WEBVTT

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so you can start with the acknowledgment of contributing. Yes, I will just mention that I love the I another one. Thank you. Okay. welcome everyone to this joint session, and I'm the I'm Patrice Almaguer, a president of the Rc. 51,

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and I'm the program coordinator of the Rc. 51 sessions.

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Unfortunately, I I think Jennifer Clark, who is the chair, is.

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She's not here, so I will act as

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program as a chair of the

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of this session, which has as the second part of the rise of the far right and Populist movements in Europe we have. The the previous session was with the same name, and we had a very interesting

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and

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papers, oral presentations and online presentations. Just a discussion before.

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So I'm going to start within the acknowledgment of country.

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and which is part of a

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of the

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the first first presentation, and I will.

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A and then we will start with a Pamela, even Jackson. Okay, on behalf of everyone. Rather, I pay respect to the spirit of country. Here in AR, where we are meeting, I acknowledged the past and percent colonial nation, Rundary Wong, as the sovereign people. Here the cultural and knowledge holders who maintain and promote the naram, aboriginal law

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costumes and custodianships, responsibilities for the country and the people that the country continues to sustain generation after generation in the future. For all of us

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I recognize the important contribution that first nations thinkers have made to sociology. including challenge to our dominant, dominant ways of thinking.

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We thank all first nation delegates in the room today for their contributions to knowledge in the discipline.

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Well, a welcome. Then we will start, and

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I will stop sharing here.

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and we'll

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To Pamela Irwin.

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Yes, 2 will be the first presenter that is Irwin Jackson Row, Islam College.

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and I. Let's yes. Come up here and let's check. If your presentation is.

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we have someone here who knows how to. Yes, just to check. If I know, because she was in our last session.

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Okay.

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Hi, all right, I'll move fast because we have several presentations in this paper. We ask what drives support for authoritarian Populist parties in East Central Europe

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and the right button to press here.

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Okay.

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so why isn't it?

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Why isn't it moving?

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I tried it

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so it's a while to work. Sometimes I work from bitter experience.

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Okay, so thank you.

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I appreciate it.

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 there have been a lot of studies of support for Populist parties in Western Europe, but regional, national and temporal variations in the appeal of authoritarian populist parties are not well not yet well understood. Populism may vary by region or nation. The political experiences of birth cohorts differ across countries.

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so examination of smaller geographic and cultural areas are needed. for example.

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recent research has pointed out that neonationalism in right-wing parties in Western Europe emerged after 1,990.

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Nationalist ideology in Eastern Europe is not exclusive to right-wing party voters. So those are 2 examples of how we must recognize that Populism isn't the same everywhere.

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even within Europe. So we look in this paper at 9 Eastern and Central European States that are listed there, Bulgaria, Croatia, Chechea, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, and these were the 9 East Central European States that were included in Norrison, Inglehart's 2,019 study.

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We chose the ones for which Updated European social survey data were available, and we use 9 waves of data, 2,002 to 2,018. But the data predate the 2,022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

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in addition to that, to better understand the context in this area of Europe and within individual countries, we here also talk about data from transparency International, the EU Justice Scoreboard Board, the European, the euro barometer, and the economists.

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I can't do justice to all of it in the time that we have.

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But this is one of the tables that we offer to understand the context of the countries that we're dealing with. Perhaps today, with the limited time. The column to look at is the one on the right, which is from the euro barometer and reflects the percent of the population again in 2,020. Who think that corruption is widespread.

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and the perceptions are quite large, because one of the questions is, is.

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if we think about some of the countries in East Eastern and Central Europe, say, Hungary, and the corruption that's well known with EU money be just being distributed among Victor Orban's friends. The question is, do people recognize corruption? And the answer here is, is Yes.

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The countries also differ in terms of

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the exact nature of the government.

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Eastern and Central European nations are all different from each other, of course, and so we are, for here the economist's perspective in 2019, their their rating of these these countries, and something we can talk about in considering the differences among them. But I think for the time that we have the thing to focus in on in Table 5 is the

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the of the general public that feels judicial independence is good or fairly good, and this is from the EU justice. Scoreboard. in that middle column as well, and we see differences among the countries. But but by and March the judiciary isn't getting a high rating for judicial independence.

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We talk to some extent in our paper about how this differs in Western Europe, and we really can't say

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that one region is completely different from another. When we look at individual states. because let's say, we look at Greece or Italy here. And still again, look at the percent who think corruption is widespread. It's quite high in those countries, but otherwise in Western European states.

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It's somewhat lower than in East Central States. Again, with regard to judicial independence.

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If we look at Greece or Italy, as we see, as in Eastern and Central Europe, a small percentage of smaller percentage of people who argue that

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the judiciary is independent. But in other Western European states it's somewhat higher. So we want to make clear

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that each individual nation is distinct from the others in that we can't paint an entire region? With the same color that there are commonalities. Between countries! In the different regions as well. And again, we don't have time to fully discuss that now. 250.

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But we're working toward understanding the

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the reasons why people vote for right-wing parties in

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radical, right-wing parties in Eastern and Central Europe, because to some extent it seems like a contradiction. These nations in Eastern and Central Europe worked quite hard to fulfill all the requirements of EU entry. The EU has standards for liberal democracy, and yet enough people in in some of these Eastern and Central European countries are voting for

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Political leaders that are authoritarian, and, in fact, are

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fighting with EU agencies with regard to rule of law issues. So this is our question, and when we look at Eastern and Central Europe, post 1,989,

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we have to keep in mind the population losses that were a significant challenge along with severe resource shortages.

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unlike unlike East Germany, which, of course, is in the West, which got a lot of resource support from Western from Germany as a whole, not as much support went to the nations in Eastern and Central in Europe, and our argument is that authoritarian leaders promoted images of minority group threat

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that worked toward increasing their power, and that diversity in Eastern and Central Europe is conceptualized more in terms of class rather than ethnicity or gender.

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We suggest that Gedron's argument In his British Political Science Review paper which focuses on Western Europe that there are many ways to be right. Also applies in the East that a single issue. that's important to to a person

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can get them to vote for the right-wing candidate.

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This is reflected in the democratic backsliding of many of these countries since their 2,004 EU accession. And so we focus in on increased citizens support for citizen families and seniors. and protections for the traditional culture and religion and welfare chauvinism as factors

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that were important in providing a social safety net that emerged naturally in post-communist societies.

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So we have this diagram that we could spend a lot of time talking about which is our effort to put together.

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key factors that contribute to the right-wing vote. And we start with the conservative, traditional religion characteristic of

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East Central European nations. Again, focusing again on economic instability and mass migration as we discussed the creation and targeting of an enemies less list by by leaders intent on power, and

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how fear of crime committed by immigrants, even though few immigrants settled in Eastern and Central Europe that could be used by authoritarian leaders to help them get the vote. So we'll see how that goes with the data. We have 2 tables here.

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where we've analyzed the European Social Survey data. to this is a logistic regression. 2 different dependent variables. This first one is the vote, and the second one is the feeling of affinity. Toward the Populist, the right-wing Populist! party

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and

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To summarize these most easily for our presentation today we calculated the predicted probabilities. Here again, these are based on controlling and and the multivariate logistic regressions. And with this diagram we can do a fast kind of summary where these are all the statistically significant

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variables that contributed in this case to the vote for the far right party, and in the next one to feeling of affinity. And

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well, we could say a lot about all of these significant variables. Perhaps most important is the fact that ideological self placement and religiosity have the greatest impact on the likelihood of a person voting for the far right party in these 9 Eastern and Central European nations that we have looked at

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Here, with regard to feeling Closest to the far right party, we find something similar. You see the highest bars there for ideological self placement and religiosity.

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what does this all say to us? It tells us that personal characteristics of voters attract them to white right-wing populism in Eastern and Central Europe, and that ideology and religiosity predict the right-wing vote and party affinity

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that welfare attitudes about welfare, chauvinism, that is, government should help the people. You know, for example, of the family 500 program, in Poland, where people who have families that have children get automatic payments from the government level of education that is, lower education, that these are factors that contribute to the right-wing vote in living outside of the city. So

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all things that we can talk about.

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So we argue that or we point out that ethnic conflict and welfare, chauvinism drive support for authoritarian Populist parties in East Central Europe. Kraft and homes In one of their pieces said that Liberalism became the god that failed in Eastern in and Central Europe, that there was little preparation on on the part of within nations that had been under

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Soviet domination for diversity or capitalist economic cycles. The irrational fear of immigrants.

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though few, came fostered, was fostered by leaders like Orban, who wanted to gain power, and that allowed them to dismantle judicial independence, democratic elections, and a free press

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transparency, international Eurobarometer and the EU Justice Scoreboard reflect citizen recognition of corruption and weak judicial independence in East Central States, and the closing of the State was supported by local traditional church leaders.

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We suggest that change may be more likely than we think. The European Commission has tied funds to its rule of law annual reports. Hungary has recently been denied 22 billion dollars

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over judicial independence, academic freedoms, Lgbtq. Rights and asylum. The vice-grad group within East Central Europe is divided now on liberal democracy, and not necessarily all going in the same direction, and the war in Ukraine may undermine voter affinity for a strong Russia and reduce support for Eurosceptic parties.

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Sit fast, but

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get the job, I said. My parents

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that just for

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just take it, there's some chef here.

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for those who are in the room. Would you like to pose a question or a comment? Yes, I think

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if you can come here so people can see you

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wait and

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wait. Wait, wait.

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stop, share. Let's see if you can do it. Come here so they can see you. I don't know. Yes.

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and

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thank you for your presentation. I have 2 questions for you. Yes, The first one is you. You called it October and Populist, or is yes, so I wanted to ask, do you distinguish between automatar andism and Populism because

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you seem to use it independently? Or what's the what the relationship here? The difference? And the second question in

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your your findings seem to be in line with the findings

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in Western countries. So the same set of predictions, predictors for voting for writing parties. So did you find any difference between

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the western, conscious and eastern central part of the country's own?

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Is it? Can we say that there is no difference, and the voters are pretty much with the same background.

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Okay? So the first question, just for the microphone. So yes. So the first question was, why do we talk about authoritarian Populist parties? Right? I'm going to take the easy way out to say that we used

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the classification of parties used by Inglehart and Norris, because we were comparing.

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we thought, the Inglehart and Norris both of their studies. But the book where first author is Pippinaris, Norris and Inglehart

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really lays everything out in several 100 pages so. But but we thought that more needed to be examined and that, we needed to look more carefully both at West and and East. So in 2,018, we analyzed Western European States alone, and that article came out in sociologists without societies, without borders, I think, is an it is the exact title of the

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General. And and now we chose the 9

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Eastern European States to examine. We did find some differences that I didn't focus on here. Among the differences. For example, in

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Western European states, I believe religion was not a predictor

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of voting for the right wing party. I'll have to double check that to be so certain. But so we were surprised that religion was a predictor here, and we also found that older people in Western Europe were less likely to vote for the right wing party. and We. We discussed that as being related to

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the history of the Second World War and the fact that religion wasn't protected, protected by the right wing party. So we we did find differences there. Did I answer your questions? I I I would have to actually, though, go back and check our other paper to do a better job for you, because in this paper

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the trouble with the paper as opposed to a book is, you don't have very much space. So in this paper we we only focused on Eastern Europe and alluded to Western Europe throughout it. But I can send you the paper. I can send you both papers.

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Yeah.

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to be there.

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But I thank you very much for.

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Okay, thank you. Thank you.

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thank you very much for this presentation. We will continue with the next one.

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Just check in

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 is

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and room

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Salovsky, I'm Kol Shinska. Okay.

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perfect. Thank you very much.

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Very well.

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I think people can see you.

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Thank you.

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This one. Yeah, sure.

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And I use the pointer.

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and you should be able to meet.

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That's correct.

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So my name is Sadovsky. This is the paper co-outered by Marta coaching Sca, who is conveniently sitting there. So you can address the the questions today

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and to the paper to both of us. In the last decade there was a wave of Populists

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came into power in different parts of the world, also in Central and Eastern Europe, but not everybody were able to secure.

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to secure the reelection and to stay in power. So there there might. There might be different reasons why people first elected

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in certain parties, and different reasons for them to stay in power.

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The cases where my Populists.

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stating power, where, for example, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland in our paper will be showing data for for for the Polish case, and will focus on what has happened to a political trust

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which might be particularly interesting, because Populism is mostly linked with spreading distrust in political institutions, in political elites, minorities, and so on.

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So we were wondering what will happen to political trust after

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in the Populist party forms the the government.

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And

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now I'll try to move to the second slides, probably by clicking. Yeah, thank you.  and we'll analyze

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using empirical data from survey studies, the impact of Populist to all on

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primarily trust, but also public opinion. More generally, there are

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several intrinsic questions connected with the topic

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that we undertake first of all, kind of Populist politics increased, actually increased national level of trust in in in the State and its institutions. And the answer to this question is, yes. Obviously, Polish case shows that

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the average level of trust in Parliament in some other political institutions as well has reason, since in the first year of the law and justice role we will be comparing the

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In survey data from 2,013 and 2,018. But I will showcase this result also with the Uss data.

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So the second question is, how is it possible? Well.

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and what are the mechanisms possibly linking those to those 2 notions?

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theory

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assumes that one of the primary drivers of trust in political institutions is their performance. For example, if we look at Scandinavian countries, the the performance of of State and its its institutions

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is a

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value is it's highly valued, and in international comparison. You will find it highly correlated with the trust in those in those institutions. That's that's why another important topping was looking into the indicators of

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of public opinion on state policies in in Poland, before and after

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long justice party coming coming to

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to power. And finally, how this? How does this relate to polarization?

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So

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the, the, the I actually the the last.

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The question will be answered in the next slide. Once again, once again, I should remind you that those results shown in the picture

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on the right are from the 2,015 elections, and we have the

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a Polish panel measurement of attitudes from 2,013. So before the election, and 2,018,

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and as this is a panel study, so we got the answers from exactly the same people.

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But I will start from the results of the

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a European social survey, and I wanted to illustrate something that in the literature is called the winner effect.

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which in large part explains, how is the Populist politics?

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Linked to the general average rise of average political trust in Poland. First of all, if you will look at the periods under subsequent governments, then you will see that the voters of the ruling party

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are usually trusting the institutions, mostly in each of these spans. For example, in the 2,000, in 2,002 to under the leftist government, it was the leftist voters that trust trusted the State.

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the the Parliament most. It was the same during the brief, long justice role in 2,005, 2,007, and then, under the liberal civic platform, their voters obviously were trusting the institutions most. But what has happened after 2,015, as you can see, is

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that this winner, Bonus, as we can say.

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became really huge. I mean the voters of the

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a ruling party. The Law and justice party became suddenly much trusting in much more trusting than actually than any other.

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and

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 A! A electorate of of a ruling party before in in the span of 20 years, while the the voters of the so-called losers the the the supporters of civic platform became the least. The least trusting ones in this situation.

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So what we have here is actually the illustration of the political polarization that occurred after 2,008

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15. But the increase in the trust.

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The ruling party electorate was significantly higher than the decrease in the

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opposition.

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So this is one. This is the first result that I wanted to share with you. The second involves what we tentatively called partisan lenses or partisan glasses effect.

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And we compared, how did it work on average? this is based on on panel data this time. Before the the 2,015 elections, and afterwards. This is

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the coefficients in this model.

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 Describe this time the the the outcome variables is not the trust itself, but the measures of performance in different areas. So first of all, we see the coefficients that explain how much.

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how well people evaluated the performance of economy as a whole, then in the the model one free and one for we can see how they What was the opinion about the policies concerning fighting corruption, and finally, the opinion on fighting unemployment by by the government.

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So what is

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What we see here is that obviously in general winning party, also, before the

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law and justice party came to power.

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evaluated the those 3 dimensions higher than other vot voters. The important reference point here is is the non-voter category. But what has happened after 2,015 during the the measurement in 2,018 was that there was a very strong winner effect.

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On top of of the standard winner effect that we observed before, and it was significant. While the change for the non-vorders, for for example, haven't been significant, so we see that there was a large shift in how people

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have seen state policy policies during that time. So in a way, there was a

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it implied a question on whether the policies themselves themselves, by the All and justice government were much better, or the relationship between the performance and the trust have perhaps changed much.

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So this is basically the the same winner effect that we saw with the Ss data. But this time this is estimated, based on panel data. So the same people asked twice, and it shows more or less the same effect. But I want to move to the to the final slide with 2 key results.

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because we wanted to check 2 effects, mediation, effect and moderation effect. But what mediation effect involves?

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 the hypothesis that

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actually the

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people enjoyed new policies much more, and so those the the better evaluation of policies influenced the a political trust. This is why we had such a rise in in general level of trust in

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but the second hypothesis, and it it involved moderation, was that perhaps there was a certain change in the perception of the

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A performance

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and its influence on political trust.

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So when we look at the mediation tests the proportion that is mediated by by the performance indicators, well.

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I would say it is mediocre, because the proportion of the variance that is explained by the by the performance.

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it is less than one quarter.

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But if we look at the mediator effect. Then we see large differences between

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and

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those observed in a electorate of law and justice party, the winners here

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and

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2 reference categories, in fact, losers and non voters.

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So the tendency itself

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was

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mostly universal.

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What we see here is that

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people voting on the party in power where

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the sensitized the yeah. The sensitized toward the perception of the performance performance measured the difference between those voters

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who had, like

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low values of this economic performance variable and those who had the highest

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values of performance. Evaluation was mostly.

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it was low and mostly statistically insignificant. While in losers and non voters the performance valuations had relatively

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a big influence on the trust in Parliament. In this case

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the biggest difference between the previous Liberal Government Government and and the law and justice government was that all those effects actually were stronger because of the of the generally more pronounced

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erez agmoni, a more pronounced winner effect. But yeah, basically, the the main result of our study was this dissenticitization effect, which meant that people took less into account 150.

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The actual

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policy outcomes and how they gouged them, and were more probably more sensitive to what their party of choice were telling them.

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yeah, that's it. Thank you.

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Okay. okay. yeah.

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Okay.

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let's check if there's someone.

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Yes, I think I think you can use this microphone now. Yes, please.

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Related to our analysis that we found that in in our study of 9 East Central European States that people who voted for the Populist party.

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This is beyond pulpit. This is online of this day, and you know, on average.

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 I

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had a high level, higher levels of mistrust, of

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global governance

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and higher levels of trust

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in national governance that the voters of Populist parties were less likely to mistrust national government. They they supported it. And so I was very interested to hear you discuss the Polish case, and I. I read also someone else's work that

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a

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if when Populist Parties stay in power, voters have more support in them. So I was hearing all of that while I was listening to you.

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Yeah, yeah, that's true.

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Thanks for the comment. I mean, yeah. we we didn't do a broader analysis to to verify it. For for different countries, I mean in in this analysis at least.

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But yeah, their politics is mainly aimed at national audience, one would say, but

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perhaps this is one of the paradoxes, because usually in the literature you will find an argument that

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trustee's political trust is conducive to democracy, but sometimes this

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this doesn't apply.

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they will take you from

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anyone else or someone back home. I think. Actually, there's just milk. Who is the next presenter. So if there's no other comment or thank you very much, and we will

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give base for the next one.

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but

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okay, is this one just I have to click in this.

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But is this

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miracle? Can you check your microphone and open your

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Mirko Kilian Braack: I hope you hear me and and

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try my come out? Sometimes I have some problems with my come up. Okay, I wait. Wait. Just give me a second.

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I went to

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fix you here so we can see you at the same. We can see you at the same time that we are.

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We have your presentation. So

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hey, welcome and sing on. Thank you.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: Thank you so much for having me.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: My name is Clark, and I presented a joint work with Melanie Dani Lakhuno, and we are working at the Frankfurt Division of the Research Institute, social cohesion

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Mirko Kilian Braack: in a project called Radio Conflicts work division

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Mirko Kilian Braack: and social creation and gender issues. And

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Mirko Kilian Braack: today I present working process called How Do Competing gen ideologies, impact voters in Germany, and we concentrate today a little bit on the question.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: I was competing, general. a part of social conflict between the white wing Populists on the one hand and left center of part is, on the other hand.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: just give me a second.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: Okay, so why are we interested in this questions. First of all, we can say.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: families and the generate arrangements of care and employment side of families are who we proceed of social cohesion, and this pre-recorded of social cohesion is influenced, on the one hand, by gender ideologies like you need. I mentioned it? General agencies which are known as egalitarian on the one hand with

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Mirko Kilian Braack:  women and men, both working and full time jobs and both sharing. And then we got to turn right. The care of arrangements and child care

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Mirko Kilian Braack: well in traditional thinking, like

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Mirko Kilian Braack: women being responsible for the whole house and child care. And men are

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Mirko Kilian Braack: working in full time. And between this and we will not a sense it is gender identities. I will come back to this data which are mixing up partitioning and the arrangements and

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Mirko Kilian Braack: the other influence factor. Our family policies. Hmm! Give a background in which

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Mirko Kilian Braack: this arrangements can you board?

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Mirko Kilian Braack: And what we see is, and this is part of the social conflict I just mentioned as a competition for gender and family arrangement norms inside the society. So

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Mirko Kilian Braack: when it's not only that's a different and family arrangement, norms.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: and I don't like this, but they are competing with each other.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: And what we see is, if you take a look in the literature, I said, who's research focuses on the impact of policies on gender ideologies. But

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Mirko Kilian Braack: this is not so often asked. what is

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Mirko Kilian Braack: the impact of of Jena? I don't know if it's on politics, and or at least for all, what are the impact of geneticologies? And we are asking. This is why we ask how to compete in general. I've been to this in Germany, and specifically we asked our different generalities associated with different voting intentions with respect to this

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Mirko Kilian Braack: social conflicts I just mentioned.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: So

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Mirko Kilian Braack: why are we so interested in gender ideologies? And first of all, the classic as a classical assumption would be taking into account the modernization theory.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: And that's this a change that's a changing values and changes in general, like. you know. more women up working and full time.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: higher educational from an end.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: Like, I said, changing values which are following in

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Mirko Kilian Braack: means that

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Mirko Kilian Braack: every young award should be more egalitarian than the

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Mirko Kilian Braack: of better living standards in the use, and this is leading from traditional to you're going to change the ideologies over time. And now

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Mirko Kilian Braack: we see this threat is slowing down, or has even been stopped in the last year. So

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Mirko Kilian Braack: this changing venues

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Mirko Kilian Braack: not not long have to find and

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Mirko Kilian Braack: well over some parts of this modernization process even, are not so much to find nowadays, and what we can see is that this changes, affects men and women differently. This is because men have not so much changed what has not so much to change the behavior. The rest is because they can work on full time and

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Mirko Kilian Braack: some

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Mirko Kilian Braack: taking some care responsibilities. But the main changes are from women because they have to see how

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Mirko Kilian Braack: they can combine

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Mirko Kilian Braack: care, responsibilities on the one hand and full time working, on the other hand.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: and one reason for it to change, as is

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Mirko Kilian Braack: under the L. A. Census gender agencies I just mentioned before. What meant they are mixing up

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Mirko Kilian Braack: in a complete what concrete means.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: That's a second that many people and individuals are saying, yes, of course, women should be response, and should be able to work on full time, and

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Mirko Kilian Braack: should be able to

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Mirko Kilian Braack: have individual decisions, but

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Mirko Kilian Braack: in a natural and a sensuous way they all believe women would like to be mothers, and women would like to be responsible, especially for childcare. And

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Mirko Kilian Braack: this is just nature. This is the main argument here, and this is represented by approximately 50% of the population in Europe.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: That's

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Mirko Kilian Braack: in the literature. Just not clear. But that is

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Mirko Kilian Braack: more disadvantage for women. Or this is connected with more disadvantages just for women, because it can be said.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: women have to be working full time, and then they have to responsible for child care and also home care work in the household.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: But other other other aspects are saying, this is just a an effect of individual individualization. Processes like mentioned by inhabitants like to. And it's such.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: This is a free decision, and this is because it's

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Mirko Kilian Braack: they assume it's the nature of them to want to be muzzles. And so this is not just that we're in touch with them. But

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Mirko Kilian Braack: an individualization effect. This is the conflict and literature

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Mirko Kilian Braack: which which we see in

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Mirko Kilian Braack: respect for.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: So if we now look at working behavior. We see that gen ideologies and family orientations are out of cultural conflicts, especially between center, left

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Mirko Kilian Braack: and right ring Populist parties.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: and that there are election-related issues. Because there's questions of, do we need more child care? And just

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Mirko Kilian Braack: what are the best best aspects of family policies that this is this, this is our all parents. The family call gender agile and family orientation clashes between

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Mirko Kilian Braack: the population, but also clashes between the political parties and what we can see is that individuals

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Mirko Kilian Braack: we brought or punish a dressing. Jenner, I apologize to.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: This is what Scott.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: what we find in policy. If you pick 3 and

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Mirko Kilian Braack: sorry this punishing regarding is.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: I've gone. Impression of this conflict between to party political parties and what we find is that policies, political parties and Jenna identities meet here in this conflict and in this policy feedback.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: I's a on the one hand, in the like, I said, in terms of census, and we will not  ideas or traditional, or you can determine gender works.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: and just not just

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Mirko Kilian Braack: towards us. To Germany. As a special case, Germany is a country still a country in transition, because, since the reunification in 1,990,

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Mirko Kilian Braack: we see, on the one hand, the conrogance between East Germany and West Germany in terms of

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Mirko Kilian Braack: general arrangements. So

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Mirko Kilian Braack: there are nowadays more childcare centers in

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Mirko Kilian Braack: West Germany and in both parts of Germany, so called.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: One and a half on a model with a man working a full time, and the women working in part time after the birth of the first child.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: Yes. it's the main

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Mirko Kilian Braack:  Your main employment arrangement between the partners. But there are still differences of gender eternalities like there are more egalitarian individuals in East than the West Chamberlain, and also an arrangement because it's still

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Mirko Kilian Braack: yeah. I'm more you going to turn arrangements in East than in West Germany, and

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Mirko Kilian Braack: that it is more common to relief in West Germany that the man should be zoom

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Mirko Kilian Braack: mainly responsible for employment, and to women

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Mirko Kilian Braack: to be the most main and main responsible person for

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Mirko Kilian Braack: also it.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: That's what we also see as changing family policy objectives. Since the 2,000. This is a reform of the

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Mirko Kilian Braack: parental allowance, and a huge expansion of Peter in a child care

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Mirko Kilian Braack: sent us, and

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Mirko Kilian Braack: what we see here is that this is not

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Mirko Kilian Braack: supported by all parts of the society, and especially not supported by all parts of the political parties.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: and we see a reconciliation of family work and motion of. and that's a political goal in the last years. But. like I said, this is also part of political conflicts, especially

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Mirko Kilian Braack: part of political conflicts with Wyoming couple of.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: So what we are doing today. Or you know, paper is, we use 2 ways to support a based online survey conducted as part of the German language to an election study

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Mirko Kilian Braack: court class, and

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Mirko Kilian Braack: these 2 waves are part of the so-called class tracking, and the class tracking consists of German citizens aged 18 or older.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: Now we're eligible to vote in the Federal elections, Germany in our case the last Federal election in 2,021,

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Mirko Kilian Braack: and the class working is out, coming from 2,021 and the beginning of 2,022, and the

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Mirko Kilian Braack: to have access to the Internet. And our sample consists of 2,110 individuals, and

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Mirko Kilian Braack: I want to dependent where we are able is the voting preherence for the Spd Center left party the Queen's

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Mirko Kilian Braack: to left party.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: the city who sees what is the center white party?

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Mirko Kilian Braack: They have to pay what

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Mirko Kilian Braack: it's somehow a little party, and to right wing Populists party after you and our main independent where we are at Jenna. I don't know to you on the next slide, and we control for the way it's like age, education. We're going to Jose, the T.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: East and West Germany, or the political orientation of.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: and what we see here is, you know.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: 5 gender. I don't know if you

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Mirko Kilian Braack: hey, Tom. let me see.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: So support of an egalitarian position in present, and what we see is huge support for the question of both partners and a relationship work. They should share household and child care equally.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: or you can quite support, for a man can be responsible for looking after, shut up doing just as well as a woman.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: But we see also not so high support

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Mirko Kilian Braack: for the question in a good relationship. The man makes sure that his partner never has to go about financial matters.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: So here and it got determined. Position is

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Mirko Kilian Braack: for about less than half or so individuals, and especially the question that I' from between one and 3 years suffer when they are cared for, mostly in a child care facility. Or they.

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Mirko Kilian Braack: yeah, just sweet, you see?

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Mirko Kilian Braack: Yeah, huge

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Mirko Kilian Braack: or less support of an egalitarian position. And what we are doing is, first of all, we

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Mirko Kilian Braack: conduct, or later in class, and another is for the gender. I don't know if it's a classification procedure to assign discrete, variable. It's to like 10 to where it's and which is a person centered

366
00:56:07.380 --> 00:56:09.100
Mirko Kilian Braack: a procedure. And

367
00:56:09.630 --> 00:56:27.099
Mirko Kilian Braack: in the next step, then we use. we look at voting behavior by estimating a multi-nominant logistic impression. and we use step by small construction. So we start here with the the general projected gender identity classes and then edit our

368
00:56:27.440 --> 00:56:29.170
Mirko Kilian Braack: comfortable with

369
00:56:29.270 --> 00:56:34.620
Mirko Kilian Braack: so results that's ever to Marion it effects. And today I will only show the final model.

370
00:56:35.690 --> 00:56:36.730
Mirko Kilian Braack: And

371
00:56:36.740 --> 00:56:48.400
Mirko Kilian Braack: now let me show you the in our latent class under this. And so what we see here as a conditional probabilities of an egalitarian response.

372
00:56:48.560 --> 00:56:52.770
Mirko Kilian Braack: Geography items, and as a number of

373
00:56:52.820 --> 00:57:05.379
Mirko Kilian Braack: gender ideology classes is driven by statistical aspects like the Asian information criterion or the equation, information criteria, but also by theoretical assumptions. So, for example.

374
00:57:05.720 --> 00:57:16.579
Mirko Kilian Braack: we decided how to call this portion ideology classes, and what we see are 2 unit dimensional classes which we call traditional. This is a line

375
00:57:16.910 --> 00:57:19.989
Mirko Kilian Braack: at the bottom of the crowd. And

376
00:57:20.110 --> 00:57:25.660
Mirko Kilian Braack: so you got a Tav in class, which is a line that's the top off so craft.

377
00:57:26.000 --> 00:57:29.130
Mirko Kilian Braack: And we see this Jessica assumptions up

378
00:57:29.350 --> 00:57:33.599
Mirko Kilian Braack: here. You get egalitarian positions for that. You got it in class. So

379
00:57:33.810 --> 00:57:36.289
Mirko Kilian Braack: I predicted for a condition it

380
00:57:36.570 --> 00:57:42.060
Mirko Kilian Braack: could it possibilities of responses for the egalitarian, and no

381
00:57:43.140 --> 00:57:56.249
Mirko Kilian Braack: conditional probabilities of an egalitarian response for the partitioning class? And between this we see to. And we've learned a sense in this classes which we call on the one hand, child centered secondary on no.

382
00:57:56.480 --> 00:57:58.049
Mirko Kilian Braack: So here you see

383
00:57:59.170 --> 00:58:03.120
Mirko Kilian Braack: a huge. you know, really less support for

384
00:58:03.340 --> 00:58:06.599
Mirko Kilian Braack: child care, but I support for

385
00:58:07.030 --> 00:58:08.940
Mirko Kilian Braack: from an employment, and

386
00:58:08.990 --> 00:58:16.990
Mirko Kilian Braack: she had responsibilities for host also in Kabul and the other class we call traditional pragmatics.

387
00:58:17.090 --> 00:58:18.489
Mirko Kilian Braack: which,

388
00:58:18.620 --> 00:58:23.260
Mirko Kilian Braack: not as traditionally as a classics in the world UN dimension it traditionally class, but

389
00:58:23.520 --> 00:58:32.600
Mirko Kilian Braack: still traditionally. But so we, our interpretation is these are persons who wanted to be traditional. But accept realities and say, Okay.

390
00:58:32.900 --> 00:58:36.209
Mirko Kilian Braack: and it's like it is. And then you support

391
00:58:37.420 --> 00:58:38.909
Mirko Kilian Braack: a little bit more

392
00:58:39.110 --> 00:58:43.540
Mirko Kilian Braack: women, employment and child care, because this is

393
00:58:44.330 --> 00:58:46.400
Mirko Kilian Braack: this is how it is in our life.

394
00:58:47.010 --> 00:58:52.990
Mirko Kilian Braack: And if we now take a brief look at our go to a multi-nomial, logistic regression model.

395
00:58:53.170 --> 00:58:58.130
Mirko Kilian Braack: The main and important sector are the significant differences between

396
00:58:58.220 --> 00:58:59.970
Mirko Kilian Braack: the Queen's on the one hand.

397
00:59:00.000 --> 00:59:09.969
Mirko Kilian Braack: and so right toing properly so after you. On the other hand, and I have to apologize to you. They are not writing queens we are working in.

398
00:59:10.020 --> 00:59:12.870
Mirko Kilian Braack: This is how they call it from Germany, and

399
00:59:13.150 --> 00:59:18.920
Mirko Kilian Braack: what we see is compared to all, to traditional pragmatics. Tradition is, and

400
00:59:19.120 --> 00:59:25.340
Mirko Kilian Braack: shall I send out secondary honors that just significantly higher, or more likely for

401
00:59:25.590 --> 00:59:27.000
Mirko Kilian Braack: photos, also

402
00:59:27.220 --> 00:59:32.010
Mirko Kilian Braack: queens to be part of the Ukraine class, while, on the other hand.

403
00:59:32.210 --> 00:59:41.189
Mirko Kilian Braack: notice of the after you are significantly more likely to be in one of these 3 classes than the part of the you can retail. And

404
00:59:42.180 --> 00:59:43.750
Mirko Kilian Braack: what we found

405
00:59:44.100 --> 00:59:52.929
Mirko Kilian Braack: no significant one. Yeah, please, no significant differences for all of the other parties. And so let me come to the end.

406
00:59:53.200 --> 01:00:12.959
Mirko Kilian Braack: And, to conclude, we see individuals with traditional gender ideologies are more likely to have a voting performance for the right thing. Populist or right individual. It's I'm more likely to have a preference for the queens, and we see that persons from the end of the

407
01:00:13.250 --> 01:00:17.889
Mirko Kilian Braack: a higher preferences for the left party on the on end

408
01:00:18.180 --> 01:00:19.120
Mirko Kilian Braack: again.

409
01:00:20.020 --> 01:00:25.050
Mirko Kilian Braack: a higher performance for the aft, and a lot of performance for the Queen. So

410
01:00:25.140 --> 01:00:26.160
Mirko Kilian Braack: you see

411
01:00:26.580 --> 01:00:31.620
Mirko Kilian Braack: that competing and especially traditional and egalitarian gender identities

412
01:00:31.680 --> 01:00:39.260
Mirko Kilian Braack: partly influence voting behavior, and this is especially the case for queens and the right from capitalists.

413
01:00:41.900 --> 01:00:42.950
Mirko Kilian Braack: And

414
01:00:44.470 --> 01:00:45.490
Mirko Kilian Braack: so it.

415
01:00:47.650 --> 01:00:57.769
Mirko Kilian Braack: I see I have some problems with my camera. I just close it for a second until we it's not works again to free. If you discuss, we see

416
01:00:57.930 --> 01:01:07.300
Mirko Kilian Braack: the line of conflict over gender issues and family followers is predominantly between the Queens and the Alfred across ideology classes in Germany, and

417
01:01:07.560 --> 01:01:16.829
Mirko Kilian Braack: there are what was interesting for us, striking similarities between both of the after you and the left party partitioned in, especially for tradition and shine center.

418
01:01:19.430 --> 01:01:29.500
Mirko Kilian Braack: We see that general idolatr, by an important role in the sociologist conflicts and accompanied their political organization. And so this is

419
01:01:32.880 --> 01:01:33.700
okay.

420
01:01:33.920 --> 01:01:40.599
I thank you for your attention. Thank you. Thank you very much.

421
01:01:41.050 --> 01:01:51.590
 and Q. Milk for this interesting presentation, and

422
01:01:51.750 --> 01:02:10.890
I will check. Thank you. Yes, you're having problems with your camera. So I wonder if there's any comment or yes, I think you can use this microphone and thank you for our volunteer. Yes, because she has solved the the problem with the microphone, and now she has

423
01:02:11.410 --> 01:02:12.660
a camera

424
01:02:12.730 --> 01:02:15.410
there.

425
01:02:17.470 --> 01:02:30.640
I would like to ask you whether you try to combine the same amount of. but separately for western parts of Germany was in the

426
01:02:30.810 --> 01:02:46.860
and separately for the because the 2 most tradition of my these things are linked, and I have both having the.

427
01:02:47.100 --> 01:02:58.590
So it could be interesting if you fully control for the East-west divide within Germany. But if you would present those results.

428
01:02:59.840 --> 01:03:05.579
but Germany, then perhaps wouldn't be much human.

429
01:03:08.070 --> 01:03:12.099
Mirko Kilian Braack: thank you for your question. I apologize. I will.

430
01:03:12.930 --> 01:03:15.909
Mirko Kilian Braack: My camera still has some problems. So I

431
01:03:16.210 --> 01:03:20.209
Mirko Kilian Braack: and we have not done this yet.

432
01:03:20.230 --> 01:03:23.699
Mirko Kilian Braack: I think we are thinking about it. So it's a good comment.

433
01:03:24.300 --> 01:03:30.070
Mirko Kilian Braack: I have to say. I'm not sure why we hadn't done this right now. But

434
01:03:30.480 --> 01:03:34.389
Mirko Kilian Braack: yeah, I think we would check and test.

435
01:03:34.610 --> 01:03:43.469
Mirko Kilian Braack: It's possible, because all they just said, I'm not sure that we would be or would get, co-operance with the sample size, especially for East Germany.

436
01:03:43.480 --> 01:03:56.070
Mirko Kilian Braack: I'm considering the legend in this, because we need some number of individuals to to to estimate this. And so this is maybe the problem here, but we will check it out. Thank you.

437
01:03:57.900 --> 01:04:04.599
Thanks for the response. Would you like anyone else to make a question, do some comment.

438
01:04:04.700 --> 01:04:06.320
give some feedback.

439
01:04:06.800 --> 01:04:10.399
No? Okay, well, thank you very much, Miko.

440
01:04:10.450 --> 01:04:17.839
Killing, and we will go to the next or next presentation. Let me check

441
01:04:18.470 --> 01:04:20.160
the order of

442
01:04:21.470 --> 01:04:25.330
the we. Okay.

443
01:04:27.360 --> 01:04:29.840
never. Rocky. This is one.

444
01:04:29.880 --> 01:04:31.310
Yes, okay.

445
01:04:35.070 --> 01:04:37.650
Exploring Populist episode of

446
01:04:39.170 --> 01:04:47.900
 fantastic.

447
01:04:48.710 --> 01:04:56.040
And we yes, this is where is here? Yes, and then hide floating meeting controls. Perfect.

448
01:04:56.410 --> 01:04:58.660
fantastic. Thank you. Okay.

449
01:05:01.690 --> 01:05:02.410
And this.

450
01:05:02.710 --> 01:05:04.259
thank you. Thank you.

451
01:05:04.710 --> 01:05:22.059
So Hello, everyone. My name is Mcconnell Rodsky. I'm finished. My Phd. At the University of Warsaw. And Well! In contrast to those very interesting previous presentations, I will talk to you about a qualitative study so quite different

452
01:05:22.140 --> 01:05:26.070
in the the approach quite different in scale

453
01:05:26.330 --> 01:05:36.290
and definitely more exploratory and preliminary in its nature. So I'm a bit of an outlier in the panel.

454
01:05:36.350 --> 01:05:41.920
The study focused on the knowledge practices of loyal.

455
01:05:41.930 --> 01:05:45.230
a highly motivated law and justice

456
01:05:45.420 --> 01:05:48.670
supporters. And

457
01:05:51.710 --> 01:05:53.050
I'm trying to.

458
01:05:55.060 --> 01:05:55.860
Okay.

459
01:05:56.610 --> 01:06:15.040
And the presentation will firstly described the epistemic approach I adopted and explained the reasons why next so very briefly talk about the the law and justice part in the current political context. But I'm pretty sure you already have something in mind after the presentations, previous presentations.

460
01:06:15.380 --> 01:06:19.929
 and I will tell you about studies, methodology.

461
01:06:20.130 --> 01:06:28.570
But I would try to raise through this initial part of the presentation, because, firstly, I would like to tell you more about the study findings.

462
01:06:28.940 --> 01:06:47.249
and secondly, and I'm very sorry for a shameless plague, but tomorrow morning I will have a presentation dedicated to this theoretical methodological aspect of this study. So if anything catches your attention or interest, I I invite you to tomorrow morning, or you can just ask me

463
01:06:47.400 --> 01:06:51.399
 in the Q, and a.

464
01:06:51.740 --> 01:07:07.869
So, after describing a proper results, I would indicate some limitations of the starting and finally present. Conclusions which hopefully will not only will give you some knowledge about the the case of law and justice supporters.

465
01:07:08.040 --> 01:07:19.819
but some useful discursive frames, some discussive practices, and heuristics, too, to useful for analyzing other communities of Populists

466
01:07:19.830 --> 01:07:20.920
photos.

467
01:07:22.560 --> 01:07:23.310
But

468
01:07:24.110 --> 01:07:40.989
so the epistemic brochure adopted was an attempt to go beyond the usual supply and demand site division in populism studies supply side meaning studying. politicians, discourse and demand sides, meaning analyzing voters. Attitudes.

469
01:07:41.260 --> 01:07:47.489
Hmm. I wanted to focus on what happens in the middle in between.

470
01:07:47.550 --> 01:07:55.090
on the basis of glyph formation. information processing and the way knowledge is legitimized.

471
01:07:55.560 --> 01:08:08.740
And also I wanted to study, discuss frames that are actually used by supporters of the Law and justice party, and this presentation that they is focused on exactly on that

472
01:08:09.450 --> 01:08:13.289
This approach takes as its starting point.

473
01:08:13.420 --> 01:08:21.970
The concept of an epistemic community inspired by works of Down Vandique a day for the vas

474
01:08:22.130 --> 01:08:28.200
who proposed concepts of epistemic and epistemological circles.

475
01:08:28.570 --> 01:08:35.249
The first type, the the epistemic circle, can be defined as a set of people that share a specific view.

476
01:08:35.300 --> 01:08:39.910
for example, a type of narrative or a discursive frame.

477
01:08:40.030 --> 01:08:42.399
while the epistemological circle.

478
01:08:42.850 --> 01:08:49.719
it is a set of people that show a specific type of reasoning or a specific type of processing information.

479
01:08:50.230 --> 01:09:00.380
The epistemic community, on the on the other hand, can be defined as a specific configuration of various epistemic and epistemological circles

480
01:09:00.430 --> 01:09:14.360
that intersect. And importantly, this configuration consists of a group of people that normally share specific beliefs and ways of reasoning, but also have a sense of community and belonging

481
01:09:15.320 --> 01:09:36.579
 to study the abstent community of of core loyal law and justice voters. I decided to focus on 4 key elements that shape their knowledge, practices, and belief for me that, being discursive practices, the formativity, communication, practices, and communication, topology or structure.

482
01:09:36.610 --> 01:09:42.130
and, lastly, a broch category of cognitive, effective and social psychological processes

483
01:09:42.290 --> 01:09:45.520
for convenience, even though it is a

484
01:09:45.740 --> 01:09:59.990
simplification of a matter. We can associate each of this category with a core central question pertaining to how knowledge is formed, what is set, how it's performed, how it is communicated.

485
01:10:00.100 --> 01:10:06.030
and how it is processed. and in this presentation I will focus mainly on the first category.

486
01:10:06.180 --> 01:10:15.980
Perhaps if we have time, I will give you to some a little bit from the the other categories.  yeah.

487
01:10:17.350 --> 01:10:21.820
So I feel completely justified in skipping this this slide

488
01:10:21.870 --> 01:10:28.310
after after the previous presentation. Maybe the the only thing would be that

489
01:10:28.580 --> 01:10:38.770
currently law and justice still enjoys quite high support of about 31, 32, 33%.

490
01:10:38.860 --> 01:10:40.330
And

491
01:10:40.410 --> 01:10:44.500
of these, 31% of about

492
01:10:44.640 --> 01:10:53.820
usually to third from between half and 2 thirds is associated with core voters. So quite a high number.

493
01:10:54.640 --> 01:10:55.340
Hmm!

494
01:10:56.860 --> 01:11:13.279
This call loyal voters started with a qualitative methodology that combined individual in-depth interviews and focus groups. 25 ideas and free Fgis were conducted in small citizen towns throughout the Mazarin province.

495
01:11:13.300 --> 01:11:18.840
which, with the exception of also primarily also in its suburbs.

496
01:11:18.910 --> 01:11:33.689
is quite consistently law and justice, and in this regard it is quite similar to Eastern Polish provinces that form the political stronghold of the law and justice party.

497
01:11:34.200 --> 01:11:47.460
You can see the recruitment criteria here. 2 things I would like to emphasize is that first of the participants of the study were chosen from people who possessed strong views.

498
01:11:47.520 --> 01:11:55.070
But we're not fanatics, and we're not people who leave and prove politics are not obsessed.

499
01:11:55.240 --> 01:12:08.450
And, secondly, that every effort was made or taken to assure the diversity of the service participants. They shared political views, but otherwise they were quite varied.

500
01:12:08.660 --> 01:12:09.700
Hmm!

501
01:12:11.490 --> 01:12:15.700
I would love to finally tell you something more about the finding so very quickly here

502
01:12:15.720 --> 01:12:26.150
to observe all those 4 dimensions. The interviews had to blend various methodological tools to study belief forming from different angles.

503
01:12:26.270 --> 01:12:38.770
So interviews usually started with an initial non-directive, unstructured part, and then gradually introduced various projective techniques and tasks.

504
01:12:38.920 --> 01:12:41.920
some of which I will describe in in later slides

505
01:12:42.030 --> 01:13:02.740
of importance, is that many of these tasks were designed to take advantage of the so-called thinking about protocol, an approach aimed at studying people's reasoning, in which participants are asked to verbalize any thoughts and any associations that come to mind during the completion of the of the task.

506
01:13:02.930 --> 01:13:14.850
So much of the data you're going to see comes from these verbalizations. And the way what spends narrative and justify the the choices and answers

507
01:13:16.860 --> 01:13:19.110
so first and foremost.

508
01:13:19.320 --> 01:13:29.860
One of the sentiments Most frequently and firmly expressed by the participants was that being a law and justice supporter is not just an electoral choice.

509
01:13:29.960 --> 01:13:32.629
It is a core part of their identity

510
01:13:32.660 --> 01:13:50.619
on equal footing with being a poor Catholic, or a member of one's own family. and this narrative was first observed in the less-structured part of the interview expressed spontaneously by participants when discussing the view of current events in Poland.

511
01:13:50.800 --> 01:13:56.040
and more evidently during the identity map construction task.

512
01:13:57.290 --> 01:14:16.830
So it was a technique, a sort of bogartis. Yeah, inspired technique that involved arranging a set of cards with names of various groups on a diagram. And these cards were to be placed according to the perceived closeness or distance towards the the specific group.

513
01:14:17.160 --> 01:14:26.239
and in scope of the thinking allowed protocol I mentioned. Earlier participants were asked to verbalise any of their thinking process throughout the task.

514
01:14:26.640 --> 01:14:35.030
So the the idea was to produce a relational description of identity, and that is

515
01:14:35.080 --> 01:14:39.429
contextual and grounded in relations with different groups.

516
01:14:39.640 --> 01:14:44.850
Almost universally there was a core set of groups

517
01:14:44.910 --> 01:14:52.819
that were most important, most important, with which participants most identified

518
01:14:53.610 --> 01:15:04.970
among them the families, of course, polish both Catholics, sometimes close friends, and quite often law and justice's supporters.

519
01:15:05.200 --> 01:15:10.320
 And this was a surprise for me, because

520
01:15:10.650 --> 01:15:23.129
there were no party members in the study, no campaign volunteers, just the people who voted for the justice party before and would do so again.

521
01:15:23.360 --> 01:15:26.370
And it is many of the study. Participants

522
01:15:26.570 --> 01:15:36.359
generally follow politics. News on politics, and, for example, they identified just 2 free 4, law and justice politicians by name.

523
01:15:36.430 --> 01:15:40.250
Yet they strongly identified with the party.

524
01:15:40.520 --> 01:15:43.509
more with a party than any specific politician.

525
01:15:43.640 --> 01:15:47.379
and with the supporters of this party.

526
01:15:48.210 --> 01:16:01.589
 What also caught my eye during the analysis is how paradoxical and contradictory the the vision of the community was.

527
01:16:02.060 --> 01:16:06.369
it was at once complete and fulfilled and in decay

528
01:16:06.550 --> 01:16:13.819
it was complete because, as participants asserted true poles in poles of flesh and blood.

529
01:16:13.910 --> 01:16:19.069
share all the important beliefs and views like Catholic.

530
01:16:19.110 --> 01:16:44.130
They share fundamental values. They share one overaging call, and that goal being the prosperity and safety of the country, and, moreover, they know exactly what is in their best interest, and know who they should vote for in order to guard that interest, and you can probably guess who that is.

531
01:16:44.570 --> 01:16:51.150
So. There wasn't a a priori assumption that, once origin determined one's views.

532
01:16:51.160 --> 01:16:54.960
and the true Poles form a unified front.

533
01:16:55.750 --> 01:16:56.430
Hmm!

534
01:16:57.480 --> 01:17:05.849
At the same time there is a sense of decay. I believe that the community of Polish people is slowly disintegrating.

535
01:17:05.880 --> 01:17:09.820
There is just less and less real Poles, real Catholics

536
01:17:09.890 --> 01:17:22.110
and people gradually abandon the faith and the values, and in this grave situation. It is the community of law and justice supporters that unites the remaining real polls, protects

537
01:17:22.140 --> 01:17:24.919
the values and provides a sense of agency.

538
01:17:25.460 --> 01:17:35.919
of the paradox here is that this community emerges precisely because of the rapture that it considers to be the main threat to its existence.

539
01:17:36.130 --> 01:17:39.799
There are no true poles without fake balls.

540
01:17:39.870 --> 01:17:45.120
There is no unity of true polls without a division in a wider Polish society.

541
01:17:45.290 --> 01:17:53.180
Hmm. So real pause from a community that maintains itself through the acts of commemorating the lost pure

542
01:17:53.290 --> 01:17:59.509
community, and in order to regain it, separate itself from others.

543
01:17:59.590 --> 01:18:03.359
So it arises through an essentially negative immunitarian

544
01:18:03.380 --> 01:18:08.149
mechanisms to identify the other and to exclude him.

545
01:18:10.320 --> 01:18:15.629
Another thing I would like to emphasize is a very particular vision of democracy

546
01:18:15.710 --> 01:18:30.539
that that study, but participants had a vision I would call a vertical one. In this framework a horizontal vision of democracy would be a system in which different visions of managing the the public at first compete.

547
01:18:30.590 --> 01:18:38.239
and through this competition for political debate breed the new compromise solutions. So something you could call a Habermassian.

548
01:18:38.430 --> 01:18:40.630
Our deliberative democracy.

549
01:18:41.220 --> 01:18:55.099
on the other hand, a vertical vision of democracy would be a system of delegating power by an authorized subject of people to a specific party, expecting in return protection of its interest

550
01:18:55.380 --> 01:18:58.380
something that would call a muchitarian democracy.

551
01:18:58.660 --> 01:19:12.550
This vision is closely related to the vision of committee of real pose I mentioned, because a logic of collectively delegating power feeds neatly into a vision of the homogeneous community

552
01:19:12.660 --> 01:19:15.340
that forms a united front.

553
01:19:17.020 --> 01:19:23.349
Again, that vertical vision of democracy was perhaps best visible in narrations

554
01:19:23.570 --> 01:19:30.490
offered, while drawing an imagined perfect same, the lower the House of Polish Parliament.

555
01:19:30.780 --> 01:19:51.699
But spins were asked to divide seeds to various parties as they saw fit, and of course, narrativeise this choices and that they opted for a long justice majority. The call of blue here is not that surprising? But what was surprising was the percentage of Parliament's seats assigned to the party.

556
01:19:51.950 --> 01:20:01.319
In earlier studies, for example, law and justice supporters were not completely sold on the idea that the party should have

557
01:20:01.380 --> 01:20:07.329
a majority to change the country's constitution. But that was not the case in the study.

558
01:20:07.450 --> 01:20:16.050
Substantial group of people did want law and justice. They have a very high majority of 50, 60,

559
01:20:16.120 --> 01:20:18.849
70, 80%,

560
01:20:18.890 --> 01:20:24.230
and in some most extreme cases to be the sole party

561
01:20:24.410 --> 01:20:26.050
in the Parliament.

562
01:20:26.710 --> 01:20:33.719
Now, this may be due to the different political and economic context in which this study was made.

563
01:20:33.750 --> 01:20:40.890
but spent, cited the need for even more expansive powers for the Government to overcome various obstacles.

564
01:20:40.920 --> 01:20:47.559
limitations well, that come both from insight and from abroad.

565
01:20:49.570 --> 01:21:02.489
Lastly, I would like to mention, to discuss frames that were crucial for categorizing and interpreting information and making sense of the world. Personalization and ethnicization.

566
01:21:02.940 --> 01:21:13.050
Personalization was a broad tendency to link various phenomena or processes with a specific social, political actor.

567
01:21:13.380 --> 01:21:18.330
and perhaps one of the most evident example, but far from the only one

568
01:21:18.350 --> 01:21:30.569
was that the case of the former, a Polish Prime Minister and former President of the EU Council, Donald Tusk, and the so called Vinatuska, or Tusk's fault

569
01:21:30.740 --> 01:21:36.599
in the law and Justice's discourse, do not displace a near mythical role

570
01:21:36.610 --> 01:21:59.270
as a symbol of a males and traitorous politician, and is linked to and blamed for a variety of phenomena from inflation and and energy, resources, scarcity through an alleged influence of court judgment, and EU's enmity towards the government, to the crash of the Presidential plane in this morning.

571
01:21:59.660 --> 01:22:05.690
ethnicization, on the other hand, was a tendency or a discuss of frame.

572
01:22:06.020 --> 01:22:23.469
That frame! Various phenomena as intentional actions carried out by other nations. Again, for example, claiming that Germany caused inflation in Europe in order to gain influence over other countries, including Poland.

573
01:22:24.710 --> 01:22:30.000
So I don't know how much time we have, because I have just some.

574
01:22:32.100 --> 01:22:35.530
all right. maybe from

575
01:22:37.180 --> 01:22:42.099
This was quite an interesting observation. Many of the sun spots spent

576
01:22:42.470 --> 01:22:50.009
said that they very often compare Media, content to find what is real, what is true

577
01:22:50.290 --> 01:23:00.300
to well, Check the pro government and anti-government information, in, in hopes of finding for themselves what is true.

578
01:23:00.450 --> 01:23:17.120
Well, it may be a bit naive, but theoretically this expulsion oneself to different information, information that could cause potentially cognitive dissonance that offers quite a different image of the world

579
01:23:17.380 --> 01:23:19.810
the well

580
01:23:19.970 --> 01:23:29.069
that should theoretically have a role in decreasing polarization or de-radicalization.

581
01:23:29.480 --> 01:23:33.469
And that was not the case here.

582
01:23:33.600 --> 01:23:46.530
It was very clear from the interviews that the consequence and the intention of comparing media was to strengthen one's own view.

583
01:23:46.600 --> 01:23:57.219
to to check what the enemy says. and at the end it was driving polarization rather than decreasing it.

584
01:23:57.880 --> 01:23:59.130
Hmm!

585
01:24:00.320 --> 01:24:06.080
Some just very selective observations here.

586
01:24:06.420 --> 01:24:16.180
I for a disclosure. I I use heuristics in the sense that they are used by gargi.

587
01:24:16.210 --> 01:24:21.329
So in a much more relaxed way than, for example, Daniel Kahneman.

588
01:24:21.460 --> 01:24:38.940
Gertrude, and the roads of heuristical toolb, so a variety of cognitive mechanisms that work on different levels and can be used consciously or are used unconsciously

589
01:24:38.950 --> 01:24:41.450
to categorize data to

590
01:24:41.460 --> 01:24:49.219
to what are used in different tasks and different contexts.

591
01:24:49.640 --> 01:24:50.760
Hmm.

592
01:24:51.610 --> 01:24:58.960
One other thing that was quite consistent in the study was of a information source heuristic. I something I would call that way

593
01:24:59.020 --> 01:25:08.880
so that the source of information was usually far more important than the content itself. In the interviews I had

594
01:25:08.930 --> 01:25:22.270
in many cases, when I read, together with the participants, examples of politician speeches, articles during the focus groups, we view together some excerpts from one

595
01:25:22.300 --> 01:25:36.310
TV programs, political programs. And well. it is cognitively. If we if we take, for example, the notion of the cognitive Niza and and the tendency to

596
01:25:36.520 --> 01:25:54.349
simplify cognition. It is quite a a useful heuristic, just to not to even Not to even try to deflect an argument from the content point of view, but just because of its source.

597
01:25:54.920 --> 01:26:03.739
Another thing was a strong tendency to imagine. Voters of other parties are similar to those parties politicians.

598
01:26:04.050 --> 01:26:11.190
and this had consequences at times, for example, of the social identity theory.

599
01:26:11.380 --> 01:26:13.860
that was a

600
01:26:14.140 --> 01:26:15.290
hello.

601
01:26:16.020 --> 01:26:24.280
It drives a very homogeneized vision of supporters of other opposition, for example, parties.

602
01:26:24.850 --> 01:26:33.430
and lastly, there was. There were many instances of attribution, error, fundamental attribution, error, which means the

603
01:26:33.750 --> 01:26:51.519
when trying to explain reasons for someone's behavior. Fundamental attribution. Error is a tendency to understate, not to take into account situational contextual matters and

604
01:26:51.630 --> 01:26:55.719
just focus on the personal traits.

605
01:26:56.140 --> 01:27:06.610
And it was quite, as you can maybe see from the quote. It was quite pronounced in many

606
01:27:07.230 --> 01:27:19.270
in many interviews you show me that I have. If you have any questions about the study limitations, I will be more than happy to answer them. But I will just skip to the conclusion

607
01:27:19.280 --> 01:27:26.030
 so as to the final.

608
01:27:26.300 --> 01:27:28.369
the final considerations.

609
01:27:28.800 --> 01:27:45.400
I would like to return to a more sociologically oriented point of view, and indicate the socio-political value that the epistemic community offers to its members. Firstly, the piston community provides a broad range of narrative and cognitive tools.

610
01:27:45.400 --> 01:28:00.850
Some of them use consciously, some of them not with which to structure and interpret the increasingly complex in the back world. It train forces the logic of personal agency against the logic of risk and probability.

611
01:28:01.030 --> 01:28:17.550
It pictures the worlds as a domain of intentional actors, as specific, individual and social actors who act intentionally and provides meaning to otherwise impersonal or global processes.

612
01:28:18.160 --> 01:28:19.770
Another important thing

613
01:28:19.780 --> 01:28:29.400
was that the analysis of the system Committee of law for justice votes pointed to 2 ways identity is constructed in relation to

614
01:28:29.410 --> 01:28:31.260
the political choices.

615
01:28:31.420 --> 01:28:36.280
I would argue that we can see discussive frames and cognitive

616
01:28:36.510 --> 01:28:41.609
mechanisms or processes working in unison to create a sort of humanitarian look.

617
01:28:41.860 --> 01:28:49.199
gradually excluding another and another and another group in order to maintain the pure community of true polls.

618
01:28:49.220 --> 01:29:04.450
and in this immunization loop, the the sense of being alone, justice supported played to vital roles. Firstly, it was used as a sort of intermediary identity, used to select and articulate elements of other identities.

619
01:29:04.580 --> 01:29:30.210
Indeed, much of the collective discourse of round justice, supporters and politicians was aimed at defining fundamental traits or vision of true polishness, and but so often express a conviction that the true of truest pose are those that support law and justice. Secondly, the community of law and justice voters acted as a guinea of last resort.

620
01:29:30.230 --> 01:29:35.259
the core community around which other communities gradually shrink.

621
01:29:35.400 --> 01:29:42.330
but also one that provides. And this is crucial agency, personal agency, who is members.

622
01:29:42.490 --> 01:30:05.169
And lastly, this research strongly suggests that we should return and focus on the concept of representation when analyzing Populism, and perhaps understand representation in 2 interrelated ways, both as a relation between those represented and those that represent, in which both sides influence and define each other.

623
01:30:05.480 --> 01:30:13.940
and as a mental operation, the creation of various representations of both oneself and the surrounding world.

624
01:30:13.950 --> 01:30:24.239
So these 2 aspects of a presentation closely cooperate to construct a political subject, a true real people that deserve to be represented.

625
01:30:24.460 --> 01:30:32.719
and to give this subject meaning, provide a meaningful, sensible image of the socio-political world in which to act.

626
01:30:33.540 --> 01:30:37.409
Yeah. that's it. I spell. Thank you very much.

627
01:30:40.960 --> 01:30:41.970
So

628
01:30:42.330 --> 01:30:44.880
I stay here for any questions.

629
01:30:50.270 --> 01:30:50.960
Okay.

630
01:30:52.680 --> 01:30:55.840
just comment views feedback

631
01:30:56.470 --> 01:31:00.449
that the if you want to.

632
01:31:00.980 --> 01:31:04.740
Why, if someone looks right in the Yes that we check here.

633
01:31:06.840 --> 01:31:10.580
Yes, it's quite light, and we are.

634
01:31:10.890 --> 01:31:17.650
I think, is the effect of the whole week having very interesting information. I will

635
01:31:18.010 --> 01:31:20.580
 music.

636
01:31:20.830 --> 01:31:28.220
Well, I just a comment just to check I and he said, I I'll comment because we can just have 10 min for

637
01:31:28.450 --> 01:31:29.990
for the rape.

638
01:31:30.330 --> 01:31:42.989
I I like the approach, the methodological approach, maybe because I'm closer to the week's perspective. But what I like from the from the whole session is that we had a kind of methodology

639
01:31:43.350 --> 01:31:54.769
variation to the same topic, and I think those who were listening as me have learned interesting perspectives on

640
01:31:54.780 --> 01:31:57.050
on how to approach

641
01:31:57.180 --> 01:31:59.960
the topic of the of the session

642
01:32:00.050 --> 01:32:06.160
and and I'm sure those who were approaching from a more

643
01:32:06.370 --> 01:32:14.510
a quantitative way with this analysis, with a large data, might have have some.

644
01:32:15.090 --> 01:32:30.650
some, some interesting thoughts on this. More, I hope so. I I was actually, I'm actually wondering, what do you think about this approach, which is much more a quantitative into the perspective of the agents, and so on. I mean, we have

645
01:32:30.740 --> 01:32:33.149
few minutes. So we can discuss that

646
01:32:34.710 --> 01:32:40.230
to say that. yeah. we realize that those.

647
01:32:40.810 --> 01:32:46.700
Yes. I was saying about desensitization in general.

648
01:32:46.810 --> 01:32:55.669
Here we have what it means in an individual to have those party

649
01:32:55.710 --> 01:32:59.180
into the glasses. Actually, that we use a realistic

650
01:32:59.210 --> 01:33:22.640
not to actually look up on what's going on in this with the state and society, and so on. So I think that it was a coherent picture, at least in case of okay, do you want to comment something? You will come along. Why? Why? Why? Why things approaching here? Because they need for a time, because we use this.

651
01:33:23.550 --> 01:33:25.010
I wanted to

652
01:33:25.310 --> 01:33:30.630
to that question because I find this a fascinating compliment.

653
01:33:30.680 --> 01:33:39.370
Some of the quantitative work we've been looking at. And I wonder. You know we're all

654
01:33:39.440 --> 01:33:43.629
I've done our work pretty much before the war in Ukraine.

655
01:33:43.640 --> 01:33:46.290
And now that we have this image

656
01:33:46.390 --> 01:33:53.539
of how individual people are thinking about their place in the society and their relationship to

657
01:33:53.570 --> 01:33:56.120
a party and their relationship

658
01:33:56.220 --> 01:34:00.789
to being Polish and and Catholic.

659
01:34:01.890 --> 01:34:04.370
Do you have any hunch

660
01:34:04.470 --> 01:34:15.879
as to any ideas as to how the war in Ukraine and Poland's involvement in, you know, resisting

661
01:34:15.920 --> 01:34:20.940
Russia and in helping some of the Ukrainians

662
01:34:21.100 --> 01:34:25.470
gets into this worldview that individuals

663
01:34:25.570 --> 01:34:28.130
and individual supporters

664
01:34:28.170 --> 01:34:29.559
of the party.

665
01:34:30.090 --> 01:34:32.420
yeah of the law and justice. Yeah.

666
01:34:33.380 --> 01:34:55.689
well, actually, this much of this data was gathered after the invasion, so I can answer by quoting from the memory some of the things. My study parts have been set, and of course they were very sympathetic, and in general supported by all means. The

667
01:34:55.840 --> 01:35:01.950
well, quite extensive help to the Ukrainians.

668
01:35:02.080 --> 01:35:11.790
There were, of course, well, a lot of variety in this narratives about the Ukraine people, and there was, for example, there was

669
01:35:12.290 --> 01:35:18.849
very often this this notion that, of course. Yeah, we have to help.

670
01:35:19.040 --> 01:35:21.260
But let's not forget history.

671
01:35:21.820 --> 01:35:34.559
And, for example, my grandma told me about what Ukraine did during the Second World War. And of course it's it's about the

672
01:35:34.750 --> 01:35:44.769
the massacres in the volume of the region that I think it's in English. So

673
01:35:45.180 --> 01:35:53.370
that is quite interesting. It was a sort of division, this on the level of

674
01:35:53.710 --> 01:36:08.110
what to do now like pragmatic, we have to help, that's obvious. And we have to also support Ukraine in its fight against Russia.

675
01:36:08.270 --> 01:36:09.280
the

676
01:36:09.430 --> 01:36:27.390
but we have some worries concerning the Ukrainians that are in Poland. And let's not forget, for example, this history and this matters that are well

677
01:36:28.090 --> 01:36:45.049
erez Agmoni should be included in our view of Ukraine and the situation right now. So it is varied. It is just a very a part of the answer. But it was one type of answering this question of invasion.

678
01:36:45.650 --> 01:36:46.430
Okay.

679
01:36:47.330 --> 01:36:54.399
 thanks for the comments and the and the observations. Anyone else where

680
01:36:54.580 --> 01:37:00.120
anything else? We're a bit tired. well, this was a joint session.

681
01:37:00.610 --> 01:37:12.039
we're in the C. 51. There's some of our members here, but a I'm not sure which was the other, because there were 3 3

682
01:37:12.250 --> 01:37:33.930
3 different research committees. But what I want to say is that in in the R. C. 51, which is on on social cybernetics system, thinking and and and so on. you might be surprised that we actually analyze this kind of topics. But it sounds like like far away now, so cybernetics.

683
01:37:34.130 --> 01:37:44.250
It's much more related to Lumann. But it's not only Lumen, that's my flag. They're not. But we use very much the concept of reflexivity

684
01:37:44.350 --> 01:38:03.840
at the different levels and in distinction between the social distinction and so on and and feedback among many others. What I'm trying to say is that it has been very interesting to just to listen your your approaches, and I'm sure at some point

685
01:38:03.900 --> 01:38:17.740
we will contact you just to keep the conversation on how this can be seen, also from a systemic perspective. because either the large a perspective that you approach with your your data setting.

686
01:38:17.770 --> 01:38:27.510
and offers a view of how the system is actually getting transformed and modify. What are the forces in between the

687
01:38:27.600 --> 01:38:44.880
well, the the political perspectives, and the groups, and so on, and how and how that can also can apply to this micro level where there is this epistemological positions, and the weight and and reflectivity from the

688
01:38:44.930 --> 01:38:59.260
from the outer, or or actually avoiding that level of reflectivity. Now that you also show it in your in your quotes like. No, no, no, this he he was fine. He was just not to all to vulnerable. I like the the

689
01:38:59.770 --> 01:39:11.110
we are reaching the end. Thank you very much for for this session. Thank you for coming and listening, and thank you for our volunteer, who was here very helpful. And and and that's it. Let's have a

690
01:39:11.220 --> 01:39:14.020
so for everyone. Thank you.