could look at issues around community policy. In South Africa.

449
01:38:22.000 --> 01:38:41.000
Issues about alternative to policy particularly in this own police environment, what are the alternatives available? For example, in Nigeria, we have you know the regional police in indigenous community policing are like their motto in the southern part.

450
01:38:41.000 --> 01:38:49.000
I mean the southern part. You know, police organizations that are peculiar to the indigenous people there.

451
01:38:49.000 --> 01:39:03.000
Also in the north you have the Isba also. So I don't know if that can also be replicated in South Africa to see what alternatives to communities that are mostly unlikely or least used to police themselves.

452
01:39:03.000 --> 01:39:07.000
Thank you very much.

453
01:39:07.000 --> 01:39:12.000
I think we have to collect questions.

454
01:39:12.000 --> 01:39:33.000
Yeah. I have a question with reference to access of justice. With special reference to the policing system, what do you think are the dimensions of the disparity in access to justice?

455
01:39:33.000 --> 01:39:45.000
Is it race, gender? Or anything else or maybe economic status.

456
01:39:45.000 --> 01:39:56.000
Should the administration say? Question is. Hello, sir. So the question would be with respect to the barriers that have been discussed, clientele barrier and so on.

457
01:39:56.000 --> 01:40:03.000
How would you suggest that the police overcome those barriers?

458
01:40:03.000 --> 01:40:16.000
I have one observation regarding You have, repaired alternative system. Towards decreasing this barriers to access.

459
01:40:16.000 --> 01:40:23.000
What is your mind about alternatives systems on that? Come again.

460
01:40:23.000 --> 01:40:34.000
No, I want to repeat. My question is that you have mentioned in presentation that you are recommending some alternative system.

461
01:40:34.000 --> 01:40:44.000
In policing followed by access to Just this access to policing would be more easier and to be more effective.

462
01:40:44.000 --> 01:40:54.000
Is in your mind is alternated.

463
01:40:54.000 --> 01:41:01.000
Okay, so thank you also. Thank you for your presentation also. I would like to ask first all the dimensions also.

464
01:41:01.000 --> 01:41:20.000
I would like to ask first all the dimensions that you present. I would like to ask first, all the dimensions that you present, all the dimensions that you present, from the literature or is already the first result of the data collection that you are doing.

465
01:41:20.000 --> 01:41:38.000
First, all the dimensions that you present, did you take this from the literature or is already the first result of the data collection that you are And also if you are planning to to interview people from the black and from the white community from both of them and or if this would be the what type of if you were playing to explore those dimensions in

466
01:41:38.000 --> 01:41:45.000
towards those different publics.

467
01:41:45.000 --> 01:41:52.000
Yeah, I just have a, I mean, a question of what you mentioned in your 3 different parts of the system.

468
01:41:52.000 --> 01:42:05.000
One is I mean referring to what I was talking about I mean to hear about the police culture It looks like even though there has many been many changes in the composition of policeing.

469
01:42:05.000 --> 01:42:13.000
Just through to your policing and the culture, I mean the training in this association, etc. Remains, I mean very, very old system.

470
01:42:13.000 --> 01:42:26.000
So II wonder what is happening to this shift. Being the access to justice if if you don't really promote new relationship between the citizens and the police.

471
01:42:26.000 --> 01:42:43.000
So what are the programs? Issue about accessing the criminal system after all. Okay, thank you very much.

472
01:42:43.000 --> 01:42:52.000
For that presentation. I want to, you mentioned something about the local policy. In Nigeria from, Koi. My name is Dr.

473
01:42:52.000 --> 01:43:01.000
Wangou for Menuu State University of Science and Technology. For the Igbo part because he mentioned the Europeans, our own is called Abu Bhagan.

474
01:43:01.000 --> 01:43:07.000
Ibuba, yes, just to point that out. Okay, my question is, I need your thought.

475
01:43:07.000 --> 01:43:18.000
I mean that you are from Nigeria but you stay in South Africa. Do you think the issue because as a conversation we are having now around state policing.

476
01:43:18.000 --> 01:43:30.000
In Nigeria whether the the decentralizing the police force so that we have the state components of police so that we don't become only a federal thing.

477
01:43:30.000 --> 01:43:48.000
What we should be or take is do you think it will contribute to reducing the barrier state policing? I know you talked about the Rua Orban having police at the Grand Toban, I'm looking at from your system barrier, I look at the from your system barrier.

478
01:43:48.000 --> 01:43:56.000
I look close. Where do you see the centralization of police? Would I contribute to barrier or not?

479
01:43:56.000 --> 01:44:05.000
What should be your advice in terms of state policy. Do you contribute to barrier almost? Thank you.

480
01:44:05.000 --> 01:44:20.000
Okay, thank you. There's a bucket of questions. The first one is from okay, this is about Okay.

481
01:44:20.000 --> 01:44:34.000
Community policing that I think for community policing we work in South Africa. Also, actually they are alternative to policing in South Africa.

482
01:44:34.000 --> 01:44:45.000
The functions of those alternatives are quite limited. For instance, they cannot arrest. You can't arrest, they cannot Called anybody anywhere?

483
01:44:45.000 --> 01:44:59.000
What they do is the moment the private or whatever even if a security that's highly structured and developed private policing system but the limitation is huge.

484
01:44:59.000 --> 01:45:07.000
You immediately they spot the they have to call the police the state police So they don't have right to hold anybody.

485
01:45:07.000 --> 01:45:17.000
But you know in some parts of Africa and Asia There is what you call excesses of these structures. The individualatism.

486
01:45:17.000 --> 01:45:27.000
In fact, now South Africa is actually having problems with vigilantism because it is there but we see that there have been a series of killings of people.

487
01:45:27.000 --> 01:45:42.000
Whether if you like legitimate or illegitimate however there have been that you know a strategic killings and others so well South Africa has got a policy not organized.

488
01:45:42.000 --> 01:45:49.000
Inform our police and organize around communities that they are there. But not as populist it is.

489
01:45:49.000 --> 01:45:59.000
In some other African countries or in Asia. But, we have Did that. But that is not being encouraged actually.

490
01:45:59.000 --> 01:46:18.000
Because of the challenges that it has posed in recent time. So what is the what is being encouragement is you know the kind of private registered a policing system, security we can't call it policy on so to say.

491
01:46:18.000 --> 01:46:24.000
So that's it. That is a question about

492
01:46:24.000 --> 01:46:30.000
Access.

493
01:46:30.000 --> 01:46:39.000
Okay, that's what do I think about The determinants of assets. That's from Mitra.

494
01:46:39.000 --> 01:46:53.000
Well, as I mentioned That is kind of a flip of the whole thing. Previously, it was racially determined than in the current dispensation.

495
01:46:53.000 --> 01:47:02.000
It is about er, you know, who has what? So the economy is a driving factor.

496
01:47:02.000 --> 01:47:12.000
In the sense that the less you have the less confidence you will be to command or if you like to attract the service of the police.

497
01:47:12.000 --> 01:47:31.000
If you want to make complaints, something like that. Sometimes they don't regard someone. Wish I know it's not only in South Africa I think it's everywhere in the world don't know the poor person is not really listening to more than someone who just like He mentioned celebrities.

498
01:47:31.000 --> 01:47:37.000
We have all the hoping around them. In fact, at home they have all the panic buttons.

499
01:47:37.000 --> 01:47:46.000
They have all the numbers of police, the police will listen, their children are in schools. Anything that happens to them police will come just a day.

500
01:47:46.000 --> 01:47:54.000
Quatin, something like that. So that access actually a determinant factor of assets is that economic position what you have.

501
01:47:54.000 --> 01:48:22.000
But somehow. Gender does not really Yeah, gender is not a factor. What, where gender plays a role is the kind of complain you are making Yeah, the kind of complaint you are making to the police or you know when you are at What we call the front office.

502
01:48:22.000 --> 01:48:32.000
So your gender can play a role. I don't know. Have men don't usually go to complain about.

503
01:48:32.000 --> 01:48:53.000
Domestic violence. It's culturally. So I don't know how many men go through the police to large complain that they are wives, to large complain that their wives are beating them or something.

504
01:48:53.000 --> 01:49:07.000
Doing that. So Also, ladies as well, in fact, even Whether you call it the message violence, you call it a sexual monastery, you know, sexual offense.

505
01:49:07.000 --> 01:49:14.000
Men hardly go there for that or so. But unfortunately for ladies, even those that have genuine cases as well.

506
01:49:14.000 --> 01:49:21.000
You know, depending on the background of the police officer that is opening docket. We will not listen.

507
01:49:21.000 --> 01:49:30.000
You know because of the conflict between the bags and baggageies we come we carry from our culture into our workspace.

508
01:49:30.000 --> 01:49:38.000
If the police officer is highly a patriarchal person, you will not even listen to the lady saying anything about.

509
01:49:38.000 --> 01:49:54.000
GPV or sexual assault or something. So it depends. But we cannot clear up. Is no more racial now before you choose to be race, but now it's about perhaps economic conditions.

510
01:49:54.000 --> 01:50:17.000
Then the question on clientele How do you suggest the police will overcome the barriers? Well, I'm currently conducting a study, my sabbatical, really trying to see how we can reconnect the police where they Citizenly, more or less looking at, in fact, it's a

511
01:50:17.000 --> 01:50:31.000
macro study that is going to focus on or is focusing on kind of mending trying to mend in the problem to bring the people back to the police and police back to the people.

512
01:50:31.000 --> 01:50:40.000
And that in that sense is for the police to hear from the people. In fact, and that's what my study is going to generate.

513
01:50:40.000 --> 01:50:51.000
It is what is it that they want police? Like what do you want police to do so that you can you can be friendly with the police once again?

514
01:50:51.000 --> 01:50:58.000
So that's the perspective I'm taking. So I think we keep that one to research. And from research we are going to know.

515
01:50:58.000 --> 01:51:06.000
What do people want? Because I cannot speculate what people want. And then from there, police will take it and know what to do with that.

516
01:51:06.000 --> 01:51:18.000
Kind of death. Quite a number of barriers anyway. Police can deal with their own. I as an organization but as well can think about.

517
01:51:18.000 --> 01:51:28.000
What people want them to do. Alternative system, not really. But I know that I mentioned alternative systems.

518
01:51:28.000 --> 01:51:41.000
As a kind of Barrier in a way when I mentioned that because People can now make use of the private security or something.

519
01:51:41.000 --> 01:51:47.000
So that reduces the confidence in the police. That's what I'm really very sure of.

520
01:51:47.000 --> 01:52:00.000
So people reduce the confidence people have in the police. Keeps decreasing because they can actually shop alternative. Especially from the privacy security agencies.

521
01:52:00.000 --> 01:52:16.000
So that's what I'm really very sure about. So those private security agencies tend to provide if you like more sophisticated personal protection when it comes to personal protection.

522
01:52:16.000 --> 01:52:31.000
So it's like people who want to have or some security agencies. Install panic buttons at home than calling the 900, and, ONE, or police or whatever number.

523
01:52:31.000 --> 01:52:38.000
So you want to press the panic button, you pay for for every month. You pay your bill.

524
01:52:38.000 --> 01:52:42.000
As far as you pay your bill, anytime you have a problem at home, you just press a bill.

525
01:52:42.000 --> 01:52:54.000
Anytime you have a problem at home, you just press the panic buttons are those will come but not the traditional way of taking the phone a cop police because most people couple police the phone will ring and ring out.

526
01:52:54.000 --> 01:53:01.000
So that's why people see now, okay, now we can sort it out by focusing on alternative policy.

527
01:53:01.000 --> 01:53:10.000
The police have to actually kind of work more on how to respond to people. This is okay. Thank you.

528
01:53:10.000 --> 01:53:31.000
I'm drawing it so so much. Did you get the What you present from literature? Or first of course this is copying review there was no it was just thematic So we didn't do any rigorous analysis in terms of statistical.

529
01:53:31.000 --> 01:53:32.000
We are not at that level yet, but in information we have here is from what we found in literature.

530
01:53:32.000 --> 01:53:56.000
Even from my previous studies, you know, kind of scoping and then put them together. However, going forward We want to employ more of a quantitative not of serving because the survey is going to give us a larger dimension of responses.

531
01:53:56.000 --> 01:54:06.000
Than qualitative. We may not really want to go qualitative, want to go quantitative, get a great number of people, test them on some questions and variables.

532
01:54:06.000 --> 01:54:22.000
Then the police culture what is happening to access whether as it is not working they say if what you're doing is now working You know, if you keep on doing what you are doing, your result will not be different.

533
01:54:22.000 --> 01:54:33.000
You still keep you keep on getting the same result. So as a professor Mendez has mentioned, police keeps on having the same training formula.

534
01:54:33.000 --> 01:54:40.000
The same, so the only panacea there is to change the training system or what is in the content of the curriculum.

535
01:54:40.000 --> 01:54:49.000
In the training so that they don't Keep on using the old system as far as they are using the old system and old curriculum in the police college.

536
01:54:49.000 --> 01:54:58.000
We will keep on getting the same result because if you don't change your methodology you may not have a different result.

537
01:54:58.000 --> 01:55:04.000
However, sociology has proven that wrong anyway is the science that believes that. There are other variables that you cannot hold concerned.

538
01:55:04.000 --> 01:55:27.000
Who can even change the result even if you are doing the sentence? So finally, do you think state policing well Instead of policing in this system, South Africa for instance is is a centralized government it has centralized government structure is not a federal state So state doesn't even work.

539
01:55:27.000 --> 01:55:40.000
It's not federal. So the province cannot even have, cannot even think about that. So constitutionally, it is not practical.

540
01:55:40.000 --> 01:55:47.000
Thank you.

541
01:55:47.000 --> 01:55:56.000
To do the Let's do. So thus we concluded the session. Thank you all presenters. Thank you all presenters, good presentation, good interactions.

542
01:55:56.000 --> 01:56:03.000
Thank you all