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Okay, now I feel a little bad. But all right. So we should, we get started. Yeah, all right.

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so welcome. Everyone.

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yeah, welcome. Everyone online as well. I don't know exactly how many people we have online but welcome. So this is

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a final session of the day today. This is session 2 on non-religion meaning practices and consequences across the life course organized by Jackie Frost from Purdue we have 4 presentations lined up for us. We're going to try and keep the presentations around 15 min, so for those here I will indicate

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Julia. I will.

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I will try and indicate at some point. But I'm sure you will be right on target, and I won't have to intervene at all. So I'm sure that will be great. Yeah, yeah, And we are just going to go ahead and get started with our first presentation. And this is by

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Sarah Ramani. Can I get that close to right? Yeah. Explaining Maori atheism in. I'm not going to get it at to Ray and New Zealand. I don't know how to

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see. That's why I'm not going to say it. There we go, all right.

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hey?

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So my project looks at

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atheism in the context of New Zealand among Maori.

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Since this is a group of sociologists, I thought, I will entertain you with some numbers and stats. These are Maori religious affiliation from the national census, as you can see, from 2,006 to 2,018 we can see a sharp increase in Maori identifying with a category of no religion which coincides with a decline.

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and Maori identifying with Christianity and a smaller decrees of people who chose the

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option of Maori religion, belief, and philosophies.

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Aside from these stats, we we really don't know what is happening in these processes. How our body.

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the conversion? What are the processes of deconversion among Maori? Are they actually just rejecting Christianity? Or are they also rejecting Maori traditional beliefs and philosophies. So my

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research, which is actually a collaborative project with colleagues Peter Ads, who teaches in Maori studies at Nhangawaka, and my other colleague, Jeff Trouton, who is in my immediate team, and his expertise is on History of Christian mission. In New Zealand. Myself I have my research, background, and interest has always been on the process of deconversion, and that was trajectories.

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So what we're looking at is, what are the diverse positions of non-belief? How are your conversion? Narratives constructed. What are the anchors? And since our research has been funded by explain an atheism project, we are also looking and coding for key causal factors of atheism at micro and macro levels.

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But because

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this context is quite complex, our analysis is going to take into account the complex history of colonization. Christian Mission Maori cultural revitalization policies and the impact of new technologies on the emergence of Maori atheism.

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Just to kind of very briefly give you a context and background. So Christian mission in New Zealand actually started in 1,814, with establishment and conversion of people taking place with Anglican Mission. They weren't initially met with a lot of success.

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But this conversion picks up in the Thirtys with the arrival of Methodists and Catholics.

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According to my colleague, this

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label of Christian conversion might not be appropriate at this point, because a lot of Maori were obviously they had their own pantheon of gods and their tradition, and they pretty much integrated Christian ideas into that constellation and repertoire of beliefs. In any case.

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Extensive Christianization takes place, and, according to some accounts, by 1,850, something as much as 60% of Mahi would have identified as question. Then we have the signing of the tertility which is at this point colonization becomes official. 2 versions of this text exist in the English version.

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Crown gets sovereignty over Maori people and the land, and then the Maori version Maori are guaranteed sovereignty. So you can imagine how things go pretty much from back to words. After this point. There's a lot of land stolen millions and millions of acres of land is stolen, which leads up to what is the literature refers to, as the New Zealand land wars the crown and allies pretty much

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when this war

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and gain complete control of New Zealand. In the Fiftys, we have migration of Mari to the and urban centers who are people who are in search of income and work.

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and this leads to Pakiha, which is the term for European settlers in New Zealand to come up and reinvent vigorous sort of state assimilation policies. This includes. So in order to

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turn Maori into British New Zealanders, and this includes suppression of language, culture. So up to later on, 85 people were not allowed to speak Ted or Maori in public spaces, in schools and workplaces.

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And by this end point that I'm referring to. According to some accounts, it's only 20% of Maori who can speak enough of tetra that can be considered as native speakers.

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In any case.

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this leads to some activism in the 70 s. Which then leads to the establishment of the Treaty of Witangi Act, which is pretty much an outlet for Maori to

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to have their frustrations expressed frustrations against colonial history as well as racism, that they were experiences. This act is amended in the 85,

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which then allows Mali to make claims all the way back to the signing of the tragedy. These claims include claims of land claims also for loss of language, and so on and so forth. These are important, because you will see that the data I have referred to these important moments.

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How am I doing on time already?

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Okay, so

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the project is qualitative. I'm doing in-depth interviews that are semi-structured with atheist and also with theist as a control group. The in this particular group will be from

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Jehovah witnesses Mormon Church, Catholic Church, Anglican Church, and a religion that's a syncretic religion between Christianity and mounted traditional beliefs. And this reflects the pilot study that we have people coming typically from these backgrounds.

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we ask

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questions that fall under 4 themes, your religious background, your social context.

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questions of belief, meaning, what does atheism mean to you? Do you think it's on the right? Why is that the case?

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What do you think about certain cultural vitalization policies, do you, you know, engage with much social media? Are you part of a community atheist community? And so on.

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and the method of analysis is too full. My favorite a combination of thematic and structural narrative analysis. What that means is that I'm not looking or mining the data for biographical information. But I'm looking at the way people speak. The performance of the narrative

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as well as the broader background, the broader socio-cultural, historical, linguistic structures that shape their narrative. But we're also testing a series of explanations of theories about the rise or of atheism.

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so these are again at individual and societal level, looking at education, existential security, technological changes, homogeneity and social network, religious pluralism, exposure to worldview pluralism and so on.

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what I'm going to present now

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is a slice of this data. So far I've interviewed 27 people. 11 female. 2 people identified as takata tapui, which is a queer identity. 14 male. One thing that I would like you to pay attention is the age

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mean and 1 million, which might have a major effect on the findings that I will present education wise all by one person.

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They didn't have a tertiary educate all by one, had a tertiary education. Their backgrounds were

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typically

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moderate exposure to religion. But even those who grew up in the non-religious families had a considerable level of exposure through grandparents. So this is also quite important.

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Something that I'm finding

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at the outset is that

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that? And I'm going to look at the deconversion of the plots

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is that the vast majority of people first becoming an atheist is a rejection of Christianity, so they actually describe it as a two-stage process. And and and the examples are endless. something like 70% of people that I've talked with hinged it primarily on this theme. So here you have Arroha, who says.

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I'll let you guys wait for yourself, which would be quicker.

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Can you give me a nod when you're done

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so? Aside from the colonial critique.

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we also see other themes, and in this regard the contours of the conversion narratives are quite consistent with the literature. Barber, Turpin, Zuckerman. What have you all speak of? Religious hypocrisy, exclusivism, bigotry, intellectual doubt. But what I. The the reason I picked this particular quote here is that

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in regards to religious exclusivism and bigotry, still, you can see traces of colonialism being built into it. And that's what I wanted to emphasise that it's still hinged in some ways that critique is entangled with colonial critique. Do you want to have a second to read? Johnny's?

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Okay, I am at the 5. Okay, so so that's the first rejection of Christianity. But the kind of construction of atheist identity in relation to Maori worldview is an entirely different story, and it's much more complex. And people take position on the spectrum from naturalist sort of metaphysical naturalism. I don't believe in God, and I'm pretty sure there is no God here. I have Hemi, who captures

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or exemplifies this position.

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I'm not going to give much explanation given that I have 5 min. But here you can see people having quite a bit of commitment to having consistency. So the main stories are that. Well, if I want to be intellectually honest, if I'm rejecting Christianity for all those things, I also then have to see my traditional beliefs in the same light.

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Because, you know, if this is a supernatural belief, this is also a supernatural belief. One thing that I forgot to add is that that rejection of Christianity also coincides with immersion in Maori culture. Maori language, like people learning Maori history or Maori language for the first time, so that sometimes this dip into that worldview, and out of that bit some people would reject entirely and say, Well.

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both seem supernatural to me. No, thank you, and then you have a position that I would describe as negative atheism, which is pretty much. I don't believe in God, but it doesn't come with that assertion that I'm pretty sure there is no God. It just leaves that bed out.

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And here you have mana exemplifying that position from a Maori perspective. We see everything as life. The trees are alive, and that not just in a metabolic sense, but they're alive in a sense of personhood, and so on. What these people shared in common is

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pushing for an allegorial metaphorical interpretation, and actually arguing that

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in terms of

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how, in terms of like scientific approach, some of Maori views and concepts fit better into scientific epistemology, which I thought, that's a very interesting interpretation.

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And then, on the other side of the spectrum, you have people who I'm categorizing as uncertain unbelief agnostic. But what is really fascinating again here is that only one theme, or one concept keeps coming up

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as the sole concept that I might be agnostic towards. And that's ancestor relationship to ancestors. And again, over and over, looking at these narratives and these moments of ambivalence. People really point towards A.

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I really feel my ancestors are watching me, and this I can't reason, and my my rational side of thinking doesn't accept what's going on. But this is how I feel.

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So we have different trajectories. And, as I said.

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looking at the narratives at this kind of preliminary stage, you can see this trajectory of the conversion and immersion into Tia Maori, and then we have spectrum of belief. And for my control group I can see that people sometimes.

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you know, I'm I'm speaking to people who are at this middle stage

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of their journey as well. So it's so far it's working. Not too bad. Okay, so preliminary finding of the stuff that I'm coding in a deductive way.

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Education is coming up. Obviously, as I said, 26 out of 27 people. had at least one degree. some of them all have. Ph. D. Some of them have 2 masters, but it's not any kind of education. It's a very particular kind of education that comes up. And that's like that. 60% of these participants had a degree in social sciences

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and 33%. So that's one-third

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specifically in Maori studies. So if you think and look back at the data that I presented it, it makes perfect sense, because marriage studies really deals with the issue in history of colonization as well, then at second stage at this point.

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But it just pluralism and exposure to worldview pluralism comes up, I think, 24 out of the 27 participants. So far, homogeneity kind of. I'm trying to figure out how I can code it properly. But it's not far based on my understanding of how I'm coding it. But these 2 are the anti-top things that are coming up. And obviously, we, I still have some ways to go.

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 Internet use.

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Not so much.

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And this is quite interesting. Because actually, I've yeah, I would have imagined definitely so. Anyway, that's where I am. I'm just going to thank my

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amazing people who funded my research. And yeah.

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there are some implications. Maybe I should say that as well. Do I have a minute?

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Yeah, there's a lot more to do, and I'm really excited for

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what? What? That that direction this research is taking. And that's thinking about the the relationship between atheism and colonization, those dynamics, how how they play out lots of interesting things, and where public should be interested in this study is

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how it will disturb this monolithic view of indigenous people. Somehow their identities and sense of self being

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permeated with spirituality. That is a sort of essentialist approach of understanding indigenous life.

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and that I think it will have a massive impact on policies in New Zealand, because pretty much

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the direction it is taking. The State is favoring a lot to incorporate Maori worldview spirituality into public policy. And and somehow these group of people are entirely sidelined and and forgotten, and so they should have some representation, the main limitation that I see as the age.

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and I'm pretty sure if I can reach out more to Gen. Z. Their stories and narratives would be a lot more different and interesting anyway. That's me. Thank you.

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Okay. So thank you.

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Our next presentation is Jackie Frost, who is going to be discussing well, being across the non-religious life course.

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All yours. that.

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hey? Everybody? Thanks for sticking it out with us on Friday night. So I will. I'm presenting this paper and forgive me for reading, but it's very statsy, so to get into time. I thought I would just go ahead and read it.

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okay. So there is a long line of research in the sociology of religion that assesses the relationship between religion and health, and for a long time this research has pretty consistently argued that religious people are happier and healthier than non-religious people, and there are many reasons why religion might be good for someone's health and well-being. Religions and religious organizations provide social support.

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emotional support, and even material support which are all important for health and well-being. Religion is also believed to provide people with a sense that their life has meaning, and it reduces anxieties around existential questions.

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But while there are extensive debates in the literature about what kinds of religions and what kinds of religious practices are most conducive to health and well-being. Until recently the non-religious, and these studies have been treated as a homogeneous group and variety among the non-religious has been ignored.

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But recently there has been some important new studies, showing that if you pay more attention to the diversity among the non-religious, a new picture of the relationship between religion, non-religion, and well-being emerges. So, for example, Joe Baker and his colleagues find that atheists report similar, or in many cases better mental and physical health outcomes than affiliated theists.

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In contrast, it was the non-affiliated theist and the agnostics in their study that had significantly worse physical and mental health outcomes.

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Similarly, scholars like May and Galen suggest that people with unstable religious, or non-religious identities are more likely to experience negative mental, and physical health outcomes versus those with stable, religious or non-religious beliefs and identities.

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So these studies really suggest that the relationship between religion, non-religion, and health is curvilinear with the committed religious and committed non-religious, experiencing better health than the people that are sort of in between.

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So more generally, scholars of non-religion are increasingly showing that many non-religious people successfully use secular means for bolstering their self-concepts, building social support systems and coping with life stressors. And just as importantly, there is considerable variation in mental and physical well-being among different non-religious groups.

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So these studies are a great start. But I think we need more research that really digs into the different mechanisms that shape health, and well-being among the non-religious, and that pay attention to their diversity.

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So in this article, my co-author, Penny Edel, who couldn't be here, we're trying to identify a broader range of factors that shape, health, and well-being among the non-religious. And we're paying specific attention to how health and well-being might change over time across the life course of being non-religious.

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So in this article, I'm using pilot survey data that I collected with Penny Edel for a project that we're calling the non-religion engagement and well-being survey or news for short.

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And we're developing this survey to be more attuned to different non-religious beliefs and practices that we do have religious respondents in the survey as well. So we conducted the survey in the fall of 2,020 in the United States, using an online survey system called Survey Monkey, which I'm happy to talk more about in the Q. And A. If people are interested, our survey includes 1,326 respondents, and we oversampled for non-religious people in order to really be able to dig in 2 differences among them.

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And so this pilot survey is cross-sectional. But we're working on grant applications to fund a larger, nationally representative sample. And the goal is to build this out into a longitudinal survey project. So we can really capture, change over time across the life course.

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So in this paper we analyze 4 different mechanisms that might shape health and well-being among the non-religious. And we run like logistic regressions and do some mediation analyses to determine how these mechanisms combine in different ways to impact health and well-being.

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So we look at the relationship between the mechanisms which I'll describe, and in a second, with 3 well-being outcomes life, satisfaction, happiness, and self-reported health.

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So first, we look at non-religious identity as a mechanism, because that is what past research has largely focused on. So this variable captures the identity label that our non-religious respondents identify with. And they had 5 options to choose from on the survey. Atheist, agnostic sort of the nominally non-religious, spiritual, but not religious, and nothing in particular.

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So the non-religious option. Here is a bit confusing, because I'm using the label non-religious to be sort of an umbrella category to capture all of these categories. but we also offered non-religious as a response option for the identity question. And this allows respondents to signal that they're non religious without having to select a specific identity, like atheist or agnostic, but also without falling into sort of nothing in particular category, because they lack a better option.

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So it's sort of in between. And it was actually the most common option selected among our our respondents.

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But we go beyond just comparing identity labels, and we investigate 3 other potential mechanisms that might shape health and well-being among the non-religious.

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So the first is what we're calling the non-religious identity duration variable, which is a measure of how long. Someone has been non-religious, and it helps us start to get at how health and well-being might change over time. So, as I mentioned earlier, the goal for this project is to be longitudinal, so we can really capture how non-religious beliefs and behaviors change over time. But for this cross-sectional pilot we had to settle with just asking how long our respondents had been non-religious.

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So we collapsed their responses into 3 categories which we call recent nun, meaning you have switched from being religious to non-religious in the last 5 years, long time, none meaning you have switched from being religious to non-religious in in more than 5 years ago, and then always nonsense, people who have always been non-religious.

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So third, we measure whether or not our respondents attend any kind of atheist, humanist, or other explicitly non-religious organization. These could be political groups, community groups, hobby groups, or any other kind of explicitly non-religious organization.

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No other study in this area really includes a measure of non-religious group attendance which we think is a really big oversight, because in studies of religions relationship to health, it's typically argued that it's more about the group connections that people get through religious organizations than the religious beliefs themselves that actually impact health and well-being. So, seeing whether this is true for non-religious people was one of our major goals here.

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And then, finally, we include a measure of what we're calling affective orientation that captures, whether our respondents find comfort or anxiety in their non-religion. So with this measure, we're trying to get it something different than how certain they feel about their non-religious identity.

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and instead, try to capture about how they experience that identity on a day to day basis. So non-religion can be experienced as anxiety-inducing for some people, because non-religious people often lack clear answers to existential questions, and non-religion is a stigmatized identity in the United States, at least, so it can come with social isolation and experiences of discrimination.

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But while most research tends to assume that non-religion can only be anxiety-inducing, we also measure whether people find comfort in their non-religious beliefs and identities.

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Many non-religious people do feel certain about existential questions, especially atheists, and they find comfort in that certainty.

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And in other work I've done. I've shown that some non-religious people actually find comfort and meaning and uncertainty.

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So we can't really use certainty as a shorthand for sort of feeling comfortable about being non-religious. because it's more complex than that. So we asked respondents to report whether their non-religion causes them. Anxiety gives them a sense of comfort, or neither, for the neither option it read, I I don't typically think much about my non-religion.

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and so keep in mind that we surveyed both religious and non-religious people in this survey. So we have these measures, but rewarded as needed for our religious respondents. So in the models that I'll go to, I'll go to next. The religious are often the reference group with which we're comparing the various non-religious mechanisms.

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Okay, so I'm sorry there's lots of numbers up here, but I will describe them for you. So in Table one over here on the left are our demographic stats, as well as a breakdown of the percentages across our 4 main independent mechanism variables.

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So across our entire sample, both religious and non-religious respondents, 49% find comfort or strength in their religious or non-religious identity, 11% experience anxiety or stress around their religious or non-religious identity. And 39% are what we're calling indifferent or said, they don't typically think much about their beliefs.

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We also break down what percentage of our sample is non-religious. Overall 37 and a half of our sample was non-religious. Of that 37, about 9% were atheist, 7 and a half were agnostic. 8 were non-religious, 5.6% were nothing in particular, and 7 and a half were spiritual but not religious

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in terms of the non-religious identity duration variable. 10% of our sample are recent nuns meaning they switched to non-religion in the past 5 years. 17% are long time nuns meaning they switch to non-religion more than 5 years ago, and 19% have always been non-religious.

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And finally, 12% of our sample reported attending an organized event for an explicitly non-religious atheist or humanist organization at least once a month or more. I also wanted to highlight a few things in Table 2 on the right about differences across the non-religious groups and the religious groups on some of our key measures.

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So first in terms of affective orientations, you can see that all of the non-religious identity groups are more likely to be indifferent to their towards their non-religion than religious groups are to be towards their religion. So, while only 20% of religious people report being indifferent.

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But, on the other hand, the religious are much more likely to report finding comfort or strength in their religion. The non-religious people are to find comfort in their non-religion. But this doesn't mean that they're anxious about being non-religious. It's just that most of our non-religious respondents reported indifference rather than comfort or anxiety, and you'll see this come up as being important in the models in a second.

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Okay? And then finally, on the right side of Table 2, we can see that there aren't huge percentage differences between the non-religious groups and the religious in terms of our measures of happiness, health, and life, satisfaction with everyone sort of hovering between 70 and 80% of self-reporting, at least somewhat or good health, happiness and satisfaction.

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Okay, so this first set of ordered logistic regressions analyze how the 4 mechanisms I outlined earlier non-religious identity, non-religious like identity, duration, non-religious community involvement, and affective orientation. How each shapes self-reported life satisfaction.

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So, as you can see, I've built these models stepwise, so that in models, one through 4. I'm testing each mechanism against the outcome independently, and then the final final model. 5. I combine them all to start parsing out mediators and moderators. I've also included controls in all of these models age, race, gender, education, income, all of those things. But the the coefficients aren't reported here, but they are in all 5 models across the table here.

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So in Model one, we can see the agnostics and the spiritual but not religious, are significantly less likely to report high levels of life satisfaction when compared to the religious but atheists, the nominally non-religious, and the nothing in particulars are not significantly different than the religious

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in Model 2. We see that identity duration does matter, and while recent nuns and longtime nuns are significantly less likely to report high life satisfaction than the religious people who have always been non-religious are not significantly different than the religious. On this measure.

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In Model 3, we see that group attendance also matters, and people who attend non-religious groups are significantly more likely to report high life satisfaction compared to those who don't attend these groups.

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and in model 4. We see that effective orientation also matters. So since the comfort, response, option, and the anxiety response, option are both included here. That means that indifference is the reference category here, and people who find comfort in their religion or non-religion report higher satisfaction than those who are indifferent.

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and then finally, in model 5 in the full model. We can see that group attendance and affective orientation are the only variables that remain significant. So this means that the differences across the non-religious life course variables, the identity duration are in some ways being mediated by group attendance and affective orientation. And I'll show this in mediation models in a second.

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Okay, so this is the same models, but with self-reported happiness as the outcome. And across all of the models you can see that there aren't a lot of significant differences in self-reported happiness across non-religious groups when compared to the religious model, one shows no significant differences, differences across non-religious identity categories and model 3 shows that non-religious group attendance is also not significant.

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how our model 2 shows that longtime nuns are significantly less likely to report high levels of happiness than religious groups are, and in Model 4, we can see that affective orientation is significant. Again, with those who find comfort being happier, those who find anxiety being less happy than those who are indifferent.

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And again, in Model 5, we see that the identity duration measure is no longer significant when we put effective orientation into the model meaning effective orientation is likely accounting for a lot of the differences across the non-religious identity, duration variable.

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and then finally, for self-reported health. Again, we have the same models, and again, there are very few differences between non-religious and religious respondents, and any of the models here the only measures that were significant were non-religious group attendants and model 3 and an anxious, affective orientation and model 5.

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So model 3 shows that people who attend non-religious groups are significantly more likely to report good health when compared to those who don't attend such groups and model. 5 shows that an anxious, affective orientation decreases self-reported health.

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Okay? So I quickly want to show a few more models that I'll run through quickly because I am running out of time. I wanted to investigate this comfort, anxiety, measure even further, because it does seem to be accounting for a lot of the variation in the models. so here I have comfort as the outcome, variable meaning, the anxiety and different and indifference options. Our group together is the reference group and in line with the descriptive statistics we saw earlier across the board. Religious people are more likely than all non religious groups to find comfort and their religion and non religion.

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however, models 3 and 4 show that attendance at non-religious groups significantly increases the likelihood that someone will find comfort in their religion, and not religion or non-religence.

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But again, this doesn't mean that this is because non-religious people are anxious. If we put anxiety as the outcome, we can see that the non-religious are not significantly more likely to feel anxious about their non religion than religious people are. The only significant variables here are being recently non-religious. So the recently non-religious are 2.7 5 times more likely than the religious to feel anxiety around their non religion.

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But being a long time none, and and always non-religious they are not significantly different than the religious. Also, we see that non-religious group attendance is also significant significant here. And so it'd be interesting to talk with you all about this in the Q. And a non-religious group attendance predicts both increased anxiety and increased comfort in your non-religious identity. And so I think this is mostly because if you're attending a non-religious group, you're not indifferent about your non-religion. Right? You are sort of feeling something about it in one way or the other.

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Okay, so I don't have time to go through the mediation. models here. But the sort of the general takeaway is that the affective orientation measure of comfort, anxiety does significantly mediate the relationship between the non-religious identity duration measures and our health outcomes.

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Sorry with my paper, so to conclude, I'll point to a few important takeaways from the analyses. So first, I think it's important to reiterate that we did not find huge differences between the religious and the non-religious across our well-being measures, despite what much of the research has has reported previously, and I think that's an important contribution in and of itself. Dozens of studies conclude that the religious are healthier and happier than the non-religious. But in most of my models the non-religious were not really that different.

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These were. There were some important exceptions, of course, but what I hope the models show is that the non-religious are capable of just as much variation on these measures as are the religious.

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Next, we find that the non-religious have a variety of mechanisms that can promote health and well-being in secular ways. Non-religious people who join non-religious groups who find comfort in their non-religious, and who have been non-religious for more than 5 years, tend to be happier, healthier, and more satisfied than other non-religious groups, and non-religious people who have less certainty-filled identities like agnostics, do fare worse. On some of these measures

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we also find that the non-religious life course shapes health, and well-being. People who have recently become non-religious are much more likely to experience anxiety around their non-religion than people who have been non-religious for a longer period of time, and this kind of anxiety consistently predicts lower life, satisfaction, happiness, and physical health. And so, if we take just these cross-sectional surveys, and we don't

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Look at how non-religious identities and experiences of a non-religion change over time. We might miss how people people can find comfort in their non-religion over time, as they sort of join non-religious groups and start to come to terms.

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So taken together, we find that, rather than non-religion in general being bad for your well-being. As much of the research in this area concludes the primary driving factor. Predicting well-being in our models was whether or not people found comfort or anxiety in their non-religious identity groups all in there. Thank you.

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thank you, Jackie. I have lots of questions, but we'll get to those at the end. So our numbers are increasing. This is great. Maybe by the end of the place will be full. This is fun. Our next presentation is by Ignacio Cassettes.

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There he is, and this is on non-religion and social cohesion.

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See if this comes up. Make sure we're good

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Bingo evidence for one.

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Hello! I in Nashville I work at the center for social conflict, and cohesion studies go in in Chile.

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This work is a spin-off of my thesis, and also it's a work in progress so welcome every comments, idea, critics go ahead.

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The general framework of my work. It's about the relation between religion and social cohesion.

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a classical issue in in sociology, but

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I think a relevant aspect to think in contemporary societies characterized by increasing diversity, including the religious one.

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So

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let me start with a brief introduction, the Latin American context, and then

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the results and some conclusions

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about the concept of a non-religious

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as different work have presented is not trivial, the definition and operationalization of this category.

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The objective of my presentation is to show a wide description. So I am not too going to problematicize mostly about the category. But shortly I recognize a negative approach. That's who consider themselves to be far from a particular religion, a non identification.

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but also

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a positive approach does who identify themselves as agnostic or atheist as an affirmative identification.

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Both of them are considered in the same category, and for this presentation sorry. But I will use non-religious and and affiliated as synonymous.

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Considering this, of course, it is not a homogeneous category, and it is necessary to recognize the Blind spot.

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but at the same time it is a useful category to analyze the massive change that different societies have experienced during the last decade.

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It is not a universal category. It could be very different, being on religious here in Melbourne, in Chile, or in India.

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and as we have here, during the conferences during the Conference. The processes of secularization are diverse, and their interpretation is not simple. Despite this, different studies have shown that this category of non-religious people, with all its difficulties differ from the rest of the population in social and political matters

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it is a relevant category.

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Social cohesion is not an easy gossip here.

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yet, despite its relevance in the social science, social cohesion remains a largely ill-defined term.

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Will some understand it as equivalent to solidarity or tolerance, or inflate the meaning of the term incorporating notions, such as inclusion, equality, and poverty.

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Bernard, for example, indicate that social cohesion is a was a concept or a concept of convenience.

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Despite this critic. The concept continues to be valid. It is a powerful concept to think in the consequences of social change.

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The operationalization is especially complicated.

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a

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full of decision which dimension which indicators incorporate the normative aspect of social cohesion. If it did, based on share values or in some particular values of solidarity, tolerance.

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or equality.

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I work with a minimalist definition focus on social ties supported by the influential work of Chen, too, and Chan, that organized the concept in a vertical and a recent horizontal dimension

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in a vertical axis, institutional trust, the confidence in democracy, the political participation, and in the horizontal axis, the relationship and organization among citizens social trust, the sense of belonging or identity.

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For this presentation I will only use social trust as our isental dimension in

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as the horizontal axis, dimension and trust in political institution as a vertical axis dimension. These are my 2 dependent burials.

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Different outdoor authors have stressed the relevance of Catholic Church and the popular religiosity to understand the cultural matrix on the continent. But there is a process of change in the radiosity of Latin American

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societies, a secularization process.

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and at the same time uproarization one. This photograph is in Chile about 5 years ago, during the resid of Pope Francisco, the or Incessional Commission inspector, are expected around 400,000 attendants, however, to the place are right. Only 50,000.

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So there is a process of secularization, certainly, but at the same time diversification.

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A

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in Jerusalem terms, the Continent has transcended from a Catholic.

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almost monopolistic situation to a more pluralistic panorama characterized by the increasing of evangelicals of their religion and an affiliated

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until the

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Catholics there

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and during until the 70 s. Catholic represented over the 90% of the population.

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and it will concentrate a

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in the last 2 decades.

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Sorry there, I think it not the last version, but it's my fault.

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of course, the and if we concentrate the last 2 decades we can see the same pattern with that acceleration, acceleration, tendency, the no-religious represent today around 15% of the population in the continent.

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Of course.

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This this tendency is different between countries, until, for example, this trend has been increasing. In the last few years, the non-religious have been rise to the 30% in Mexico. By contrast, this tendency has been more progressive with a less pronounced slope, but in the same direction

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about social cohesion, the Latin America society's lack of welfare, state, or an institutional structure that preserved inclusion according to different scholars. This characteristic could explain the persistent of low level of political trust, as you can see in the Graphic.

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brought something called this the distrust trap.

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and at the same time Latin America. Lack of a roost. Civil society. The continuing has low level of social trust and low associativity.

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so which is the source of social cohesion in the Continent.

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So scholars proposed that the integration in the continent is sustained by traditional sources, the centrality of the family in the social order, social relation based on reciprocity and the religion

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summing up in Latin America we have a social cohesion with relevant challenges. The reduced factor as an important component in understanding social cohesion and important and rabbit change in the religious landscape, including polarization and segregation dynamics. So

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does this change in the religiosity of the population have an impact on the main dimensions of social cohesion.

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the models. And results that I'm going to show a focus on social and political trust as dependent variables and as key independent, variable. The model use, the radius, affiliation or non-affilation.

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also using other dimension of religiosity as control variables like participation in religious service and importance in daily life.

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One aspect that I want to highlight is the inclusion of the contextual dimension in the analysis

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as context. For this presentation, I use the Religious Diversity Index. We we use it by the Pew Research Center reports. It indicates the concentration or diversification of the religious field.

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In this presentation I reuse this variable as moderator of the relationship at the individual level, that is, to assess whether the relationship between religiosity and trust changes as the religious contexts become more diverse.

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the multinarial analysis allows to incorporate the effect of the context. In the legal. Taking advantage of the nested structure of the day of data.

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I use a laptop, surveys an individual nested in surveys and surveys nested in countries a three-level model, following the repeat cross-sectional design proposed by Smith, Katrina, and freighter.

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So

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this is part of the the detail of the nonetheless. But I

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prefer, continue.

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Firstly, I'm going to abort social trust as a key component of social cohesion.

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I am not having time to describe the literature on social trust. But it is possible to sum up in 2 main approaches as based on moral instructor or affected by experience.

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both social trust as moral foundation and social trust, as prolooked or moderate by experiences, are linked with religiosity. Many theoretical and empirical work have been linked to trust with religion, for Wu Yama Putin, and a solar to name a few.

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But at the same time the link is not universal to analyze the relationship between the 2 concepts. It is important to consider the moral and social dimension of religiosity and to consider the context understanding the religiosity as a situated social value.

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This is a part of the regression table

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at the interviewer level.

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The analysis shows in model one a negative impact of being non-religious compared to those who identified with our religion

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in the model. 3.

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When we separate by affiliation, it is possible to observe that this difference occur in particular in the comparison between non-religious and Catholic. the Catholic tradition will give its believer a greater propensity to trust compared to, nor religious.

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and in the model. 2. When we incorporate the social dimension of relativity, the participation in a religious community.

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the difference disappear. controlling by attendance no religious trust

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at the same level that affiliated people.

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so in like with social capital theory does who withdraw from religious community tend to retreat from social life, and that will be that will impact a lower propensity to trust

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in Latin America, where civil society shows low level of organization and participation.

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This is a factor that should be considered.

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and at the country level I want to concentrate in this result

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the religious context does not affect in a different way the propensity to trust

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the.

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But when we concentrate the analysis in the moderator role of the context. We obtain this as so as a society become more diverse to the right.

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that is, it increased. The religious diversity index. The difference between affiliated and non-affiliated, disappears. In other words, when you are Catholic in a country with a robust Catholic majority, your probability to trust increase, but this relationship begins to disappear as the population become more diverse. Again, the idea of religion as a so-called value as situated in a specific context.

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Now the second dimension, political trust. Political trust is the evaluation that citizens make of the main democratic institution. In this case I use a traditional index based on confidence on the national Congress, political parties, a justice court, and the police

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 and it.

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The religion in particular, has been described as a dimension in which the trust in the Church, or any specific hierarchy, constitute a crucial factor. It is possible to assume that the affiliated people will have a greater propensity to trust in the institution than non- religion people

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at the individual level in model one, a negative impact of being non-religious compared to those who identified with our religion the model 2 and 3 showed that this effect is robust, even controlled by different dimension of religiosity.

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When we disaggregate the affiliation, the comparison is in favor of all religion, affiliation, Catholics, evangelical, and other religions so systematically, we can observe that no religion have lower propensity to trust in political institution.

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Unlike social trust, this effect does not seem to depend on the level of religious diversity. At the country level, where, for example, compared to Catholics, the difference tend to decrease as the religious diversity, index increase compared to evangelicals, this effect even rise together their religious diversity.

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So as conclusion, it is possible to observe that non-affiliated show lower level of trust, both social and political.

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about social trust. The difference is explained by participation in religious service through the through this social dimension, non-affiliated, loose social capital that correlate with greater trust

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the loss of participation.

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It's not replaced by participation in other secular instances. Remember the level of so associat with the Latin America are particularly lowers.

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But this dynamic is not a static. It depend on the context in particular, as a country increase its level of religious diversity. The difference between identifying or not with a religion tends to disappear.

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the context moderate in the moderate being, the real relation between religiosity and social trust. This stress, the approach that reliability has a social, situated role.

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Personal identity become a more socially normative behavior when the context reinforced it

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on political trust. The non-rangeous people tend to trust lower than religious people, even controlling by different dimension of religious. It is possible to observe a spillover effect between different realms.

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In this dimension the context does not interact significantly in the relationship at the individual level.

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and in more general terms.

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the increase of no religious in Latin America interacts in different ways with social cohesion. This transition, faster in countries like Chile, lower in other, like Paraguay or Mexico, constitute an important.

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a cultural change in the continent, where religion and the Catholic Church in particular, has been a structural role in the comprehension of social cohesion.

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Therefore it seemed necessary for future research to incorporate different dimension of religiosity, different dimension of social cohesion.

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the effect of non-profitiosity as contextually situated.

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And of course, the heterogeneity within the categories. Thank you very much.

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Okay.

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so

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we have one more presentation. And this one is online. I am supposed to stop sharing, I believe.

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All right, Julia, can you share your screen? Let's make sure it works.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: Thank you.

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Yeah.

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Hey, we're good.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: Okay, that's all yours. Okay, thank you very much. good evening, everyone, and thank you for staying here until the end. so my presentation is entitled. My life hasn't changed much change, and continuing Catholic upstate lives, and I'm happy to present right after the previous presenter because, I'm also going to include partly and Latin America with the case on Argentina.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: So my study is about a post to see from the Catholic Church in both Argentina and Spain. And I understand, or in this context, Argentina and I, to see, means an explicit form of non religion which implies the rejection of mostly institutionalized religion.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: and one of the characteristic trades of This position of apostasy of

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: requesting the removal of once data from the Church records is a a position of anti clericalism.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño:  so the literature on religious exit has highlighted that exit from highly close environments, or what I learned yesterday, that is often called high coast religions by, and this is the term proposed by go, and also used by other colleagues in the room.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: is often a process that is done in in the not in the open. So it's a hidden process when people belong to environments that require strong time commitment, and also strong in group attachment.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: Leaving these groups is often done in silence what to say, and it may imply life change in social, economic and family consequences.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: and it also can mean, or often implies, a major changes in one zones, beliefs, behaviors, relations places of residents, financial situation to deal with this moving out of this high cost, religion and close environment.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: So in this presentation, I want to inquire whether this is also the case, that leaving the Catholic Church formally a apostatizing in Argentina and Spain.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: Whether that also has this a mayor, a life, a changing

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: situations or or consequences.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: and my study is frame within the lift non religion and live in a policy perspective. So I'm interested in how those who have decided to leave the Catholic Church experience this process, how they? Talk about it! And that's why I conducted narrative interviews with 44 upper States, so 22 in Argentina and 22 in Spain.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: between 2,018 and 2,020, and interviews were done with both men and women. Cis gender and Tpt. Qi people people with different levels of education, so mostly with higher education, but also people who only had a primary education.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: different professions from liberal to more blue-collar. workers

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: and I also did observation in a a collective, a pro to see organized by a feminist group in Spain. And I analyze material and visual components of this policy movement. And here, on the right hand side, you can see a letter that one of my interview is got from the church at confirming that they're supposed to see had been done. So these are the kinds of materials that I'm also engaging with.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: So in relation to my study, which, of course, is qualitative. I asked my participants what were the triggers that made them decide to a policy what were issues that prompted their decision to leave the church, and I have grouped their responses. And this 4 plus one. So many of them refer to the impact of family members, friends, and other acquaintances.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: either because they had over, also apostatized, or because they had introduced them to a new ideas and perspectives in life that had made them decide to leave the church.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: access to books, and also education, and has also been something that fostered or trigger. Some of these people's decision to apostatize, especially because, as was mentioned in the first presentation, this offers an exposure to worldview pluralism. that people didn't have before.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: the Internet is also highlighted as an important element facilitating the decision to apologize, especially because it

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: makes the process much easier and concrete.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: and also some of them refer to experiences within the church at with the church for a, especially in in their school years.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: And an additional element that I want to highlight. Here is, a frequent catalyst for this decision. To leave the Catholic Church was the feminist movement, especially since 2,018, when the struggle for the legalization of abortion became so the strong in Argentina, and that also impacted. the Spanish feminist.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: so

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: as the title of the presentation already shows. most of my apostates. indicated that the decision hadn't changed much after a post to ties, and I asked them explicitly about the consequences that I possibly might have had in their lives.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: So most of them indicated that in relation to beliefs and religious practices, if they had had any before, they were rejected a long time ago. So at the moment of apostatizing. There were no big changes.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: I asked them if, after a post to Tyson, they participated in religious events, and they most of them admitted that they did participate in funerals and weddings but this was what they call social participation, so mostly to respect either the person and the family who had disease and the families or

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: other friends, for example, if they were getting married, but they also re-signified this participation, and renegotiated it in interesting ways, but I cannot go in that into that.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: I asked them whether they had

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: particular particular reactions from the social environment and what they highlighted was

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: many different ways of in which their environments responded. So lack of understanding, curiosity, and willingness to know more about the process, approval and negative reactions, but mostly in difference and

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: same goes for the work environment. Most of them had no consequences except for one person who was fired explicitly because of their political and the public

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: engagement with a process and a couple more who said they prefer not to mention these 2 colleagues coworkers, because that could raise some suspicion.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: just to give you a few snippets or some as it samples from the interviews. When I ask, has anything changed in general? These were the kinds of answers. I got. No, nothing, absolutely just the very intimate satisfaction of saying I've done what I had to do. No, life doesn't change.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: Actually, it's something you're already clear about. You do it. You feel comfortable. And you really forget. No, because it came along the way, or we already had it very digested. And if I go, these are of course, very short answers. But if I if we go a bit

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: deeper into the reflections that they make. There are actually some changes, but they don't seem to be very much into this

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: categories of life changing consequences mentioned by The literature on high cost this affiliation from Kai. High coast religions. So they say, I feel more free. It was really important, but on a practical level my life has not changed. I no longer went to mass. I already didn't have any kind of relationship with the church, etc.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño:  Another one from Argentina says, I don't think it changes your life, because I think what changes the most is internally

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: the changes that I took off that label that did not correspond to me. that has nothing to do with me.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: Similarly might this life hasn't changed, but I have. Life hasn't changed at all, but I have. I'm stronger, I'm freer. I think I'm stronger. I think I'm freer, and that's enough. It's an internal political act. So in the end she says. In that sense I'm more powerful. Yes, it has changed a lot.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: mighty in Argentina says, I think it's more of the same. It change when I stop we live in like that on a personal level, but on a personal level it was more of the same.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: So it's a bit They also contract themselves. They say it changed, but at the same time it didn't change.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: So how can we make sense of this? kind of discourses? Is it really the case that these are post states really didn't feel any changes in their lives. How come? We seen the literature that This affiliation has several consequences and impact on people's lives, and in this case it seems not to be the case.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: Is it? Because, belonging to the Catholic Church in Argentina and Spain nowadays doesn't really require any commitments, and therefore just signing off really doesn't have an impact or other other things in there. And what what I try to understand is how these people narrate their process, and well, drawing on literature

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: on this affiliation narratives, I wanted to propose the notion of a narrative of early detachment, and this is something that I say?

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: That appears recurrently in my interviews, which is a a narrative that presents a post to see stories as something that

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: originated in their early childhood or youth.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: so it's not something that happened abruptly in their late years, but it's something as they argue that they were always thinking about that they from very early ages they were very critical of the church, or they didn't believe what they were told in school.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: and in a way this could be a strategy to build some con. Sorry to reduce the discontinuity

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: between a previous self and a current self, although One could also think that simply.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: especially the younger generations, didn't have much engagement with the Church

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: from the beginning, and therefore there were no big changes.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño:  and I wanted to conclude that in a way it could also be the case that there are no

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: big significant changes in people's lives, because apostasy

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: in this case it's not a matter of religion as such. It's not a matter of having lost faith, or, as many of them say, reject faith, or as it's not a matter of stopping participating in a religious community or stopping practicing.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: There are a few examples. A few of my interview is where there was actually a change when that were more engaged, and they stopped being practicing Catholics. But for most of them this was not the case. I policy was not about

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: losing their religious engagement. It is a a a political decision, a political act that they engage with. to denounce the role of the Catholic Church in this context.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: And well, I, colleagues from other studies have shown that in Catholic majority context, where the Catholic Church occupies such a prominent position, and this was the case for the history of Argentina's pain till the Mexico and many countries in Latin America.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: apostasy is a form of a fighting the the, the lack of space for religious descent. And it's also a way of putting forward claims for the secularization of the State and the this engagement of the church from a political activities and public debates.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: so

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: in a way. And here I wanted to make a connection with the first presentation and atheism, and most of these people I identify as atheist. But a post to see in general is a way of

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: fighting elements such as the role that the Catholic Church played in the colonization of Latin America. This is something that came up in the interviews very often especially in the case of Argentina, but also of a way of denouncing the role that the Church had played, for example, in the dictatorships of Franco and Bidela and throughout the history of the 2 countries.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: So

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: if we understand apostasy as a political act or as a form of political activism. It is easier to understand that it didn't have such a mayor impact on people's lives and on their practices, behaviors, and relations to their environment.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: So here, just a couple of photos of a recent feminist processes that have been done in Spain on the left hand side, and Argentina on the right hand, hand side to just show you a bit of what I've been talking about, and I will stop here, and I look forward to your comments and questions. Thank you very much.

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Excellent, thank you, Julia. That was great So we do have

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plenty of time for Q&A

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presenters. So we want to have our presenters come up here so you can receive the arrows as they come in.

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Excellent! And I will run around with the mic

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for those who have questions. Oh, hands are already up. All right. Get up there. Quick.

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Okay.

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yeah, yeah, yeah. I just need to double-check the name. Sorry. I have actually 2 questions to 2 different presenters. First, first presenter. Sorry. I don't know how to. Okay, Julia, can you hear the question? Yeah. Okay.

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So

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you mentioned that there's a lot of policies in New Zealand that

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trying to include the indigenous worldview, Murray and I understand the whole point. I used to live in New Zealand, so I know a little bit

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what I, when I was lived there. What I was always wondering is like how and I was interesting to here interested to hear what your participants say about the

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push to

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include Mari language and worldview in early childhood education and in schools, because

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I find it very difficult, because there's a lot of religion out of schools push. But then, on the other hand, you have the Maori worldview included as a form of culture. But it's still

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not secular. So

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I was just wondering how if they talked about this, and if they mentioned it.

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and the other one is for Jackie.

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I was just wondering if you mentioned that, and I didn't catch it. I apologize.

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But obviously you made this connection between

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levels of anxiety and

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attendance, of non-religious groups. Did you look into? Did you check at all. If people had

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already mental health conditions.

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because if they had them they might not feel social anxiety. And that's why they didn't attend.

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So, you know, I mean, I wonder if there's like a correlation you look into?

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Yes.

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goldfish here. That's a great question. yes, 100%. Because those questions are part of the interview, and everybody does have an opinion about it. And usually it is that they're concerned, that. And I'm going to power. For as a participant here, that under the protection of culture or revitalization, a lot of spirituality is being sneaked in where it doesn't have to.

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And there's this tendency of depicting Maori as spiritual beings, where, in an exaggerated way, and people are quite.

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they don't like that. But then you also have the other extent of more controversial positionalities, where I'm even terrified to

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renarrate or reach all those positions, such as people who work in education themselves and obviously in in New Zealand. Now there's this debate around indigenous ontologies, epistemologies, and how we should teach that in addition to science. And so, yeah, so some some of the participants have quite

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critical positions on those on those ideas. And yeah, so does that answer a question.

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Yeah, thank you. So first off, I would say, like, No, we weren't able. So this is a cross-sectional service. So we weren't able to sort of determine if they were anxious first and then attended later if the anxiety came after. But that is sort of the goal of the longitudinal project that we're working on. So we can actually sort of test. You know what's coming first, and the and the mechanisms. But I do think so. So to remind people. The finding was, we both found that

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people who attended Non-religious groups are both more anxious about their non-religious and more comfortable with their non-religion. And so we're trying to figure that out. And again, because the reference group is indifference. So if you're attending a non-religious group, you're probably not indifferent

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about your non-religious identity. But I think also you know people who are anxious about what it means to be non-religious are probably seeking out places to come to terms with that right. So a non-religious group is a space to sort of talk through that to meet other non-religious people. So I think the longitudinal work is needed to determine like, does that anxiety go away because of that. So because of that group attendance or not? Or does that increase anxiety? Because then you sort of

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you realize there are a lot more options to sort of work through. So like, right? So we're unsure. And so that's where this cross-sectional survey showed us that we actually need longitudinal data to really answer that question. So we're hoping that someone wants it eventually.

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thanks. That was a really interesting session. 3 comments. Julia, I love the narrative of earlier detachment. You might be interested that pagans, when they report conversion.

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say, I always was one.

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So there's actually a parallel that in pagan conversion narratives where they don't convert. I always was one.

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but I thought that was interesting.

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Jackie!  I wondered whether

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you'd looked at participation in other non-religious groups like sporting groups.

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because it seems to me that you're falling into that thing of thinking that to be non-religious is to be opposed to religion, whereas to be non-religious can also be to be in different religion, in which case participation in sporting groups might be really interesting.

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And and finally, Sarah, how did you define atheism?

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 I,

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because because it it seems to me that

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that indigenous ontologies?

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 it's actually problematic to call them religious in a lot of ways. And so to talk about atheism is to maintain

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a sort of Christian way of thinking about the world. And so it seems to me a problematic category.

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Should I respond? First, because I'm very antsy and thank you for the comment. Yes, so we are using.

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First of all, let me reiterate that most of the vast majority of the participants came from Christian household.

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So the way that I got interested in this project, to begin with, was finding out about a group of people, a community who called themselves Atoa-core, meaning no god, and they translated it as

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community of Maori atheists and fre thinkers. So I'll start there in the research how I define atheism. Obviously, I'm using multiple different terminology, but in a negative sense. And and when I reach out to people to ask whether they want to participate. I send a little survey which one which one of these positions describe your

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views it starts with, I don't believe in God God's.

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and then downwards from there.

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I'm not sure if I'm 100% responding to your question, and I think that's a much bigger sort of definition and philosophical approach to this. But yeah, the fact that they represent themselves as atheists, and because they are living in coming from Christian backgrounds. To begin with, I feel like

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I'm not

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majorly concerned or uncomfortable with that approach.

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yeah, great. We do actually have a question about sort of participation in other sorts of civic and social groups on the survey. So that's something that we could certainly look at to see if you know participation in other.

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you know non-religious spaces like not religious, I guess I would say, rather than not like non-religious also promote well being. And I'm sure that there are significant things there, but I would also say that I don't necessarily not all explicitly. Atheist and humanist groups are anti-religious either. So, for example, I studied the Sunday Assembly, which was an Atheist church. It still exists.

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and they are explicitly sort of trying to not be anti-religious anymore. And so we focused on the non-religious, the explicit sort of atheist humanist group attendance to sort of parallel studies of religious group attendance. But I think you're right. We can certainly look into other types of spaces that non-religious people might be finding sort of well-being and social support. And and we can certainly look at that yet.

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Julia, did you want to respond to the comment.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: well, I I also had. I had a question. But I can just say, Thank you, Douglas, for referring to your work on Pagan, I think it's your own work as I will look into that.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: And may I use this opportunity to already ask my question.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: Yeah. well, I I was also going to ask you, Jackie, about the whether you had to look at participation in other organizations that are not explicitly not really. Just because I think that could also maybe be interesting. And I have a a question for if not, you about the

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: about the last

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: loss of trust on political institutions, or the lack of the less lower trust on political institutions by the non-religious. And of course that depends on the context. But I was wondering if you have

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: any assumptions or hypotheses of why this is the case of what the multi patients could be. even if, of course, this is a quantitative analysis. I don't know if you have done any more in depth, qualitative analysis of

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: The reasons behind this. Thank you.

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Thank you, Julia.

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The hypothesis of this relation, the lack of political trust in non-religious people

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very up

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a different policy. But the main argument is that participating be part of

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A religious community is at the same time to be part of a

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a species of hierarchy, maybe an explicit charge or no. But it's some kind of a hierarchy

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that in some way

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up to a spillover effect to other real in this case, to a political real. So you are

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most a

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there

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most adequate to a certain form of hierarchy. So this is the the the hypotheses of why the religious affiliation. Religious people tend to trust more in political institutions than non-affiliated.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: Yeah, thank you. I I was asking, because, among some of the posters I interviewed. they highlighted their rejection of authority altogether, or authorities that are far from them. So I thought that maybe this was also the case of what you found in your research.

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Yeah, I I I have to recognize that it's a another blind spot of my work, because

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a in Latin America. the

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the Catholic Church has suffered a very.

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a strong punch just in the

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trust in the Church, you know. So this is a

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it's a really a really good question and an aspect to to inquire in in detail.

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Julia Martinez - Ariño: Thank you.

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Yeah. Thanks everyone for again, a great round of papers. just a couple of questions, one for Sarah, and one for Magnatio Sarah. The the Maori Bible, was first published in 1,868, which is quite early in terms of New Zealand history since colonisation.

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And I was just wondering if that's come up in your research at all. I mean in terms of the historical context as a text of conversion or a text of identity.

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And in more recent times, if it's something that's still read or something that's still important, noting what you said about

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Maori language been about 20% of fluid speakers. So yeah, just curious to to know if that's come up at all. And Ignatio, that was an interesting photograph about with the visit of Pope Francis.

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So just wondering again

431
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in terms of what you're saying about Catholicism, you know, taking a punch, if you like, in Latin America, if any of those institutional

432
01:22:34.200 --> 01:22:49.209
church methods, if you like. papal visits, world youth days, if they're having much impact in terms of the church re engaging with Latin America and the like. Yeah, thank you.

433
01:22:53.810 --> 01:22:54.970
First.

434
01:22:56.530 --> 01:23:09.110
okay, so the Bible doesn't come up. But some of the items that do come up which is quite fascinating are questions around with these.

435
01:23:09.160 --> 01:23:36.959
the concept of ego, which is a supreme Being in Maori worldview, and that Supreme Being is curiously, very much like the monotheistic god. And there's like a debate within humanities whether this is a post-colonial construct, or whether actually, you know, traditions in the Pacific region have this ideology. So this idea comes off that I realized.

436
01:23:36.980 --> 01:23:48.670
that's E, we, that my mother, or whatever we believed in is actually even that is a colonial construct, and the rejection of that. So that's as close as it it would get to the

437
01:23:48.870 --> 01:23:52.820
reference to that regarding

438
01:23:53.100 --> 01:24:09.080
the percentage of people who can't speak to that. That was an example that I was giving around 1,900 fiftys. Today things are changing. There's a lot of state-sponsored programs helping

439
01:24:09.450 --> 01:24:15.270
everybody to learn Maori supporting the bicultural nature of the

440
01:24:16.220 --> 01:24:18.050
country. Yeah.

441
01:24:20.660 --> 01:24:21.320
the

442
01:24:22.600 --> 01:24:29.490
the panorama that you describe, and the photo graph tend to

443
01:24:30.200 --> 01:24:31.740
to to the thing.

444
01:24:32.080 --> 01:24:34.490
It's true.

445
01:24:34.620 --> 01:24:39.209
in fact, during the visit of the Pope Francisco in Chile

446
01:24:39.380 --> 01:24:41.950
we have a many social movement.

447
01:24:42.180 --> 01:24:48.739
The religious people engage stronger in the church

448
01:24:49.320 --> 01:24:56.889
social movement against some decision of the Pope. Yeah, no, no, not not any

449
01:24:56.990 --> 01:25:14.609
person against the.

450
01:25:14.840 --> 01:25:19.589
So it's a very interesting position, because they are

451
01:25:19.690 --> 01:25:23.079
engage people, you know, but

452
01:25:23.420 --> 01:25:29.890
the institutional trust to connect with the presentation.

453
01:25:30.230 --> 01:25:31.120
A.

454
01:25:32.050 --> 01:25:33.170
It's

455
01:25:33.550 --> 01:25:39.850
this, I think, tend to to to, to coincidence with the the fluid

456
01:25:39.880 --> 01:25:44.300
of the religious affiliation, at least in countries like Chile.

457
01:25:44.640 --> 01:25:48.040
If you see the Graphic in 5 years

458
01:25:48.090 --> 01:26:03.389
the people change. I don't know 20%, the rise of an affiliated. So it's really, really fluid. And it's not the problem of my data, because it's a systematic in different surveys. So

459
01:26:03.470 --> 01:26:05.190
it it's a big issue.

460
01:26:08.120 --> 01:26:20.099
Well, thank you all for your fascinating presentations. I also had some questions about a non-religious community, but I think you have already

461
01:26:20.170 --> 01:26:32.889
explain a little more. But I also have a question that might be a methodological question regarding this result, where you find that it's

462
01:26:33.060 --> 01:26:38.390
among recent knowns that you find perhaps more anxiety.

463
01:26:38.470 --> 01:26:52.509
And I wonder if the reason is because they are non-served because they are recent. May I explain it? Perhaps it's the fact that they have changed recently that may foster the anxiety

464
01:26:52.510 --> 01:27:13.979
and not the direction of this change. So I wonder if it wouldn't be interesting to compare this group with recent religious. Let's say, those who have changed from one denomination to another, or that we are non-religious and become because it seems that the fact of being recent is quite important in

465
01:27:14.350 --> 01:27:17.300
the results that you are having.

466
01:27:17.320 --> 01:27:32.409
I can, as you. I know you were focusing today on chile, but I would love to know if you have done some comparisons with other Latin American cases. And Julia, it was fascinating, and

467
01:27:32.650 --> 01:27:38.900
I wanted to ask, since apostasy is mainly a political act.

468
01:27:39.150 --> 01:27:55.579
If you find among your interviewees other political characteristics that would be salient, you mentioned their closeness to feminist movements, but I don't know if there would be other

469
01:27:55.830 --> 01:28:04.050
elements that could help us understand. Let's say, the political profile of your interviews. And thank you.

470
01:28:06.860 --> 01:28:27.600
Yeah, okay, I'll go first. So we did actually look at the recently religious as well. So the sort of the shifters. And we actually found that they they had increased comfort over the long term religious people. so something about shifting into our religion sort of gave them a sense of maybe they found new answers to questions that they didn't have before. But I do think there's something

471
01:28:27.600 --> 01:28:44.189
about the recency more than it is the being non-religious that matters here right? So if you leave a religion, you're leaving a community. Often you are sort of opening up new questions about, you know, existential questions about, you know. Why am I here what happens when I die? Those kinds of things?

472
01:28:44.190 --> 01:28:57.010
and also in the Us. Especially being non-religious, is a stigmatized identity. And so that comes with, you know, anxiety about. Can I tell people about this? You know those kinds of things? So I think there's there's a mixture of of it.

473
01:28:57.010 --> 01:29:22.829
A shifting identity brings people anxiety. And so I think maybe there would be something interesting about looking, you know. Again, the the recently religious were more comfortable, tend to to find more comfort. But maybe looking into other kinds of identity, changes that aren't necessarily related to religion could be interesting to sort of get at like. Is it really being non-religious that matters, or is it this identity change that's causing? I think that's a really interesting insight that I'm going to look into more.

474
01:29:25.980 --> 01:29:42.569
I'm sorry, by my my, my fault, but the the data it's for all Latin American countries, 18 countries, and all the results that I show, except the the specific country also one

475
01:29:42.680 --> 01:29:48.429
are from from comparative perspective to to Latin America, and this allow me

476
01:29:48.550 --> 01:29:57.739
to incorporate the contextual effect as moderator of the individual relation, but it's my fault the excessive of Chilean bias

477
01:30:01.670 --> 01:30:03.109
Julia up next.

478
01:30:05.800 --> 01:30:21.100
Julia Martinez - Ariño: Yes, thank you very much. I'm not sure who asked if I cannot see your faces when you ask. But thank you very much. And yes, probably I should have said a bit more about the profiles of this post. yes, indeed they

479
01:30:21.210 --> 01:30:50.620
Julia Martinez - Ariño: I could. I would say that they are activists in many other as fears of political life, so to say. So it's not just a policy. a few of my interviews were members of trade unions. most of them were feminist and active, active in the feminist movement. Some of them were especially men and members of atheist or Secularist organizations.

480
01:30:50.790 --> 01:31:01.890
Julia Martinez - Ariño: And one question that I ask them if they have to position themselves in a in the political scale of extreme right, extreme left as scale from 0 to 10,

481
01:31:01.990 --> 01:31:16.010
Julia Martinez - Ariño: all but 2 said they were on the extreme left corner, and the other 2 were around 3, 5. So a bit in the middle. so I think definitely.

482
01:31:16.200 --> 01:31:20.680
Julia Martinez - Ariño: it's a quite specific profile that

483
01:31:20.760 --> 01:31:31.610
Julia Martinez - Ariño: makes the effort and apostasy. So I think, if we would look at religious in different people, religiously different or non religious, but

484
01:31:31.800 --> 01:31:44.580
Julia Martinez - Ariño: who have remained members of the church. they would be many more, and also much less engage with their fight against the church, and then against it's interference with the state. Yeah.

485
01:31:45.220 --> 01:31:46.060
Julia Martinez - Ariño: thank you.

486
01:31:47.990 --> 01:31:58.859
I'm going to very quickly ask my questions. I've got just a couple, and then I think we'll probably wrap up. So, Jackie, I think you may have answered this kind of in your conclusion.

487
01:31:58.880 --> 01:32:20.059
Your r squares and all those models were really low. I harp on that a lot which is going to lead to my question for Ignacio. So if you want to comment on that, Ignacio, I'm wondering if this was a fixed effects model or a multi-level model. And then also, did you look at something like an R-square or something that takes into account the effect size. So they are statistically significant relationships. But

488
01:32:20.090 --> 01:32:32.130
how much of the variation are you explaining with the non-religion? And then I have a question for Sarah. But I'm going to ask her after, because it's kind of tangential, Julia, I do have a question about

489
01:32:32.330 --> 01:32:42.359
definitions and terms. So you keep using the word apostasy, and that term is debated.

490
01:32:42.380 --> 01:33:01.770
If you go back to say the work of David Bromley, he he tends to suggest that we reserve that term for people who leave religion and then fight against it, and not everybody else. Right? So kind of the people who leave and like, if they're not fighting. I make the same argument in some of my own research. So I'm wondering why you're

491
01:33:01.770 --> 01:33:14.179
using that term. And it could be that. That's the term that your interviewees are using. So maybe that's why you're using it. But I'm wondering why you're continuing to use that term when it can be a contested debated term.

492
01:33:18.210 --> 01:33:34.259
I'll start. I don't have a great answer. I think you're right. And so you know, what is it that's shaping health and well being, if it's not all of these other factors. but I think that's an important finding, too. Right? So it's like pushing it back against this research that says the non-religious are unhealthy.

493
01:33:34.490 --> 01:33:40.109
we find that's not true, and like religion versus non-religion doesn't seem to be the thing that matters.

494
01:33:40.270 --> 01:33:47.799
Open question. What what is it? And and of, you know, we're controlling for all of the other standard measures, too. So what's

495
01:33:47.860 --> 01:33:54.140
what's happening here? I think open questions. Still, I'm interested to talk to you more about what that might be.

496
01:33:57.310 --> 01:34:01.450
Yeah, I have to improve the presentation of of my data. But it

497
01:34:01.570 --> 01:34:07.119
social trust. The impact is around 10% of the standard deviation.

498
01:34:07.480 --> 01:34:17.640
It is not bad, and in political trust is a very strong, a quarter of point in a scale between one and 5,

499
01:34:17.730 --> 01:34:26.380
and this is even higher than the effect of social trust on political trust. There is a classical

500
01:34:27.140 --> 01:34:35.019
circle, the classical, variable that I use, and it's more than an allocation, an age, for example.

501
01:34:35.120 --> 01:34:39.130
but in political trust is the the stronger effect.

502
01:34:41.850 --> 01:34:44.369
Julia, do you want to respond? Yeah.

503
01:34:44.790 --> 01:35:04.669
Julia Martinez - Ariño: yes, thank you. yeah. I'm aware of. the participation of the term, and also of what what you've written about this and I use the term because this is actually the term that is being used by this people themselves. and they do so intentionally. So it's a way of appropriating

504
01:35:04.780 --> 01:35:15.659
Julia Martinez - Ariño: the vocabulary of the Church to actually combat or fight back against the church. So it's not a term that I chose myself or

505
01:35:15.860 --> 01:35:16.940
Julia Martinez - Ariño: and

506
01:35:17.150 --> 01:35:22.980
Julia Martinez - Ariño: and actually, these people have left religion in a way to fight the church. So they do.

507
01:35:23.600 --> 01:35:38.070
Julia Martinez - Ariño: It's not just leaving and forgetting about it. It's leaving, and while doing so fight the church. Among my interviews, I think one. I have one or 2, but I think it's one who

508
01:35:38.950 --> 01:35:56.880
Julia Martinez - Ariño: actually was very critical of apostatizing, because he felt that by doing so people and himself were legitimizing against the Church. Again, the Church, by granting the Church the power

509
01:35:57.400 --> 01:36:08.939
Julia Martinez - Ariño: to approve the the exit, or the the rejection of the affiliation. So he was the only one that was quite critical about the actual process of

510
01:36:08.950 --> 01:36:20.839
Julia Martinez - Ariño: deciding to apostatize all the rest were very proudly using the term of being an apple state. so that's why I keep using it.

511
01:36:21.450 --> 01:36:35.329
Julia Martinez - Ariño:  but I also use more analytical terms like institutional disaffiliation. when I write about this. But thanks for pointing it out.

512
01:36:36.510 --> 01:36:38.650
Thank you.

513
01:36:38.670 --> 01:36:48.600
Yes. Can I ask a question? Sure, go for it. So you can see me. We technically, it doesn't. Might sound quite weird for not

514
01:36:49.770 --> 01:36:55.350
what I was hearing when you were analyzing your data and speaking about that sort of

515
01:36:55.420 --> 01:37:23.149
attachment pattern that you're observing. What was it called? No attachment? I'd be really keen to learn about it more because it reminded me of a son of similar thing that I saw in my research on people who leave a Buddhist group called Go and Cosby, passion and Meditation, and digging into that a little bit more, I'd be

516
01:37:23.320 --> 01:37:48.479
inclined to kind of recommend it for that. So even I don't want to be arrogant. But I feel like there's a lot of similarities between our data. What I found when I was looking behind. Why are there this sense of wanting to present themselves as I'm acting on my authenticity. People wanted to emphasize their autonomy in this process, and I and I feel like.

517
01:37:48.480 --> 01:38:07.839
you know, maybe digging into around that. I think there there might be a sense of stigma to say, well, I left, and I experienced these challenges, especially for women who are part of these feminist groups. So like they're looking a little bit more in terms of when they say this, what are they achieving

518
01:38:08.000 --> 01:38:30.559
in that context of the interview. What are the senses of selves that they are presenting? And how are they? Kind of so, yeah, just just a suggestion, because it's really interesting. And and how those narratives work in order to it, is cementing their identity as an apostat. Right is doing that discourse is doing something by saying that I didn't.

519
01:38:30.560 --> 01:38:38.059
You know I didn't have attachment. So that's what I said I wanted to in the kit, and I would love to be in touch with you.

520
01:38:38.390 --> 01:38:57.379
Julia Martinez - Ariño: Yeah, thank you very much. Sarah. And yeah, I I agree. That's in their narrations. They are doing a lot of identity work. so definitely, definitely. That's something I I need to look into more, or I need to dig deeper into if I may just add, one thing is that

521
01:38:58.160 --> 01:39:08.999
Julia Martinez - Ariño:  I think there, there are 2 things happening. On the one hand, there is this what I call the narrative of our late attachment, so presenting themselves

522
01:39:09.810 --> 01:39:19.639
Julia Martinez - Ariño: from the beginning, as already atheist or critical with the church as something they had already done since they were 5 or 6 sometimes even.

523
01:39:19.910 --> 01:39:36.689
Julia Martinez - Ariño: but at the same time, I think, looking at the context of many of these people. and being myself raised in Spain. I think it in a way. It can easily be the case that these people were baptized and did the first communion in their school.

524
01:39:36.830 --> 01:39:51.020
Julia Martinez - Ariño: and that was about it, that they didn't have much more contact with the Church, because belonging to the Church was part of just being part of the Spanish population or Argentinian population, but in many cases it didn't really imply.

525
01:39:51.110 --> 01:39:57.289
Julia Martinez - Ariño: and much more commitment, especially with the younger generation. So It could really be that it has meant

526
01:39:57.510 --> 01:40:04.210
Julia Martinez - Ariño: little transformations of their lives also because it's not a high cost. Religion. Thank you very much.

527
01:40:06.150 --> 01:40:12.279
Ok, please join me in thanking our panelists, and let's go to dinner. Thank you? That's great.