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first of all, I want to do. Oh, my God! They took it out.

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Where is the knowledge of country?

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Please them will help me. Okay, now, yeah.

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Yeah. On behalf of everyone gathered, I pay respect to this period of country. Here in Ham, where we are meeting.

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acknowledged the past and present collaboration.

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Whoa!

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As the sovereign people here the cultural knowledge holders who Montague and promote the Nahan aboriginal law, cause customs and custom. Yes, ship responsibilities for our country and the people. That country continues to sustain generation after generation into the future. For all of us

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I recognize the important contribution that first nations. Thinkers have made to sociology, including challenge to our dominant ways of thinking. We thank all first nations delegates in the room today for their contribution's knowledge in the discipline.

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and I want to say that's my pleasure to. and

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you have the session here. North C. 28

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unfortunately, Jessica, from Buenos Aires couldn't make it couldn't come. But she I I I'm sure, to share with me the

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the gladness that that Rc. 28 set our proposal, and to all of you who

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propose the papers to be present in the session. Our session is on income, inequality, class, and consumption, but I'm sure the work.

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and the papers I represent here go much beyond these things. our first. Well, it's a in-person session we defined like this when we proposed it for U.S.A., so fortunately we couldn't make it so. Our first

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a group to for speakers are from Chile, Oskar, Michelangelo in Vestadelus, Lagos.

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and the paper is one one's place in times of crisis, social position according to class and other attributes. We will leave discussion

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for later on, and as it is in person, session. And we are, you know, a group here. I would ask for people who want to come closer

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and after, like saying, before some of you coming after Covid. Really miss it to have our colleagues around. I know this hum of warmth and or in-person meetings, and I would leave the questions for

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the end. I don't want to be a discussant. We don't have discussions. As A, you know, we we just open to the floor, and the idea is to have a formal session and more discussion around these things that I'm sure will be challenged for all of us. So please our neighbors from Chile. Come here, my neighbors?

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Oh, by the way, I'm Sanchez-colon from Brazil.

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 thank you

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15 min of

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that's perfect. Thank you.

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first of all, we would like to thank Celiscalon and Hisy Kaplan for the organization of this session.

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and all colleagues present here at the moment. My name is Emmanuel Barose, and with my colleague, Oscar Mcclure.

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Okay.

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we will present this paper one's place in times of crisis, social position, according to class or other attributes, and we wrote the paper with a third

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travel to Australia.

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It's okay.

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So we present the results from a study conducted during the ongoing social political crisis sparkled by Chile's social uprising and the COVID-19 pandemics.

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Our aim is to understand how people define a social position during a period of rapid and social change. Specifically, we analyze how individuals label their social position.

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using notions related to class or other attributes, for example, sex occupation.

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etc.

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In 2,021. As the crisis continued, we applied a vignette-based survey to a statistically representative sample of 1,620 individuals.

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Respondents were from the Chilean capital, Santiago and Puerto Mont, an intermediate city in the south of the country, as you can appreciate on the map.

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In order to study the subjective social position of participants, we presented each of them 4 vignettes. Each vignette describes a fictitious person

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in a clear and realistic language.

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These 4 people are representative of the way in which individuals classify members of society. According to data obtained from a previous vignette-based survey applied to a representative sample of the Chilean population

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from lower to higher classes.

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Vignettes are particularly effective when measuring complex, multi-dimensional concepts that are best described. Music examples.

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Our vignettes represent multiple socioeconomic and cultural dimensions that together define a social position in a way that the respondent perceives as realistics realistic.

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Furthermore, by referring to the to third parties described in the vignettes rather than posing direct questions, we help respondents to feel more comfortable, addressing sensitive situations, such as those related relating to their own social position.

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Thus, in the first stage of the survey, participants were presented with 4 vignettes, these ones.

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and told that these represent different types of people within Chilean society. For example, one of the vignettes reads as follows, as you can see on the slide.

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Valeria Carrasco works as a secretary at a paper mill. She is 34 years old, separated, and has one child. She studied risk prevention at a technical and vocational institute, but was unable to find a job in her field.

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She lives in an apartment on Avenue and Paron in Lois perjury, district, metropolitan region in a secretural role. She receives a net monthly salary of

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around 600 Us. Dollars or 900 Australian dollars. Some of your friends and relations have lost their job.

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but demand on the paper produced by the meal remained strong, and she had kept a position during the pandemic.

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So the first question posed to interviewees was, What name would you give to the group to which it vignette belongs?

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An audio recording of the term used by each interview was made on the server administrators, tablet.

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and this term was later codified.

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Each respondent was then asked which of the vignette character they considered to be most like themselves.

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only a real small part of the sample, identifying with the character from the elite.

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So in the results results describe below. We do not refer to the to this specific vignette, using only the 3 other ones.

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This enables us to indirectly establish each respondents identification with one or 3 statistical strata, upper, upper, middle, sorry middle, and lower class.

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Finally, we combine the 2 responses that is, identification with with a specific vignet and the name assigned to the social group represented by that the vignette. This provided us indirectly

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with the person's subjective social position. Time.

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This process contrasts with other used in other researches in which the respondent is asked to select on scale the stratum of class type with which they identify

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Oscar. We go.

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but it good afternoon I will continue with the results of this study.

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No, I'm sorry

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we could have ideal the audio recordings of the names assigned by each interviewway to the social group represented by the vignette with which they identified.

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based on an initially inductive procedure.

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This qualification allowed us to reduce the data into several categories or subtypes

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that we then grouped into 2 larger social position types.

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The first type encompasses

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those who allude in various ways to the notion of social class using terms such as upper middle class, middle class.

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Lower with the class and low work test.

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In reference to this

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subjective expressions, we use the term class.

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The second social position type consists of those inquiries

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who bunch of personnel and other attributes. For for example, a specific Europe

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income.

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sex, or personal attitudes.

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This also includes references to poor people.

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a category that we consider to be separated

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from the issue of so of social class. It alludes to a lack of income.

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Other respondents.

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other respondents mention and other income levels, such as medium-level salary.

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44% of the of the participants or the survey refer to social class.

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This figure was considerably Rapidly higher than that obtained by a survey that we applied in 2,016, based on a similar mythology.

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in which only 5% of respondents

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identified the position in terms of class

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exchange suggest

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that the socio-political crisis, triggered by the popular uprising of 2,019, provoked in some individuals

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a process of cognitive change

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that lasted at least until this more recent survey applied in 2,021.

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The 2. The ways in which respondents define their subjective positions are not necessarily associated with the social strategy

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into which they self-class it. The type

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based on the vignet to which they consider themselves most similar.

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This can be seen in the figure.

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The majority of those

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who use the the notion of class are individuals who identify with the lower middle class.

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accounting for 52 of the respondents.

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However, a large proportion of upper-class respondents also use the notion of class

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interestingly.

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only small percentage of lower class in the interface

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interviews refer to class when naming the there. Such a procedure of this

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70%

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mention other attributes, often using terms such as the poor or hard-working people.

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By contrast, our statistical analysis of the data reveals that as the level of education rises, so does the likelihood that it deals will define themselves in terms of social class.

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particularly among those who have completed university or vocational education.

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This suggests that class identification is associated with with Coca-cola

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because of forecasting, call an enlightenment

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based on hager labels of education.

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Finally, the income levels and occupation of interviews

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do not have a meaningful influence on the use of the notion of class.

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In conclusion. around half of the people surveyed as part of the person study.

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declare that they belong to a group that they identified as a social class.

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The other half defined the subjective social position in terms of other attributes.

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The latter

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constitutes a relevant contribution to the debate

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on the use of measures based on scales of subjective status

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or plus. So yet the class. and regarding the the relative size of the various groups that make up

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the society

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respondents who appe to attributes other than social class

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to name the, to name their social position preferently.

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referentially, classify themselves in the lower scatter.

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On the one hand, this confirms that there is a strong presence of contradictory

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class positions, particularly in this lower group.

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On the other hand, those who identify themselves

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with the middle stratum

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frequently name the position as social class.

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Sas. Thus, according to the methodology of this study. assuming a subjective position of social class is more characteristic of those who identify themselves in the middle straddle than in middle than in the lower.

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Finally.

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the use of terms related to such a class when naming one's subjective position

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increased, marked markedly compared to the survey applied by our team in 2,016. When we found this form of self-identification to be rare.

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this suggests that the general context influences naming one social position, and the and that the association becomes more acute

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in terms of social, social, political crisis, as has been the case of Chile.

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so subjective social position is not a fixed identity, but an identity process that is both individual and collective, and may change over time.

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Thank you very much for

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the questions for later. So I started

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2 min.

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now I will call Judy.

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It's you. Yeah. And Professor J. Juji, from the Institute of so so like, Oh, God, Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Science, China and Xu Gong Institute of

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Okay.

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But anyway, he's one of the authors, a Schengen Institute of Sociology, also from the cast

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come here, and the title is not spending, not willing to spend an improvised of the impact of micro-provision on consumption

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to be here

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to that like

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15. What's your time now.

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Austin? New.

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it's a 10 to 5. Now.

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good afternoon.

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Thanks for organizing this session. It's very exciting event, and I'm very happy to be accepted to this session.

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and I'm also exciting to share with my very latest thinking and noticed

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paper consumption. Because I've been doing consumption studies since. My Phd, so I've been graduating some Ph. D. For like 10 years. not 12 years.

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And I want to come back to China because I was

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studying Phd. In the Uk. And I go back to China, I attracted more data, and the course has more. sense of what's going on in contemporary China to have more data and a more positive data. And but I've been have this puzzle that the consumption pattern is also cannot be explained

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inadequately of the Chinese people. There are some puzzles like, although their income has increased. I mean, compared 20 years ago, or especially along with the

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yeah relatively rapid development for this, for this, like 20 recent 20. Years their consumption has. It hasn't been largely increased or in latest at 20 years, so it's kind of This phenomenon has been studied quite a lot in economics, because People will explain like Chinese people like to say

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so. They don't spend, and all like Chinese people. They have this habit of convention, a culture of fruits, so they don't spend. But that's not enough. So

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I have been so trying to propose a theoretical framework to like, give a new explanation of this phenomenon and using some very latest empirical data. So they' to to see why they can be confirmed.

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Okay.

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so this is, it is my colleague, and we work on this paper together.

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A. So it

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I've introduced some of the research background. So I mean if, since the time is

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enough. So I've given examples of what I said is as

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because so I I in this paper, actually, I started by questioning the kind of being taken from granted relationship between income and consumption.

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So I I give an example. Like old people. Actually, they are richer, I mean compared with young people. They have more money, more financial resources, and the less kind of Life goals like marriage or buying a house. These goals Life! Goals! However, they are not the consumer. They are not the main consumers of any society, they not even in China. So why, they won't spend.

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Why, they even they have richer financial resources. They don't spend Comparative. So rather the young people they have. not enough income, but they aspire to spend right, they create it, they shift the consumer culture, or they even lead the consumer culture of the society, and they want to buy costs they have to buy. They have to buy houses, have to raise the children.

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and also they they want to buy some. They want to buy some fashionable foods, fashionable clothes, so they have these consumer desires, however, so why, what is up? So I was thinking, what is a

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of stackle of stackle of the consumption of the old people. So why, what prevents them from kind of using their financial resources to improve their life, to make their life better.

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 so generally

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there is a perspective of the system of provision emerged actually in the sociology of consumption. Discipline. Yes, I'm doing actually, sociology. Consumption is my Phd, so I examine this phenomenon from this sterical perspective.

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so! Which challenge this kind of sop approach, or, as OP. perspective challenges the existing research that considers income and ses as fundamental variables in understanding consumption, and treats all other factors as proxy variables. So it opens up hopefully new pathways to for understanding consumption.

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So in this paper I will place this. This The system provision theory within the theoretical framework of sociology and examines how this provision system influences consumption as a form of structure.

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So the whole part is empirical analysis.

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And

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okay, I will go on. So the I will introduce. The first, the consumer side perspective. Then go to the provision side perspective. So the first one consumers signed a perspective in understanding consumption which we are. We we are all very familiar with is the current mainstream perspective focuses on consumer factors, consumer side factors, for example.

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Which, based, which are based on consumers, resources, capabilities, and structural characteristics.

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And, for example, even the traditional orthodoxy called economic theory. foxes on this budget. Constrained, rational choices of consumers and sociology, on the other hand, emphasized the structural constraints on consumption, and argues that consumers have limited autonomy and limited sovereignty rather than being entirely rational consumers.

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However, no matter what this kind of is, the economy or the sociology, they emphasize on what we called consumer side factors

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like we said, consumers, characteristics, consumers. S, yes, consumers, resources. So that's what we call this consumer side perspective.

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yes.

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and limitations. Why, actually, the external environment of consumption, especially the resources and conditions of the external space, plays a significant role in consumer behavior.

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However, the discussion on how macro-level extremist factors particularly like the material material structure. macro structures. Inference, consumption remains insufficient.

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because traditional sociology examines this resources through

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the lens of as yes.

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perspective.

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Okay? So that's why we have to. We have okay, I have to go past. Then the provision side provision side perspective that abuses this. have to incorporate a but pervasive perspective to explain consumer behavior in sociology. This interdisciplinary system approved provision approach

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to the practice theory based a provision perspective in the sociology consumption. They emphasize on the relationship between provision and consumption as well as understanding consumer behavior. Within this provision, consumption system, and all the practice system.

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So I give you this. the empirical

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analysis. This is a theoretical framework that we propose. We try to explain consumption from both the provision side and the consumer side. What I measure is I, I measure.

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Okay. Hypothesis is, first, we think, of course, ses has significant impact on consumption. And the hypothesis. The second hypothesis is local material provision. Situations have significant impact on people's consumption, and third hypothesis. The local material provision has differentiated effects on the consumption of different occupational classes

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that

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I'm using the Chinese Social Survey 2,021, which is the latest survey data which was conducted by my Institute.

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 then, okay, it

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how to measure these variables? I will. I will just introduce the how to. I measure the material provision which quite difficult and quite different from Existing research is first, is abundance of a material. Provision is measured by urbanization level of the district. The accessibility of material provision is measured by the number of local express delivery outlets, and they have a bit availability of high-speed real.

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So Macro level is the same as existing research is S. Yes, mainly okay. Findings controlling other variables. Household per capita consumption from high to low is ranked as core, middle class, ordinary white collars, workers, workers, unemployed individuals and farmers. So that hypothesis one can be confirmed.

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And this then controlling if we control the individual level variables. So the impact of local material hypothetization high. local material provision situations also have significant impact on consumption.

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So if if the

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local material provision is more abundant, the residents, consumption. Expenditure is also higher, and if the provision is more accessible, like they have, they own the high-speed reel, or there are more delivery. But Express delivery office. The expenditure can also be higher.

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So Ok, how you skate the discussion. Thank you very much. Is that okay?

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Thank you, Sally, a discussion. So. Okay, 2 min more. Sorry about that.

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This article actually tells a story quite different from the conventional narratives of all in those who have money, or who I richer will spend so Consumption should be more adequately understood as a story like Something like they won't. They think I will spend money because the provision is not quite satisfied, or can, meeting my demands, commit my demands.

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So it's just a kind of

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framework, and plus the empirical. And I said, I think it's very preliminary work. So I I I'm also thinking of the further kind of implications of this research. So how we kind of because, you know, in in after the COVID-19, I think the economic economic development has been a crucial issue for every country in the world

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and also a investment, because the government doesn't have so much money to to invest what they want to, what they can do to expand the economy. So my, the consumption might be an important route.

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So I think that can be So the consumption study becomes okay, kind of a little bit

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useful in this context. So we're trying to do is kind of

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what we're trying to do to do a system medical thinking, to expand the economic development, also to improve people's quality of life at the same time to do the both jobs to increase the consumption. I think that's That's a kind of more helpful way to expand. people! To expand the economic and also social development. Thank you very much.

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How should I?

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So now, Alex Cho, we met already in the Rc. 20 eighth party. and Alex. Is Stanford University from United States.

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and they, like they sorry, try to read it sometimes, and the theme of his paper is the post liberal social classes, actual and perceived levels of income, inequality and associated values, please.

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The floor is yours.

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There's lots of values.

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Hi, everybody! It's thank you to. I say, our C 28, and everybody here the organizers as well. It's an absolute honor and pleasure to be presenting my work with all of you today. my name is Alex Trow. I'm a Phd. Canada in the Department of Sociology at Stanford University, and let's dive right into it.

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I like to start with a primer on the title of this talk and what the post Liberal means. And here I'm really hoping to set up really the background and kind of a little foreshadowing of the work that I'm going to be presenting.

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So the post- liberal social theory of stratification comes from A paper written by Michelle Jackson and David Grosky in 2,018, trying to posit a a different framework for understanding stratification in the 20 first century, in the post-industrial worlds.

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and fundamentally in a in a quick summary. Really, it's a point about how downward mobility and wage loss in late industrial stratifications can be explained by a variety of factors that I've put up there, but mainly I've highlighted a couple of terms up there for mobility, loss, and

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income inequality.

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So this project really is a question, I think, about how individuals characterize or perceive trends of rising inequality, downward mobility and loss in society.

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It's, in other words, kind of a question about what's happening on the objective level. the actual experiences of inequality, and how people perceive it in their imaginations or subjectively.

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So when we talk about the objective and the subjective realities in in in social class and position, a lot of the research has been focused on the misalignment or alignment of these trends.

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And because we're in R. C. 28. Naturally, that's going to be focused on the alignment for class position and social mobility.

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Now, another way of looking at this or visualizing it differently is as follows, so we have objective position, subjective position, objective mobility, and subjective mobility. I like to visualize it slightly differently. because it's our C. 28. We'll get through this pretty quickly, but I just wanted to make sure that we get the terminology right. as I move forward. And so we're not too confused.

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So when we're talking about mobility, oftentimes we're focused on origins and destinations, or we could call that the current or the past, the present, or the family.

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Of course, because it's the family. It's focused oftentimes on your parents a set of attributes, whether it's income, education, class, etc.

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Now, what we tend to call the subjective social position is kind of this imagined social ladder, and where people place themselves. I believe you know people in this room today, and before I've already presented on similar work. I'm just gonna call this for not either the imagined or the subjective social position, and that's, of course, in contrast with what we think, is the actual class position that individuals have.

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and the difference between these 2 we'll call accrue mobility. The difference between the 2 up there is perceived mobility. Not when you' to your attention. Of course, there's a

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suspiciously empty space on the right, and that's going to be the focus on today's presentation as to what people think their futures look like. Recall that the post liberal theory of stratification really is a question about how people perceive what the future is going to look like, and how resistance, movement, social movements are going to organize around it. And so, as a result, we have what I'm going to call here projected mobility, and how people project what their future positions, how likely they are to move up and down 150

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is going to be so with that being said, we're going to push to a slightly different paper. Which is what I'm calling the imagined social ladder actual perceived and projected mobility in 22 countries.

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Now, now you might be wondering, how did I sneak in a paper about mobility into the Inequality section and a question of why projected mobility

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and future positions. So, as I've mentioned already, it's really a question about how individuals characterize or perceive their futures. Are individuals hopeful or fearful of their life chances, especially in the context of rising inequality and slowing growth. See, I brought it back to inequality.

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And and beyond that there's also a further benefits of, I think, studying projected mobility, the first of which is the the outcomes that might be associated with projected mobility, such as belief and fairness, support for redistribution, voting, behavior, etc. A lot of this has been documented in the literature as being associated with how people perceive their own mobility. But we might consider that it's, in fact, actually based on what they

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they project their mobility to be. For instance, you might project yourself to be moving downwards in the future, and therefore be more supportive of redistribution. Or you might be, you might see yourself as a

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projecting upwards mobility, and you may or may not support redistribution. You might see redistribution as your means of upward mobility, or you might see redistribution as a threat to your mobility.

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So again, suspicious empty space on the left. Other things that might be interested for studying and projected mobility are, what are the factors that explain how individuals might project their future. And it is on this half on the left that I want to focus on today, particularly in the questions of what are some individual factors and contextual factors that might influence how people have hopes or fears for their future.

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So I've talked a lot about projected mobility. And I'm and I'm moving into the factors. So some of the factors are already out there on the chart. Right? Let's talk a little bit about what we know right now about perceived mobility and actual mobility.

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So what we know so far are the individuals are consistently bad at subjectively ranking themselves, and in turn estimating their mobility. This is largely in part because everyone has a tendency to view themselves as being middle class. being in the middle of the hierarchy and as a result, they're very likely to underestimate their mobility because they're going to say, Oh, I grew up middle class in the middle class today.

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Right? We also know that individuals in more developed countries are more likely to perceive themselves as being in higher social positions. we also know that individuals experiencing growth, so short-term growth in countries are more likely to perceive themselves as experiencing upward mobility, and finally to wrap up the slide. Individuals are more likely to underestimate mobility when they're in high inequality regimes, or perceive to be in high inequality regimes.

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So what does this mean for projected mobility? Right? Why does this matter well, you might consider, if individuals consistently view themselves in the middle, in the past and present, will they continue to do that in the future, and as a result continue to project themselves as experiencing no mobility

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as well with all the factors that I've shown you that are associated with perceived mobility. Do these same factors drive the perceptions? Sorry the projections for the future.

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So, as a result, here are my research questions. How do individuals project their future class positions which is very closely tied to how individuals project their future mobility. It's frankly just a different outcome, variable. but fundamentally, the the factors that I'm going to be investigating today are the individual factors on perceived and actual individual mobility as well as contextual factors, such as cohort, mobility, economic development, economic growth, income and wealth, inequality and changes in income and wealth inequality.

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So my data comes from the 2019 international Social Survey program Issp social inequality module. this is collected every 5 years. it's and the set of surveys this time was conducted between 2019 2022. The data is being released. Relatively recently, as a result of delays during Covid I selected 22 countries that had all the that had data and all the variables that I needed. It's approximately 1,000 respondents for country.

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and after cutting it down to the sample age range and the sample core range. I ended up with N of 15,434.

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And I'm adding in supplementary data for all these contextual factors from the following data basis. So the gdim the wid and the S wid or sweet width, and gdm, as I've been pronouncing them in my head when I'm doing this work.

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so let's talk about the the key variable, the key outcome variable. And what the survey question for that looks like. So it's really based on these? the set of 3 questions. from the survey, and it asks, in our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top, and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale which runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale? So that's the current position.

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think about the family that you grew up in. Where did they fit in then? That's the past. And finally, where do you think you'll be on a scale of one to 10 worth Sorry thinking ahead. 10 years from now. Where do you think you'll be? And that's the future.

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So with that, we're able to construct kind of our outcome variable for projected mobility. And I'm going to share with you some quick descriptive statistics which

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helps us answer the very first question. It's are people hopeful or fearful for their futures.

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So here is a quick alluvial diagram of the 10 possible. rankings that individuals have placed themselves in the present and in the future I know it's a little bit hard to see with 10 categories what you could really focus on

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is the difference? In the present and in the future, that people are more likely to be projecting themselves to be in higher positions in the future for a category. 6 to 10. Another way for me to visualize this for you is to put it in a a separate looking, using mobility on the right instead of the future position.

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and instead of one to 10, I'm showing you now, upward mobility, no mobility in downtown mobility, and you'll see that very few people actually set themselves up as being downwardly mobile, you know, speed that up a little bit so that we can get to the the meat and potatoes of this.

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so individuals appear to be optimistic about the future. Live chances. What are the factors that contribute to this optimism like I mentioned. I've showed you a couple of them before, but I've shown you how the perceived mobility is constructed. Let's talk about actual mobility so very quickly. This is really just Isco scores converted to. I say, scores that are rescaled to one to 10, because that's how the perceived mobility. Scores are being set, so I've rescaled it to one to 10.

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And then for the contextual variables, I'm using occupational mobility for a cohort as well as education mobility.

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We're using a level of development in terms of the average Gdp per capita. in the last 5 years, economic growth based on the change in the preceding 5 years. Level of inequality in terms of wealth, inequality, and for both of those I have changed as well. We'll get into it. As I'm analyzing the results.

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So how is projected mobility associated with individual and contextual factors? So I've I've approached this question by using a multi-nomial logit model with 3 possible outcomes up, right down, where? No mobility? With no! But no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no! It's but for the interest of time. I'm only going to present just the multi-new my logic. So the individual factors and contextual factors I've already mentioned, I've added in controls for sex education and work experience as well as fixed effects for countries.

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in the paper itself. I use a nested model. But again, in the interest of time, I'm going to focus on the results from the final model with all of the factors put in.

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So here's the table, and I've kind of split it up into the different types of factors. Don't worry about squinting. I'm going to be zooming into each one of them with a graph. So how do individuals project their mobility, based on the individual factors of perceived and actual individual social mobility?

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So on the left. And well, actually, all the graphs you're going to see from here on, out. it's going to be based on 3 possible outcomes. So the blue line represents The probability of downward mobility, orange for no mobility and green for upward mobility.

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So on the right. Here we have actual social mobility, and we see that there is a small, positive effect, for as actual social mobility increases, you can see that the the line for upward mobility is is a gentle, positive slope.

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but really, what's driving projected mobility is your perceptions of social mobility. If you've seen yourself move up more in the past, you are more likely to think that you're not moving up in the future, and part of it is kind of a ceiling effect. You think you've made it already. There isn't much more to go on in the future.

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 next. how do individuals project mobility based on development and growth. So here we have a fairly so a slightly interesting pattern of you can see the downward-sloping line for downward mobility as Gdp per capita increases. So what that's telling us is that individuals in developed countries are more likely to project a pessimistic outlook in life.

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but at the same time on the right when you look at Gdp, change that when A country is experiencing growth, the individuals are more likely to view themselves optimistically as well. So it's less about the level of development, but more so about the short-term shocks to the economic system. the short-term positive

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gains that individuals are experiencing.

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So we're moving on to income and wealth inequality now. So on the top, you're going to have income inequality, and on the bottom we have wealth, inequality measured as a so on the top income is genie on the bottom. It's the top 10 over the bottom, 50 percentage share.

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here again we have an interest. A similar take of genie In higher individuals, in higher income, inequality regimes are more likely to to to

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sorry to project upward mobility. So people that are in more unequal societies think they're more likely to move up or to move up in society.

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It's but similarly on the right, we see that when the genie changes, when it when inequality increases, people are less likely to

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project upward mobility based on the downward green slope line on the top right graph that you see, and we don't really find significant effects for wealth. And what that tells us is that wealth, again, is one of those things that has a is a much slower kind of effect that you're seeing in society, whereas income inequality is more quickly felt especially income change in income inequality.

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So I know I'm running out of time. This is the last light that I have for results. it's on actual and relative cohort mobility. and this this this set of results is particularly interesting, because what you see is kind of a flat line for downward mobility in when when cohort occupational mobility changes, whereas you see a flat orange line for core educational mobility.

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when that increases. So what it's saying in in an almost odd way, is that occupational mobility matters more for individuals projecting upwards mobility, whereas Educational mobility! It matters more when individuals are projecting downwards. Mobility, so in summary perceived social mobility has a greater effect than actual social mobility. Under the individual factors, income inequality is a greater effect than wealth, inequality which I found no significant effects for growth matters more than development, for a positive outlook

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and for coord mobility, occupation, mobility appears to matter more for optimism or educational mobility appears to matter more for reducing pessimism. So thank you very much for your time.

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and that's my presentation.

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And now we'll have here.

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changing middle class size in Germany, based on different educators, Pia Blossfeld and verse of Innsbruck, Austria.

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Okay.

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good evening.

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Today I will speak about the middle-class and Germany, and it's a project of hoggling tail, Floyd and Kly and me, and it's actually based in at the University of Leipzig where it was before. But I moved

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to a job in Innsbruck.

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So 2 questions we will. And we address in this paper is the first one is.

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how has middle class changed the size of the middle class changed in Germany since reunification in basically an update of existing studies. And secondly, what we want to contribute is that we want to examine differences in conclusions according how we measure the middle class.

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So why we want to examine changes in the middle class so generally, there is a narrative in the German society that the middle class size is declining.

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and there are many reasons for it. For example, since reunification, Germany has experienced as many countries globalised at all countries, globalisation, a labour market, flexibleizations, increase of at typical jobs and fixed term employment.

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and particularly in the time of Chancellor Schrodinger. There has been an increase in neoliberalism and Val for retrenchment, and also in terms of the occupational change

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that there are less and manufacturing jobs. There has been a union decline, and this hits particularly middle-class jobs, and we also experienced, as in many societies, an increase in single parents, households, and divorce rates. But, on the other hand, we also had still continuing education, expansion, and occupational upgrading's introduction of a minimum wage

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and the increasing labour market participation of women and their contribution to household incomes, the rise of dual earner and double career cobbles, demographic aging and an economic boom since the mid 2 thousands. So the well. The development of the middle class over the last

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3 decades is an open empirical question. And you also see, because these different developments affect different inequality dimension. It's also important to examine it.

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Why are several socio-economic dimensions?

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So it's a more descriptive explorative study. And we use longitudinal data or panel data from the German socioeconomic panel. But we just we don't analyze it longitudinally. But we look at the observation period of 1,991 to 2,010, and look how the middle class size and Germany has changed. And we look at the middle class, at the household levels

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and households are included where the hats

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of the households, aged 17 to 65.

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So first we look at different unidimensional concepts, and then we also apply to multi-dimensional concepts. So most studies from Germany are based on an income concept of middle classes.

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and in our middle class thresholds we orient on existing studies. So our income middle class is defined

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between 75% and 200% of annual medium household income. And then you also see that we divide the middle class, and 3 groups so low, middle, and high.

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Then for wells. For the Wells middle class, we use a proxy, variable. estimating wells in reference to household income from various types of assets.

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So basically, households that get

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500 to €5,000 annually in terms of asset returns in the middle class. Then we also define the middle class by occupation. So basically, if households have a Gp position of 2 for a 3, a 5,

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6, and 4 beam. They belong to the middle class.

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and then we also build an educational middle class. So if someone has vocational training or higher education entry certificate. They belong to the middle class, and we also have 3 groups in the middle.

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so as measures we use from the G, so the net disposable household income. So it's income from employment transfers pension, Texas

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and we also weigh it. The households a composition with an Oecd scale, and we also adjusted for inflation.

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Then we also examine wells, and we look at the annual income from assets and imputed red. And it's also like income. The previous calendar year year information

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for education. We use the Casman scale and for occupation, Egp. As already mentioned, and the position for the household is defined by the dominance approach of Erickson.

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Then we also used to that multi-dimensional approaches, one which was established by Bokhart, and he says, basically, if some households fulfill all criteria for the middle class thresholds for all 3 variables. They belong to the middle class. And

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yeah, our restrictions are less strict. So we say, it's just when they met 3 of the 4 criteria that they belong to the middle class.

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and we have 5 groups or lower class, 3 types of middle classes on an upper class. And this is a simple opera rationalization.

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but and also a bit restrictive. And then my colleague also developed an index where he did

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for scores. So for income and wealth. It remains in common wells. But for education we use in years of schooling and for occupation we use the science measure, and then we add some basically up this measures. And then this is a value for the household.

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Now we come to the results. How the middle class has changed.

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And here we see the change in the middle class in terms of education, and what we see is

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that the middle class share did not change much until the mid 2,000. But there has been a shift in the

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in our middle classes, so we see that the upper middle class has increased, and the lower middle class has declined. But in general we see a decline in in the middle class. But it is not a negative story, as we have actually an increase in highly educated people

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for occupation. We see that the middle class has declined as well, and we see that the lower middle class, or shrinking, particularly in the higher middle class, has increased.

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and we see in general that the lower class has increased in the upper class. So we see this typical.

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you know, for Germany.

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Then here is the middle class in terms of income in Germany. And we see basically no change. It's not the change from 71% to

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69% is not significant.

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But there has been a significant decline in the lower middle class.

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When we look at wells, we see that the middle class is very small, and also became smaller over time, and particularly the lower middle class, has shrunk.

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Now we come to the multi-dimensional approaches. And we see that the middle class is quite large. So about 70%. And when we use the index, it's a larger middle class, but we also observe a small decline in the middle class, and this is mainly due to the decline of the lower middle class.

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So the conclusion of this descriptive analysis is that we observe a shrinking middle class, but it's only a small decline.

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and it varies according to operationalization. And mostly It's a growth of the lower and upper classes.

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and for the multi-dimensional approach there is particularly a disappearance of the lower middle class.

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So what we can conclude is that large parts of the population have benefited from these different developments. I mentioned, as in subtractive introductions, such as rising wages, education, expansion, and the improvement of the occupational structure. However, lower classes increasingly lose out. So there's not a society of collective decline, but a society of the small group group of left behind. So thank you very much.

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Wonderful. Thank you, Pia. And now we are going to our last paper. And so.

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and Professor Elizush Tanki from verse of Coinbra and and Hunesh, P. Franca, San Paulo, Brazil, middle class and identity struggles in Brazil. A case in Bay. Yeah.

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okay.

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thank you very much.

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Good afternoon. It's a great pleasure to be here with a large audience we can consider.

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I am

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presenting here not a result of any empirical studies or surveys. but just

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a small group of points of questions that probably can help us as to to reflect a little bit around around these issues in a theoretical terms, mainly in theoretical terms, but that a at the end I will refer some prospects about the project that I'm

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beginning to start in in Brazil, in Salvador de Bay, where I am now

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settled as a visiting professor

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So your 4 topics that I would like to mention here, one around social class, second, one around middle class, the third one about the identities. And finally, reference to this empirical project that I will start very soon.

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01:01:06.490 --> 01:01:32.420
we know that social class is a very a controversial concept, since always like this, since nineteenth century, we know that there is a differences and the tensions between a class social class as a category, as an abstract category, theoretical category, and as a social force or subject, a political actor.

330
01:01:32.710 --> 01:01:44.529
Of course there. There are theoretical influences here from car marks to Max Weber, I. P. Thompson, etc. But

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nowadays I think the this controversial, this world. Controversial, theoretical controversial concept has been spread out. Because

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a

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01:02:02.130 --> 01:02:24.450
if we recognize that this class struggle is still ahead. But on the other side, we it. It's more and more difficult to to identify as social class as a political actor interfering in the now nowadays economical and social trends. globally speaking.

334
01:02:24.650 --> 01:02:49.290
because, first, the industry, the all the industry which in a since nineteenth century concentrated the working manual working class and the allowed the building of a collective identity. A collective force is not any more like that, because fragmentation, because instability, because the precariousness.

335
01:02:49.600 --> 01:03:02.650
also because the fluidity of of economics and also the digitalizing world which is interfering in this substantive social reality.

336
01:03:03.070 --> 01:03:24.619
Also, I should mention that nowadays trends in terms of the changing in terms of acceleration in terms of alienation and even individualization of society gave more and more complexity to discuss this type of issues

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01:03:25.140 --> 01:03:48.540
on the other top. The second topic, it's about the middle class. Of course, middle class is a very, also very controversial concept. Middle classes are segments, and the that are in between the basement of the social pyramid and the top social data.

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01:03:48.950 --> 01:04:13.859
Of course, middle class was never a group, a substantive and consistent group, as it has been in the case of the the manual working class, at least since the nineteenth century, to the middle twentieth century, which plays a very decisive role in social and economic transformation in Western societies.

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01:04:14.210 --> 01:04:37.250
But on the other side we know that, and several sociologists have been discussing these things since. Long ago. I mentioned Klaus Heather, Franklin, for example, referring and analyzing the role of these social movements from the 60 s.

340
01:04:37.250 --> 01:04:57.819
Ahead, and the so called middle class radicalism as Frank Parkin as first mentioned that the that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that that, that, that, that that that that

341
01:04:57.820 --> 01:05:21.530
especially from Marxist influence, that that which consider traditionally the role of the middle class, just as a a buffer zone, or as some some mechanisms that avoid transformation, that avoid or naturalize class struggle and class conflicts. The social movements from the sixties

342
01:05:21.530 --> 01:05:42.500
ahead have shown the influence of values that that are clearly connected to the middle class lifestyles, for example, students, for example professions, qualified provisions, etc. That plays a very decisive role since the sixties.

343
01:05:42.500 --> 01:06:06.449
And I think until recently, we also can can see, besides the the class struggles it. It's not a a class struggle is not anymore so visible in substantial terms. But we know that still exists. And and it's very, very radicalized, because inequalities are growing up.

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01:06:06.450 --> 01:06:31.989
and the resistance of the working class is is weaker and weaker. But once in a while we saw civil societies and the new groups, middle class groups, qualified groups, younger generations reacting and resisting against this intensification of social inequalities all over the world.

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01:06:32.140 --> 01:07:04.200
and in this, in several cases we can see very clearly the presence of the middle class values revolts, rebellions I could mentioned in in the the the financial crisis in the 2,008, 2,009. We've seen this in in Southern Europe, where the students where the first generation of Precariat have been playing a very decisive role, and all all these rebellions.

346
01:07:04.200 --> 01:07:24.600
and we could probably say a quoting if you don't. So that probably that was a class struggle without a class. It was a very radical protests that we have been watching around Europe, and still recently, but I think in the recent times change that there were

347
01:07:24.820 --> 01:07:41.280
some more difficult and redirections of the values and orientations, because until one decade ago or so, we could see more left wing values and progressive values.

348
01:07:41.280 --> 01:07:56.030
Among this this is a rebellion. And nowadays we see more trends toward Populist attitudes, and the individual is attitudes so things that have been changing very recently.

349
01:07:56.210 --> 01:08:06.139
but what I could say here is that identity and class always have been interconnected.

350
01:08:06.290 --> 01:08:28.560
But Considering nineteenth century, or even the first decades of the twentieth century we could, we could see a strong identity in the working manual class, in many, in many districts of industry, everywhere. And after the eighties, the nineties.

351
01:08:28.560 --> 01:08:40.870
it's it became more and more difficult to point out the collective identities and talking and discussing about the role of the avant-garde working class.

352
01:08:40.870 --> 01:09:08.359
So the identity became more fluid. But it doesn't mean that it's not that, that it's a. It's not important. It is important. If we consider the identity as some dynamics, like a Clausette, or talked about the radicalist middle class. In the Sixtys there were no fixed identity, but the the dynamics of the protests build out some kind of identity

353
01:09:08.810 --> 01:09:23.120
collective identity. Coming from a more recent situations. I would mention also these rebellions and protests. For example, in my country, in Portugal, in the.

354
01:09:23.120 --> 01:09:44.770
in the the this more intensifying period of crisis, the international finance institutions interfering in the in the government in Portugal, We had around 1 million people protesting in Portugal in a very spontaneous movement.

355
01:09:44.770 --> 01:10:03.449
and this movement was mainly composed with the new strategy of precariat people, precarious people, young people, educated people, students from the university, but many, many qualified workers

356
01:10:03.450 --> 01:10:14.039
protesting against the against these economic crisis and economic situations. finally, I would mention these.

357
01:10:14.120 --> 01:10:30.750
this idea of starting a project relating with the with the a particular segment of workers in Brazil, in in Salvador, the by year, the domestic work.

358
01:10:30.750 --> 01:10:55.750
because this reality, there is a very important laboratory where we cannot so observate the articulation between different different criteria, of analyzing inequalities and analyzing political dynamics in terms of labor relations, because the large majority of the of the domestic

359
01:10:55.750 --> 01:10:57.130
workers are black

360
01:10:57.130 --> 01:11:03.869
or are different different technic routes.

361
01:11:03.960 --> 01:11:23.609
because they are women, because many of these conditions of work are characterized by invisibility, and and also because most of these of these workers domestic workers in Brazil, they work for the upper middle class

362
01:11:23.630 --> 01:11:33.969
or the Allies, and in this context of domestic space their worker is characterized by by submission.

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01:11:33.970 --> 01:11:57.920
by invisibility, like an attitude of servants. where? these these inequalities and these the resistance is, is, is, is master, or is impossible to come up unless new groups or new articulations, namely, If

364
01:11:58.070 --> 01:12:01.299
the new social movements

365
01:12:01.880 --> 01:12:20.140
that are not strictly connected with the labor space, but more open can articulated with the the capacities of the trade union currents in Brazil to open up the possibility of organizing these sectors

366
01:12:20.140 --> 01:12:33.330
and react against the a very rational gender and the social class deep inequalities and and justice. Thank you very much.

367
01:12:37.290 --> 01:12:39.880
So

368
01:12:43.250 --> 01:12:46.399
we both consent to stay here.

369
01:12:48.480 --> 01:12:50.830
I

370
01:13:04.430 --> 01:13:05.100
yes.

371
01:13:08.250 --> 01:13:11.280
Well, it seems like now we don't need to be there.

372
01:13:11.480 --> 01:13:16.170
 Oh.

373
01:13:17.370 --> 01:13:18.210
but

374
01:13:27.340 --> 01:13:30.899
and that's one thing, because I think it's

375
01:13:40.110 --> 01:13:41.980
of your.

376
01:13:43.930 --> 01:13:45.230
And they

377
01:13:45.770 --> 01:13:53.030
sorry. Can I just ask that we go over to the microphone because we do have online participants?

378
01:13:54.720 --> 01:13:59.429
And clearly, thank you so much

379
01:13:59.660 --> 01:14:01.849
this individual study of social accomplish.

380
01:14:01.990 --> 01:14:10.959
I have at least 4 questions.

381
01:14:11.250 --> 01:14:21.980
So, Alex, my question is regarding your model. And so I got a graph. You use some of multinomial

382
01:14:22.050 --> 01:14:23.280
love it now?

383
01:14:23.480 --> 01:14:39.570
 then. But the dependent variable is actually, if I can write the difference between the position of the parent and the actual position

384
01:14:39.740 --> 01:14:42.810
to the expected position in 10 years.

385
01:14:43.040 --> 01:14:48.170
So if you take the difference, you get from minus 10 to 10

386
01:14:48.830 --> 01:15:03.829
so, and 0 for for people who remove according to that measure. So I would say, did you try some? sensitivity issues because I would say, somebody who.

387
01:15:03.900 --> 01:15:08.999
one or minus one. Probably it's about the same

388
01:15:09.930 --> 01:15:17.210
of somebody who didn't move. So what are the criteria for? Those who move?

389
01:15:17.450 --> 01:15:27.410
Those were upwardly mobile and downwardly mobile? Or that's the the how do you construct that variable?

390
01:15:27.890 --> 01:15:30.650
So it's like a problem when it

391
01:15:30.720 --> 01:15:34.160
okay? And then to this.

392
01:15:35.070 --> 01:15:36.200
So

393
01:15:36.360 --> 01:15:46.049
sorry, because I am not familiar with the situation in China, but what I can say is that consumption is usually driven by access to credit.

394
01:15:46.270 --> 01:15:51.270
Then I would say, how is the access to credit

395
01:15:51.340 --> 01:15:56.620
in China, how well-spread are great guards of the

396
01:15:56.660 --> 01:16:04.399
so so! But to explain the right, the right or low of the consumption.

397
01:16:06.070 --> 01:16:08.250
Yes.

398
01:16:08.280 --> 01:16:11.050
for consumption access to consumption credits.

399
01:16:30.420 --> 01:16:33.249
I'm not sure if you're actually

400
01:16:34.030 --> 01:16:41.300
talking about class when you say people are talking about class because you are actually describing a status order

401
01:16:41.810 --> 01:16:47.359
when you say upper-class middle class, and that that's not class. That's a status order.

402
01:16:47.810 --> 01:16:52.600
Then, in the what you qualify as other

403
01:16:52.750 --> 01:16:55.650
responses, there are our recurrences plus.

404
01:16:55.820 --> 01:16:57.909
So when people who chase

405
01:16:58.320 --> 01:17:03.499
a social position defined in terms of economic relationship.

406
01:17:03.520 --> 01:17:06.740
so when people speak about their occupations.

407
01:17:06.850 --> 01:17:08.340
better

408
01:17:08.500 --> 01:17:17.420
a class definition when people say they are full, that's a class definition. When people speak about their recon. That's a class definition.

409
01:17:17.480 --> 01:17:23.760
So I'd like to have that more clear because I think that

410
01:17:24.310 --> 01:17:31.189
what you call class is actually status order. And other people are speaking about classes.

411
01:17:31.400 --> 01:17:38.190
I wonder if you also have some examples about the individual or personal characteristics.

412
01:17:38.420 --> 01:17:52.240
because some of those characteristics may be also related to the labour market. For instance, if somebody says I'm happy, I would say that it's not label Market related. But if somebody says I'm reliable.

413
01:17:52.310 --> 01:17:58.849
would say, that's a quality that it's needed in the labour market. So I would say.

414
01:17:58.980 --> 01:18:06.620
why are you so restricted in the use of the term class? And for Pia

415
01:18:06.630 --> 01:18:09.720
also have a question.

416
01:18:10.230 --> 01:18:16.740
so it's amazing. The high correlation you show between the 4 different measures of the

417
01:18:18.300 --> 01:18:21.010
following, your class, I would say you

418
01:18:21.170 --> 01:18:31.590
just for the benefit of speculation. what do you think is the correlation of those measures with the subjective, the the perception.

419
01:18:31.710 --> 01:18:39.589
their all the self-positioning people do of their situation in terms of classes in Germany.

420
01:18:40.390 --> 01:18:41.970
I don't know.

421
01:18:44.420 --> 01:18:46.630
I mean, if you ask people.

422
01:18:46.900 --> 01:18:49.880
which class do you belong to.

423
01:18:49.920 --> 01:18:58.429
or in that scale of one to 10? And what's your position? Will that also be correlated to the measures you take

424
01:19:04.540 --> 01:19:05.680
the

425
01:19:11.700 --> 01:19:12.940
I. So

426
01:19:14.000 --> 01:19:24.799
so my name is Pablo. I come from University of Chile, and my question is for Oscar and the morale, and it's kind of the same as the last question, because

427
01:19:25.310 --> 01:19:36.680
it seems to me that you make the comparison between class categories and non-class categories. But to me, some of your non-class categories are actually

428
01:19:37.090 --> 01:19:39.579
categories referring to class.

429
01:19:39.750 --> 01:19:48.930
So in one of the research that I made one of the few qualitative research that I made because I am not a qualitative person at all. But what I saw is that

430
01:19:49.070 --> 01:20:14.939
through the interviews people actually used like different categories interchangeablely to refer to the same type of issues. So, for example, some of them said. I am like a middle-class person, but in reality I am sort of pool because I can make it through the through the month, and in the end I think I am also work here because I work a lot, and I work hard. So they use different terms.

431
01:20:15.350 --> 01:20:28.559
according to my interpretation, to talk about the same. So what do you think about it? And how did you establish the difference to to say that in some cases we are talking about class, and in others we are not talking about class.

432
01:20:31.530 --> 01:20:32.320
And

433
01:20:37.480 --> 01:20:38.689
here, or

434
01:20:39.760 --> 01:20:43.060
we would have to be okay.

435
01:20:43.390 --> 01:20:53.859
I actually, it's not really questions. But I'm gonna give more time for you guys to talk about your work. So I would like you guys to

436
01:20:53.870 --> 01:21:05.980
tell us more about the social rising. Of course I'm Brazil. I know what's going on in Chile. But maybe it's international audience. Maybe people are not so aware

437
01:21:06.000 --> 01:21:34.099
about the social surprising we're talking about paper. I mean the the the ambience that it seems that as you made a very strong point that there is. The moment has an effect. And of course, when we do, we we have, I mean, we certification. People have this idea that things are stable, and the data is collecting, you know, in a very objective way. But it's not when people answer our surveys.

438
01:21:34.310 --> 01:21:41.860
They are surrounded by sometimes a mess. a social net, social problems or not.

439
01:21:42.270 --> 01:21:49.859
So in these things. You know the environment you are doing, your survey, or the bureau of such as doing this

440
01:21:50.030 --> 01:22:19.859
has impact on the way people answer, so, yeah, that's what I would like to ask you. I think it's very nice. We brought this about for duty, and I knew Youtube as a postdoc. So I was very sad when I said, You are a to zoom already like more than a decent. I would like just how you guys collected the data because it was during pandemics. Right? Just one. I know how it was done.

441
01:22:20.460 --> 01:22:24.219
Okay. And Alex, oh, I loved it.

442
01:22:24.270 --> 01:22:44.220
I love that because I've been working with this data on the twentieth of 1999. So and let's not talk about that. But I really enjoy Michelle and David's paper. My students love it. I always make them because it's very provocative, I would say. But guys reading

443
01:22:44.280 --> 01:22:52.199
about post. It's a very provocative paper, and it gives you a lot of ideas, and I really like it.

444
01:22:52.560 --> 01:22:56.550
Well, 2 things, I would say, perceive. Inequality is inequality.

445
01:22:56.610 --> 01:23:00.480
I think this difference between what people perceive

446
01:23:00.820 --> 01:23:10.120
and not as reality, as what people feel or they think about. Their position

447
01:23:10.150 --> 01:23:29.230
was not real. There's some objective thing there, and I would say, Well, the way people leave their perception of class is reality, you know. So that was so. I I really like this kind of work, and one thing I was

448
01:23:29.360 --> 01:23:34.220
But then you don't need to answer it, because just I wish you would do that.

449
01:23:34.340 --> 01:23:43.220
Maybe you have done. We have. Jesus yields now the young people they have a very

450
01:23:43.460 --> 01:23:58.539
it's a cure, and I don't know. You guys are young, maybe, but there is a lot of talk about the way the young people are seeing their future and their opportunities.

451
01:23:58.540 --> 01:24:16.400
and it's a very challenging and scary work out there, and I don't know if you know Chess, but you have this idea of going forward to your research and the young people. I think they would perceive

452
01:24:16.500 --> 01:24:20.020
their situations more challenging and more

453
01:24:20.300 --> 01:24:21.299
I don't know.

454
01:24:21.430 --> 01:24:28.829
and I would like to talk a little bit about. I like your last note.

455
01:24:29.110 --> 01:24:32.180
not a society of collective decline.

456
01:24:32.200 --> 01:24:38.220
but the so sight of a small group of the left behind. I would like to explore a little bit this

457
01:24:38.320 --> 01:24:47.400
and Well, Eliza knows so well I don't have a question for you, but anyway, if you want to also take your time and say something else.

458
01:24:47.600 --> 01:24:50.570
any other questions, but it's

459
01:24:54.070 --> 01:24:56.809
I also met to you at the party.

460
01:24:57.480 --> 01:25:15.820
Hi! I had not necessarily a question, but just something to think about, maybe for Alex, when you were looking at the like. It's called a Macro level kind of factors, and you use the Gdp and Gdp growth and inequality. And maybe it links a bit to the insecurity of young generation. I was wondering if something like

461
01:25:15.880 --> 01:25:19.280
wage growth, or even housing prices

462
01:25:19.310 --> 01:25:26.360
might kind of uncover the fear and the pessimism of our vulnerability, because I think.

463
01:25:26.380 --> 01:25:41.859
for a lot of Yahoo, but not even that young people in terms of where you imagine yourself in the next 10 years the ability to buy a house and have security net science is quite important. So I was wondering if that's something that you thought about. Thank you.

464
01:25:43.110 --> 01:25:52.409
because it's easier to pass around. And I would also want to make a note. As Elizabeth

465
01:25:52.520 --> 01:26:02.779
Room is packed for this Congress standards. So it shows how interesting the work of your you guys

466
01:26:03.050 --> 01:26:05.579
is she entitled to?

467
01:26:05.910 --> 01:26:21.330
Yeah, I have a question to Alex. You can you control? But because you said there could be a ceiling effect. When you look at the current state, basically and then perceive mobility, can you somehow control it in the data?

468
01:26:26.140 --> 01:26:26.860
This?

469
01:26:30.160 --> 01:26:43.610
Thank you so much, everybody, for all the thoughtful questions. I'll try to get through them as quickly as I can. So so yes, the the the short answer is, yes, I did do the sensitivity analysis. You are right that the reason? So

470
01:26:44.040 --> 01:27:09.109
here's the long answer. So I did. Well, as I the order now. So I've used the continuous variable instead of the multinomial. The reason why I present the multinomial is, it's easier to graph. You'll see that the predictors are still in their continuous forms from negative 9 to positive 9 But substantially, the results are the same. And the reason being that it's like. Yes, theoretically, it's negative and a positive 9. But nobody really says they're going to drop from the

471
01:27:09.110 --> 01:27:35.760
from from position 10 to position, one right? Large amount of the data is going to be concentrated around the negative one, the positive one kind of range. so yeah, so that's that's the that's my, that's the answer. the the results are substantially the same. so yes, the Jackson grosky paper. I I've loved it since I read it in undergrad, and I've just been trying to find ways to sneak it into my papers so clearly. You've seen how I can.

472
01:27:35.850 --> 01:28:03.420
It really diverted into a mobile of your question. yeah. So yeah. The question on contextual factors for wage and housing prices. I'm sure of wage prices will be easy to get well, easy is to get for 22 countries. I I would love to find a database where I can get housing prices for 22 countries. yeah, yeah, if you know what I would love, I like, I'm not being positions here. I would love to to see one. Yeah, yeah.

473
01:28:09.280 --> 01:28:09.970
right?

474
01:28:11.210 --> 01:28:12.270
My

475
01:28:15.990 --> 01:28:17.410
yeah.

476
01:28:17.660 --> 01:28:35.940
yeah, yeah, my my worry. There would also be like coming from San Francisco, as well as previously, being in a Vancouver, and originally from Singapore, where, like housing, prices are very high, and all those places you get big regional variation as well. not in Singapore, but definitely in Canada and the United States.

477
01:28:35.940 --> 01:28:58.200
and the last question about ceiling effects. Yes, I actually did do a separate set of analyses where I only took kind of the center. the the middle 60. So people at the absolute top see, the effect is happening because people at the top cannot go. It can only go down and likewise at the bottom. So I've done the analysis for the group just in the middle. And it's a similar

478
01:28:58.430 --> 01:29:20.240
again, substantial is not, because again, most of the data is in the center, not at the top and the bottom. So there is a theoretical ceiling effect. But practically it doesn't actually affect the results that much. what? Instead, we're we're seeing is that people that move up think they're less likely to continue moving up, whether that's because they think they've already done all that they can, or they just

479
01:29:20.240 --> 01:29:28.749
as a result of doing what they can feel like. The future is more bleak. That's unclear. That's for the investigation. Yeah.

480
01:29:29.240 --> 01:29:30.430
you. Yeah.

481
01:29:31.880 --> 01:29:35.040
Thank you very much for the questions.

482
01:29:35.050 --> 01:29:54.639
So the first question about access to credit. I I like the question, thank you. Because The axis at first one, I want to say is on my paper. Access to credit is also something like the financial resources consumers. So they are also To the

483
01:29:54.640 --> 01:30:12.570
a consumer side of perspective to understand consumption. So they enhance people's purchase and purchase in power. So So there are actually a lot of research on it. What I want to challenge is this, what to propose this? provision signed a perspective

484
01:30:12.870 --> 01:30:17.949
so of way back to access credit. I think

485
01:30:18.140 --> 01:30:36.260
I first reading a paper on income in college and consumption consumption in quality of the China. I mean, I've examined the data. So it's, I mean, like a lot of other countries. The access to credit is also stratified and on vehicle

486
01:30:36.290 --> 01:30:38.630
to different social causes.

487
01:30:38.760 --> 01:30:58.500
So The higher income people and higher social class have more access to credit. But, of course However, I want what I want to emphasize is by access. I really In my the the model of provision, side perspective. What I want to emphasize is

488
01:30:58.500 --> 01:31:15.190
The abundance and access to goods and services that provided by the market provided by the government. So I want what stratifies this access is also stratified on and on local to different social classes.

489
01:31:15.320 --> 01:31:37.270
And also thanks for the question I want to add to One real point that I didn't speak at earlier on is I think. In the digital society, and also a contemporary society. The provision side of factors are more important than the free Internet Society.

490
01:31:37.270 --> 01:31:47.130
That is what I want to propose is that actually provides some space that the government and the enterprises they can do for consumers

491
01:31:47.150 --> 01:31:58.860
not all, and by increase their income, increase the access to credit, increase anything like to enrich their financial resources.

492
01:31:58.860 --> 01:32:20.339
Mit Ctl, and what they can do is like, improve the infrastructure, like the innovative products, innovative services more friendly to all people more friendly to poor people. So what I want to emphasize in this provision, how to provision a side perspective, how to concur the social inequality of the world.

493
01:32:20.500 --> 01:32:31.809
And the second question from Annie. I like your question. It's a very good question to to to my research, and very important, because the Sovietets would like to spend

494
01:32:31.970 --> 01:32:41.179
 a lot of money on it. Actually, because we have to do the random to represent the whole Chinese people.

495
01:32:41.320 --> 01:32:53.579
You see, this is a lot of work. And what is a large team doing it? And actually, we can only do it twice a year, because it's very difficult and very time consuming.

496
01:32:53.620 --> 01:33:18.009
and it has been connected The first survey was done in 2,006. So now it's a 2,021, the latest away. And it is very presentable and using the scientific methods assembly. So, but it's the open data. So people like Chinese students, if they are interested in this data, they can apply to use it. So it's a

497
01:33:18.180 --> 01:33:19.690
thanks. Thank you.

498
01:33:20.830 --> 01:33:31.099
Thank you. I will answer your question about the social outburst, and Oscar will answer the other tricky questions about class and other attributes.

499
01:33:31.200 --> 01:33:39.510
So thank you, Sally, for your question. Yes, the social outburst in Chile was really disruptive for us and researchers.

500
01:33:39.620 --> 01:33:51.030
We have some other colleagues from Chile here. It was really disruptive. On on the Chilean Society, because it was really long. It lasted 5 months.

501
01:33:51.340 --> 01:33:54.140
and it was.

502
01:33:54.390 --> 01:33:55.230
It's

503
01:33:55.570 --> 01:34:14.710
well it was 5 months every day, so we had one month in which Sancho wasn't working. so it was really disruptive in a disruptive, in a distinct way, considering I don't know Peru or Colombia the outburst. It was about one month.

504
01:34:14.960 --> 01:34:38.910
or the French Yellow Jacket movement, but it was. It was long, too, but it was on Saturday, so the rest of the week it was quite normal. So in the case of Chile it was about 5 months. So it was really disruptive, and we had a a profound political and institutional crisis that the reason why people ask for a new constitution.

505
01:34:39.020 --> 01:34:45.830
So it had an impact on the way we did the research and the impact you. You saw in the results.

506
01:34:45.860 --> 01:34:56.289
and maybe one of the most disruptive elements for us as researchers was also the pandemic. We had to postpone the survey

507
01:34:56.360 --> 01:35:04.179
a few months, and it was really complicated, because in Chile the lockdown was one of the longest in the world.

508
01:35:04.270 --> 01:35:08.790
So the protocols for applying a survey with a tablet.

509
01:35:09.330 --> 01:35:17.930
I just can't describe it as it was just really complicated. We couldn't go inside the person's house, so it was really really complicated.

510
01:35:18.070 --> 01:35:37.200
So yes, it was really disruptive on our lives on the way we could do this survey. But it's interesting, too, because regarding reacting to the case of Germany or others. One of the questions we have now is,

511
01:35:37.540 --> 01:35:55.020
the perception, the self-identification is changing as we showed, but we might also think that we are experiencing a popularization of the middle classes. So the way people relate to classes to the notion of class has something to do with it. Also.

512
01:35:57.010 --> 01:35:57.880
thanks

513
01:35:59.960 --> 01:36:03.129
very interesting comments.

514
01:36:03.720 --> 01:36:07.999
We'll see. I see 2,

515
01:36:08.040 --> 01:36:10.579
all our positions

516
01:36:11.660 --> 01:36:13.449
in the with our our work.

517
01:36:14.180 --> 01:36:15.110
Whoa!

518
01:36:16.340 --> 01:36:20.600
For one in our side. What we made

519
01:36:21.050 --> 01:36:25.440
effectively. It isn't. It's true. It is a

520
01:36:25.500 --> 01:36:27.250
a social

521
01:36:27.270 --> 01:36:33.009
plastics working with me.

522
01:36:33.850 --> 01:36:38.430
in which we define what is a class.

523
01:36:38.450 --> 01:36:49.219
 We took once 1,600 audios that were recorded.

524
01:36:49.660 --> 01:36:52.500
and we inductively.

525
01:36:53.390 --> 01:36:58.989
through an inactive process where we constructed what we need.

526
01:36:59.190 --> 01:36:59.960
The

527
01:37:01.110 --> 01:37:01.890
yeah.

528
01:37:02.990 --> 01:37:06.240
The other alternative would have been

529
01:37:06.730 --> 01:37:10.059
to ask people to classify themselves in a situation

530
01:37:11.620 --> 01:37:17.360
the scale of classes from around one to 10. What do they classify?

531
01:37:17.680 --> 01:37:19.029
But the

532
01:37:19.250 --> 01:37:26.670
what we show is that not everyone classifies as a sort of class

533
01:37:26.780 --> 01:37:29.510
in their own works. That's what we

534
01:37:29.580 --> 01:37:33.009
who follow, which are the own world of people.

535
01:37:33.040 --> 01:37:37.629
Because we are a sociologist. I can impose them

536
01:37:37.880 --> 01:37:40.650
a theoretical

537
01:37:40.870 --> 01:37:46.550
scheme of such a plus, we follow another.

538
01:37:46.860 --> 01:37:48.420
Yeah.

539
01:37:49.290 --> 01:37:53.040
the opposite. And

540
01:37:53.110 --> 01:37:56.330
after nothing would have been

541
01:37:57.490 --> 01:38:00.100
the question

542
01:38:00.280 --> 01:38:02.360
if the

543
01:38:02.430 --> 01:38:05.090
if this inductive classification

544
01:38:05.310 --> 01:38:08.980
and yeah. they establish it

545
01:38:09.040 --> 01:38:13.379
may establish a detention between class and not class.

546
01:38:14.600 --> 01:38:16.430
But

547
01:38:17.170 --> 01:38:20.049
but that that is also a problem. Because.

548
01:38:21.160 --> 01:38:23.680
for example, what? What are the

549
01:38:23.760 --> 01:38:32.619
the discussions promoted by social policies and by neoliberalism? This is the definition of

550
01:38:32.750 --> 01:38:42.369
who are like a reality that really is a relative that is.

551
01:38:42.730 --> 01:38:45.929
the social policies that have been developed.

552
01:38:46.450 --> 01:38:49.400
It was such that it was that

553
01:38:49.650 --> 01:38:57.289
those who define themselves as poor are also assuming something like a transposition

554
01:38:57.750 --> 01:39:00.099
that may may also be discussed.

555
01:39:02.460 --> 01:39:03.640
We don't have.

556
01:39:03.870 --> 01:39:06.070
Yeah. go ahead.

557
01:39:06.880 --> 01:39:10.700
A definite response to what has been said.

558
01:39:11.350 --> 01:39:17.180
What we we can, we can do is expose queuces, which was our our message.

559
01:39:18.420 --> 01:39:21.530
What you with this quantitative data?

560
01:39:22.400 --> 01:39:23.469
That was

561
01:39:25.170 --> 01:39:28.570
letter process the you may

562
01:39:28.870 --> 01:39:30.260
to the

563
01:39:31.670 --> 01:39:35.949
that's it.

564
01:39:36.110 --> 01:39:39.369
And then I have questions to.

565
01:39:39.560 --> 01:39:44.139
Yes, thank you for the I took you comments, justice.

566
01:39:44.940 --> 01:39:47.520
ideas, what one can do.

567
01:39:47.620 --> 01:39:51.909
But I definitely I had this idea as well to look at how the

568
01:39:51.970 --> 01:39:53.049
that is changing

569
01:39:53.150 --> 01:39:56.550
and what is as perceived, changes in the

570
01:39:56.590 --> 01:39:59.750
that's nice things. This is actually so interesting.

571
01:39:59.900 --> 01:40:11.830
I tried to convince my former boss because he had it already on the table, and it was off the table. But if a years is coming from you, maybe I have a stronger support.

572
01:40:20.240 --> 01:40:26.430
I don't know. I have no siri about it spontaneously.

573
01:40:28.370 --> 01:40:37.460
I guess maybe there's perceived more decline in the middle class, but I don't know. I mean, you have to look at the data, but this will be my first guess.

574
01:40:37.780 --> 01:40:40.020
and then

575
01:40:40.190 --> 01:40:58.159
focus more on the on the small left behind. I think it's a good idea. But the thing is, it's aggregated data. And seeing if whether we get out there. So maybe you should look more on individual data. And this but I also want to. Maybe the conclusion was.

576
01:40:58.469 --> 01:41:09.210
you focused on the small left behind group, because actually, the middle class is also declining because we're moving up. And this is actually a positive story.

577
01:41:11.209 --> 01:41:16.610
Thank you. I I would like to to make some

578
01:41:16.660 --> 01:41:18.610
overall comments.

579
01:41:19.170 --> 01:41:22.449
I had no direct question for me, but

580
01:41:22.500 --> 01:41:27.180
and so I take this opportunity to

581
01:41:27.270 --> 01:41:54.579
to add some some more comments. I am. It's say that I am a little bit skeptical about this this quantitative approaches of on social mobility and social certification, especially if we do not articulate the the the, the data with an effort of contestualizing the situation in terms of structural changes of of the system.

582
01:41:54.580 --> 01:42:16.539
I didn't see much references to Pierre, but I think it's an important reference, considering not only the reproduction effect, but also the structural effect caused by economy caused by the State caused by politics.

583
01:42:16.780 --> 01:42:28.539
Another comment talking about subjective once in a paper years ago, we use the concept of an escalator effect.

584
01:42:28.590 --> 01:42:51.469
I mean, when we consider the the, the movement, the upward movement in in the in the lower levels of the the social pyramid there is a trends that tend to obscure what's going on in the top of the of the escalator, because the ones that are moving one step

585
01:42:51.469 --> 01:43:12.320
in in the lower level, they lose the vision of what's happening in the top of the escalator, you know, and this is, of of course, relate, directly related, with the intensification of the inequalities, comparing the lower structure with the with the the a light. Of course.

586
01:43:12.320 --> 01:43:40.600
another talk. Another reference that I would like to mention is that it's not possible to analyze social mobility and the inequalities without a a strong framework related to power, relations, structure of power relations. It's impossible to to leave this apart, so it's impossible to live apart. Also, the structure of the of the old State apparatus, you know.

587
01:43:40.760 --> 01:43:44.090
That's it. Thank you. There is a question.

588
01:43:47.270 --> 01:43:48.490
My

589
01:43:48.520 --> 01:43:50.789
my question, he said. Well, there you

590
01:43:51.360 --> 01:43:57.990
these 4 definitions of 4 dimensions of

591
01:43:59.430 --> 01:44:02.050
it's what they mentioned. So of

592
01:44:02.300 --> 01:44:05.920
social classes, of work. especially of

593
01:44:07.070 --> 01:44:10.120
of middle classes. Yeah.

594
01:44:10.520 --> 01:44:24.520
is there a consensus in Germany about the classifications that you use, especially in that one that is so important, based on income.

595
01:44:24.630 --> 01:44:27.930
You mentioned Oecd as as one of the

596
01:44:28.120 --> 01:44:30.989
sources for for this definition. But

597
01:44:31.290 --> 01:44:32.170
yeah.

598
01:44:32.860 --> 01:44:36.720
what is the discussion? Is there any discussion?

599
01:44:40.010 --> 01:44:43.930
My name is Nadia, and I'm as weit. I'm from Brazil. I have

600
01:44:44.100 --> 01:45:12.510
very good questions when there is great art for Alex. I love your presentation. It's it's super so interesting. I'm not very familiar with your database, and I was wondering, does your database also allows you to see by gender, and also by origin, rural and urban, like, how people perceive, if, like urban people are are easier to perceive mobility for mobility or not. I was wondering. This information is in your database, and the other question is for Judi.

601
01:45:12.590 --> 01:45:20.829
Judy, you mentioned the very beginning of your presentation, that as an example, the old people that have money but don't spend it.

602
01:45:20.940 --> 01:45:41.109
I was wondering if your research allowed you to see if all people with the same amount of money, and young people with the same amount of money. What are the differences of how they spend the money? And also, if there is intergenerational dialogue. If young people were influencing old people to spend more or to spend less

603
01:45:42.940 --> 01:45:51.249
any other questions closing, I just yeah, I just want to make a comment about class. I think class was always a challenge

604
01:45:51.770 --> 01:45:55.369
concept. This group, or situated, was found

605
01:45:55.390 --> 01:45:59.600
on this discussion about class class mobility, and

606
01:45:59.630 --> 01:46:18.570
and I think. Go on. You know it's not a concept that you can take it for granted. You're always, you know, rebuilding it, discussing, and it's not on verse. So of course, it depends on where the contest. So, anyway. But that's why that I love this session. Sorry I really like it.

607
01:46:21.990 --> 01:46:29.540
Yeah, there are many different kind of operationalizations available, and also particularly of the thresholds.

608
01:46:29.690 --> 01:46:34.980
to be honest, super, arbitrary. How they do it! But we just did the

609
01:46:35.100 --> 01:46:38.340
the thresholds that are most common.

610
01:46:46.190 --> 01:47:15.919
Thank you for your question. yes, I I would say yes. So I remember in my model the cohort effect is, in second, you see significant. The younger population. Their their expenditure is high, the household, the expenditure per capita is higher and the second wise. I didn't test that that in my model. So so far I haven't. I was thinking about your question, and I don't know how to test that

611
01:47:15.960 --> 01:47:32.649
statistic method. Maybe I can do some quality to work. That would be very interesting, because my model was concentrated on the interaction effect between individual variables and the original variables, which is the the argument of my paper. Thank you very much.

612
01:47:34.210 --> 01:47:57.209
Yeah. So to quickly answer it. Yes, you can do it by gender. I I have it as a control. But what I'm hearing from the from the discussion today is probably I should be reporting those as well, because those might be interesting individual factors. I'm not so sure about the rural urban. I don't think that's in there, but I could take a look again. And then I really saw you. I never responded to your point. Actually on cohorts

613
01:47:57.210 --> 01:48:13.820
on, you know the younger generation. And again, it's there's co-work fixed effects in there, but I should probably be reporting those as well. yeah, I think that would be definitely of interest, especially if we're framing it, as you know. Do for the future and thinking about what the younger generation is thinking about. Yeah, that's

614
01:48:13.960 --> 01:48:16.030
I believe that's all for me. Thank you.

615
01:48:18.220 --> 01:48:20.209
So I think no.

616
01:48:24.240 --> 01:48:28.269
I would like to comment something that was

617
01:48:32.470 --> 01:48:34.170
the winter

618
01:48:34.390 --> 01:48:35.460
does it?

619
01:48:35.620 --> 01:48:42.170
There are structural conditions that they find such a plus object

620
01:48:43.080 --> 01:48:43.800
the

621
01:48:44.240 --> 01:48:47.830
but at the same time that that was previously said.

622
01:48:47.890 --> 01:48:51.939
At the same time you mentioned.

623
01:48:52.760 --> 01:48:53.780
would you?

624
01:48:53.830 --> 01:49:00.249
He has a definition of such a classic. That's not the classic

625
01:49:00.630 --> 01:49:06.690
in the of capital. the economic capital.

626
01:49:08.770 --> 01:49:11.330
But if I am structurally

627
01:49:12.480 --> 01:49:13.610
social classes.

628
01:49:13.940 --> 01:49:16.410
but he also

629
01:49:16.430 --> 01:49:20.640
on this he also says.

630
01:49:21.150 --> 01:49:23.150
Hmm. There

631
01:49:23.250 --> 01:49:24.800
symbolic destination.

632
01:49:27.820 --> 01:49:29.690
Very important.

633
01:49:29.940 --> 01:49:42.730
The way you took the voice, you you, the way you do dress what you ring. That's also important, because that makes

634
01:49:45.990 --> 01:49:47.030
okay.

635
01:49:47.070 --> 01:49:48.520
nothing.

636
01:49:48.690 --> 01:49:52.389
You think the subjecting and aspect is also right about

637
01:49:53.680 --> 01:49:55.239
our session.

638
01:49:55.690 --> 01:50:04.970
and I would like to thank everybody who was all of you who were presenting all of you were here.

639
01:50:04.980 --> 01:50:14.910
and you know, and to attend this session. it was really pleasure to host it. And then, anyway, I think.

640
01:50:15.090 --> 01:50:20.259
as I said, I think things are here, and so sociologies

641
01:50:20.300 --> 01:50:35.929
and I and I, and and of course you have to be continuing to be continued like a movie. And this discussion about class, since it has been challenged a lot. It was always challenging.

642
01:50:35.970 --> 01:50:53.230
And, as I said, it's the root of R. C. 28, and I think 4 years ago we will be discussing what's class and how we can measure it. But I think it's a discussion that is worse to to have. It's important. No, thank you all. And yeah.

643
01:50:53.670 --> 01:50:55.370
and oh.

644
01:50:55.810 --> 01:51:08.000
a photo. Thank you. Thank you.