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My! My screen shows this acknowledgment. Well, good morning. Everybody who's

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gathered here in our room in Melbourne and around the world online. I'm super excited that we have this session on religion and demography. We've got some excellent papers, and I know there are a lot of people who wanted to be here, including

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Bigard, Cheerbeck and Jose, who who organized this session, but for one reason or another, weren't able to get to this part of the world today. so fortunately, we have this hybrid technology to gather. And we have this acknowledgment of country that you may have seen in previous sessions acknowledging the heritage of this land that's there for you for you to read and and take in.

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and my name is Conrad Hackett. I work at the Research Center

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on religion and demography projects. So of course, I wanted to

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be here for this session and

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I was not prepared really to do moderator duties, so I don't have long introductions, but I'm very much excited about All the presentations, including our first presentation from Sasha Becker on religion and growth, and Sasha is the most local of our presenters living just a few minutes away, I believe so. Sasha. Come on up.

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thank you.

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So I think I have 10 min left.

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okay, so

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I'll be talking about a paper that, in fact, is a survey. And talking about the survey in 50 min is always a bit of a crazy thing. So it's more of a teaser, really, about what we are doing here

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and

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there has been service over the last 20 years that study the role of religion in the economic sphere, and many of these services have

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talk, so to say, topic by topic, religion and trust, religion and competition, religion and religion. And

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and we were wondering, given, that economists are often concerned about growth. What is the implication of religion at the macro level for the economy as a whole, whether we can learn anything by looking at these dispersed

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pieces of work.

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And in order to do that, what we try to do is to discipline things by looking at a production function

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in economics, we have these production functions that have capital and labor and human capital and total fact of productivity. And can we pull these different

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pieces of this existing work together and say which of these speaks? To

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capital? Which of these speaks to labor, to the size of the labor force? What speaks to human capital, the level of education. And what what speaks to this kind of black box of total factor, productivity.

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But before I get there, let me just give you a few examples, because I have never been to a sociology conference in my life, and it, thanks to big art that I'm here so that you get a sense of where I personally come from. So I've done some work on the Reformation, and the and influence of the information on education levels.

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at the same time, also looking at gender differences in education that may vary with different religious denominations. One of my co-authors has done work on the role of the printing press for the success of the Reformation in Europe.

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Then

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there is also work by one of my co-authors on the source economic status of different parts of the population in the Ottoman Empire and the role of interest rate regulations.

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We have all together had some work on the causes and consequences of the Protestant Reformation, and I'm also happy to send these slides to anyone who wants.

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And then this is my one and only sociology publication. Some years ago we looked at the spread of the Reformation at the city level, using Martin Luther's correspondence. Who did he write letters to? And who did he receive letters from? Where did he travel.

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and which people came to study with him in Wittenberg, where he was a professor.

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And how do these personal links, many of whom existed before he became the rock star he was after 1517. How do these early links help the success of his movement? Okay, that's this, Oursr paper.

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And then we also recently had a big handbook chapter 100 pages long on the role of religion in economic history, and that deliberately ends in one of our 19 First World War.

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And now in the work I'm talking about today, we are looking at any kind of period in human history where there is growth.

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And so this is a draft of a paper that we are writing for the Journal of Economic Literature, which is a journal that writes service to give an overview of

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sub-litures that maybe other economists are not aware of at all, and is an easy introduction into what's going on in this corner of the world. Yeah of the discipline.

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So as I said in my opening words, there is. We try to just say, Okay, there is lots of work out there that says religion has an impact on, or certain things influence the way people behave religiously, whether they go to church or not.

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and many of these things are interesting, but they are not necessarily growth relevant. Yeah. So some of the work out on religion and economics can be about is their competition in between different denominations in the city of Melbourne. How about

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the Chinese Christian churches, along the M. For the so-called Chinese Bible bed in my, but there is work like that which doesn't speak directly to what's the growth of the Australian economy? Okay, so here we focus on works that we can in some way consider in light of production functions which in turn then tell us something about economic growth. So the way we would in economics typically write down a production function is output. Y is a function of capital. K

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human capital. H,

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the labor force L, and then A is the total factor of productivity. Now and typically, we would say something like, Oh, how about savings rate savings, rate inference, investment and investment influence is capital, then how about mortality rates, fertility rates.

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retirement rules all of that influences. How many workers there are in a given country? Then how about the schooling system that influences the level of human capital in an economy.

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And then how about institutions? How about whatever a number of holidays, number of religious holidays? How about certain rules, about what we are allowed or not to do in a country depending on the rules set by the dominant religion.

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So all of these things can, one way or another, influence either K or H or L, or a

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yeah. And then we pull things together, saying, Okay, let's look at these one by one. And

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there is various types of prose models that give more emphasis either on capital or human capital, on total factor, productivity, or in the labor force. And I have no time to talk about that. So let me just give you a few headlines, and behind this is a paper of 80 pages, and we are citing 200 existing papers of people.

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so the capital stock that is an input into production

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is influenced by investment. Investment in turn can be influenced by extrinsic factors or intrinsic factors, extrinsic factors, what we things like, what's the rate of return on capital? How much

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interest rate do I get if I put my money into a certain endeavor. Yeah, that's kind of a number that's out there. You can read it up on the banks website. How high the interest rate is.

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There is something about property rights, about financial institutions, all of that we call extrinsic factors that influence investment. Then there is intrinsic factors. It's this.

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what do I feel? I should be doing should I be saving for the future? And that may depend on what I'm taught by my church, by my religious denomination about what's right to do. Okay, that's intrinsic factors, not stuff set by the market, but by things that influence my own motivation. And obviously the barbarian thriftiness is would be one of these intrinsic factors that make me

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have a higher propensity to save. Now, interestingly.

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Weber, of course, is the thing that unites all the social sciences, and he cites John Wesley, the Methodist, founding father, and he cites interestingly in the German original. He uses English language terms citing John Wesley, and he says, Okay, John Wesley is talking about industry.

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which he translates as by some height and

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a frugality, not swiftiness, but frugality, which he translates at as spar some kite which then, in the retranslation of Weber, becomes swiftness. Yeah.

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anyways, there is a literature out there that is about work effort. That's one way to maybe move the economy forward, working hard. But thrift in us. The thrift in this element is about savings and about investment. Okay.

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so there is lots of work, and there is no way I can talk about these papers individually, but just to say a lot of work done by economists, and I'm I know, because I work with sociologists also in sociology and political science is concerned with the Protestant ethic as the kind of starting point

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for so many papers.

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And I guess that 95% of people who write about vib. I have never read the broods and ethnic from beginning to end. Yeah. But it is often the Jumping board, because it is the incarnation of religion and economics of religion and development.

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So we look at that. By the way, I have a podcast if you care about these kinds of cross issues. Croschat, where we interview social scientists, not only economists about their work, and often there is a religion element to it. So we interviewed recently.

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Janet Benson was work on the pre-reformation routes of the Protestant Essex. She looks at the Cistercian order and Cistercian monasteries across Europe, and how that influence is swiftiness there, because also Weber mentions the Cistercians as the forefathers of the Protestant spirit

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of capitalism.

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Okay, so we have

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stuff that looks at the Protestant Asic under the angle of savings swiftness.

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Then we turn to these extrinsic factors. There is often religions that have

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Prescriptions about what is allowed in terms of landing.

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Are you allowed to land at interest at all, or is only an interest rate of 0 permitted.

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or, as it then happens, during the Reformation period. By the way, the term usury shifts from being 0 to 5% is okay. And more than 5% is usury. An interesting shift that certainly permits landing.

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Yeah. And in Protestant areas there is a stronger move in that direction.

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So there is work out there also on Islamic finance, and how that maybe, is also holding back Islamic countries and their growth, because the banking sector has more strings attached to it.

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So that's the capital investment side. Then there is a lot of work on human capital and in economic growth models. Human capital plays a strong role, and there has been Nobel Prize winning work on that

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So human capital. we distinguish between informal learning and formal learning inform you, could be learning on the job, or what your parents tell you at the dinner table, and formal learning education in school is what is instilled in kids when sitting in a classroom.

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Education in turn can fall in 2 parts. And it's interesting to look at the literature with those classes. Sometimes education can be of a religious type.

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and sometimes education can be of a secular type. and especially when you look at a Jewish education. There is this interesting work that that says, Okay, orthodox Jews maybe spend so much time only studying the Bible

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and taking away time from productive use, whereas secular Jews in the German context have done work on Jewish academics. In Nazi, Germany.

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15% of all academics in Germany were Jews.

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Yeah. And the population share was point 5. Okay, that's just one sign of this strong and Westminster and education in among Jews.

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Then there is all kinds of work on Islamic education and Cross and the rise of Islam, and a decline as at the politics site, kicked in and regulated what was allowed to be taught.

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and there is renewed interest in Islam, in the post world for truth period in countries like Indonesia and how Islamic schools play a role there. There is work on Turkey as well.

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And then

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also, how do we get from a period of relatively stagnant crows to so-called Maltusian era into modern cross? The pros take off with industrialization? How did education, and also a shift in education

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from a lot of religious content in primary secondary school towards more secular technical content? How did that move the curve towards growth.

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 then I already mentioned ultra orthodox Judism and crows. We have a whole section on that, because there is a lot of work that I'm talking here mainly about work in economics, but also sociology. political science, to the extent that it speaks to capital labor, human capital and total factor productivity.

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And it's interesting that implicitly. I'm already talking also about gaps. A lot of the work out there is on Abrahamic religions. Yeah, Christianity, Judaism

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and Islam, and there is comparatively little empirically on

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Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism, and there is even a debate where the Khanfudsinism is a religion. But

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we are also pointing to these gaps in literature. we talk about occupational specialization, and how that might influence.

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whether an economy stays agricultural or moves into manufacturing and services, and thereby permits

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an industrial take off at some point.

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This is what I already mentioned. Benson, work on different Christian orders, and how they may have helped religious development. sorry economic development, or held it back.

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And a lot of that is also in this specialized survey that we wrote a few years ago on the occasion of the 5 hundredth anniversary of the Reformation, and then it came out one year too early.

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then let me jump to population, and that gets us more to demography.

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So in in gross models, the the of the labor force per se pushes total output, but per capita output shrinks. So if you want

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the per capita close to go up, we need to

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kind of

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shrink the population. We need to go away from having 8 kids to less than 8 kids. Yeah. And a lot of work has looked at the demographic transition. Yes, or how did we go from high fertility, high mortality rates to low mortality, low fertility rates. And how did that help

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industrialization? And so on. So all of that is covered in our section 5. And here also the Protestant essay comes back in again. So if we have a lot of swiftness, people working hard. Yeah, then the same person produces more outbreak. Yeah. And that's the way economists would think about how that influences cross. And I have to wrap up.

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Then there is total factor productivity, which is all the stuff

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that remains, and it also seems to influence growth, but that we find a little harder to measure.

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And the way we structure, that is to say, Okay, total factor, productivity.

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Whatever remains that also influences growth in a positive way can be split into technology.

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institutions and everything else. And this, everything else is things like culture, trust, trustworthiness, and honesty.

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so total fact that productivity may influence which technologies we apply. And there is examples like the resistance in the Islamic world to the printing press, where it was introduced with much delay. So that's a direct influence of a religious prescription on the adoption of technology which in turn influences cross

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his work

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on rituals. Yeah. So if you have more religious holidays, you may take away from productive days. Yeah,

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and then there can be laws that influence institutions and property rights.

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So let me just go to my conclusion. What we try to show with this survey, as I said, 80 pages one. The paper cited

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that religion affects many aspects of economic behavior, and thereby what we call proximate factors of growth or things that influence K. L. H. And A, and we try to just

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bring to the attention of a wider community that while, especially in many economists, there's people who think, oh, religion has nothing to do with economics. We are trying to say, It may have more influence than you think, because it may influence indirectly investment.

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the size of the labor force, fertility, behavior of blobby, and all things that ultimately influence the stuff you economists care about. Cross

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that this stuff.

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Thank you, Sasha. That was terrific. You've given us a lot to think about and and talk about, and there's no lack of ambition in this work. It's an incredible survey.

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and I'm suggesting that we take questions at the end. So now our next paper is Jose Novaro. I think Jose is in

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Japan, and he has a fascinating presentation about the relationship between the unaffiliated economic growth and population patterns.

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And now our challenge is to

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change the technology to bring him in. Thanks so much.

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Okay, I say, it's all yours.

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Jose Navarro: Perfect? Thanks very much. So let me see.

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Jose Navarro: Okay, can everybody see this? Is it?

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Jose Navarro: Yes, it looks fine perfect. So thanks very much Sasha, and thanks very much, Conrad, for taking over the the moderating duties you know about. this shotgun wedding style, and

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Jose Navarro: and Sasha has said the the floor extremely well, I mean, and his survey I I highly recommend the

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Jose Navarro: his his pay, and also in the handbook of economic history. It's an excellent overview of the role of religion

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Jose Navarro: and the in in economic growth. And it touches on many aspects. You know, in the it's a it's a case of economics taking over sociology in in a sense, where it it goes into the role of the human capital and the you know, and and many different aspects that are highly relevant. And they in in my case. So I I'm

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Jose Navarro: After such as a presentation. I mean what? what I have been looking into, and the already for a couple of years, together with the Vega cheer back, and the the Institute of Religion and the demography at Crackle University of Economics.

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Jose Navarro: it's we are. We are trying to get an overview of of religious affiliation. In a sense, there has been also Pew Research Center has put in quite a bit of of work into this, and it's trying to get the overview of

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Jose Navarro: of religious affiliation globally. And a couple of years ago it was 7 years ago

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Jose Navarro: that they, with an Ese Grand, the the Pew Research Center and and they got shared back. They they brought out this database

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Jose Navarro: that I have been mining since then, and this database gives you an an excellent overview of who believes in what? Unfortunately, at the high level of aggregation. So we we have we can ascribe to every citizen globally religion

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Jose Navarro: and the religious beliefs. And

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Jose Navarro: we have been trying since then to to yeah, to mind the database. And in in this exercise. What I'm trying to do is to is to calculate the economic growth contribution of of people in the last 50 years. So

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Jose Navarro: it's a a step back from what the Sasha has just been describing. And I hope it's enlightening. But

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Jose Navarro: So what we are trying not to do is he has to look into the council links. So we are just trying to present

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Jose Navarro: economic growth as and not it's always discussed in the at the regional or national level. But we are trying to ascribe a certain production to a religious group, and a I mean religion as an identity marker is, is quite fundamental, and so even people who are not the religious themselves. So I I I was. I grew up in Spain in the, in the seventies.

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Jose Navarro: and I consider myself not that religious person. But I am very much aware that I have lots of value judgments that impact my my economic thinking and my actions, and and that sort of my my programming has been heavily influenced by by where I grew up in in A, in A,

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Jose Navarro: in a very religious country that has become less religious. So this this phenomenon of a of a less and less the the circularization hypotheses.

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Jose Navarro: that says that the the intensity of religiousity has been declining.

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Jose Navarro: and they have been, lots of studies about the the the relationship between religiosity

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Jose Navarro: and the and the economic growth. So the the and stating that the so places where really it is high, they're not very conducive to innovation and the economic growth.

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Jose Navarro: And so places where religiousity has declined, they they see

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Jose Navarro: and as they, they see much higher economic growth. And I wanted to see if if the data of economic growth in the last 50 years

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Jose Navarro: have bought any proof to that.

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Jose Navarro: And the so

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Jose Navarro: but again, clearly stating that I'm not trying to make any any culture statements with this study

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Jose Navarro: and the looking at how population has. So the world population

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Jose Navarro: in the last 50 years the the share of Christians has has remained steady. So there here, you see, the population of Christians has increased from around 1.2 billion in the 19 seventies to over 2.2 billion

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Jose Navarro: in in the 20 twenties. They also the share of of Muslims has grown

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Jose Navarro: as a percentage of the of work population. So now it's almost one in every 4, a global citizens as A is a Muslim affiliation.

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Jose Navarro: And they, these other religious groups like Hindus on the back of a very strong growth of the Indian population, have grown as well, so to be almost 15% of the world population and the the the group that I'm specially interested in the unaffiliated, you know. So what this behind this secularization hypothesis that seems to be.

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Jose Navarro: you know, they they actually are declining share of them of the world population.

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Jose Navarro: And they

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Jose Navarro: they, despite their number, still growing, and the the the number still growing quite a lot in, especially in advanced economies.

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Jose Navarro: But this advanced economies have been in below the replacement fertility for already quite a while.

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Jose Navarro: and the and so we find that you know their their numbers. Actually, as a percentage of the the total world population is actually a decreasing

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Jose Navarro: I the same for Buddhists and the Fork religions. They then their numbers have remain basically steady.

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Jose Navarro: What is the now we come to them?

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Jose Navarro: So to to them economic. And so this is the production function that Sasha mentioned. So here we have the the output

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Jose Navarro: of all this population. So we we have the the UN affiliated. Those have that have been, you know, getting whose share has fallen. But their shelf economic output has actually grown quite a lot.

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Jose Navarro: and they you have. in the 19 seventies, when the G 7 arranged supreme. And we have, it was mostly, you know. So economic production was a Christian affair in in many aspects. So more than 2. So it's almost 70% of economic production was a produced by by yeah, by Christians.

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Jose Navarro: And they, you know that that share has has shrunk.

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Jose Navarro: and and they share produced by the unaffiliated, and especially by Muslims. has grown quite a lot, Hindus as well.

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Jose Navarro: So they that we we have sort of a convergence in them, in them. in the economic contribution to them to the world economy. So

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Jose Navarro: it's

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Jose Navarro: This is when you look at the absolute numbers and in per capita. So the the, the unaffiliated, actually

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Jose Navarro: they. They have grown their contribution.

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Jose Navarro: and much more so you you have to take an account that so the Muslim world population has almost travelled in this time period the economic contribution has doubled.

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Jose Navarro: and we asked, the the proportion of the unaffiliated has has more or less remain steady. and their contribution has has increased quite a lot.

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Jose Navarro: And then.

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Jose Navarro: yeah, so then. in that.

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Jose Navarro: yeah, this is more or less what I described. So

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Jose Navarro: now.

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Jose Navarro: when we look at the growth contribution

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Jose Navarro: and he had them, you know. So the per capita growth contribution that you have in this graph, and sorry if it's not very clearly visible.

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Jose Navarro: But the the unaffiliated, and that this is mostly China's growth contribution.

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Jose Navarro: They have you know, they they manage to surpass in per capita terms Christians in the 2,000. So when China was

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Jose Navarro: it inserted into global markets. And they started agglomerating a lot of the economic production globally.

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Jose Navarro: And they you also had another big movement of the the unaffiliated, which was the whole eastern block that used to be. they used to be unaffiliated, and they they they suddenly became very religious. And and so the you had this 2 contradictory movements there

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Jose Navarro: and then.

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Jose Navarro: Yeah, they they pick up it. So you you could say that in per capita terms they, the UN affiliate that are growing more because their population actually grows less, and they in in terms of their production function, they they manage to invest much more capital per person.

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Jose Navarro: And so that that investment aspect is is fundamental in explaining the differentials.

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Jose Navarro: and also the fact that Christian population is, is growing only in in in economies, which have a very slow, very low Gdp

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Jose Navarro: per person

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Jose Navarro: such as in in Africa, where the population has has almost traveled as well

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Jose Navarro: in the last 15 years.

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Jose Navarro: So let me

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Jose Navarro: wrap up.

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Jose Navarro: So we in in this paper we try to describe how religious affiliation and the economic growth have interacted in the last 50 years. And so in

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Jose Navarro: and we find that the unaffiliated, the markedly differ from religious groups, and that they have substantially grown their contribution

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Jose Navarro: to world Gdp. While growing their populations, much less

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Jose Navarro: in per capita times the UN affiliated have become the wealthiest group since the decade of the 2,010

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Jose Navarro: And the key to this development has been the differential demographic growth. Experience of the unaffiliated that seems to have a lot of capital and investment to accumulate faster than religious populations. And so this, whether this backs up or undermines the secularization hypothesis that's open to debate.

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Jose Navarro: I mean, this being just a descriptive exercise.

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Jose Navarro: But yeah, I I believe it to be so.

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Jose Navarro: So so I I have to come up with that arguments, and I'm very open for any questions and comments that the audience may have. Thank you very much.

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Thank you, Jose. That was great. Another ambitious study looking at 50 years of economic history.

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And now we turn

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to from from these broad studies and in. So I I didn't interrupt you, did I, Jose?

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No, no, no, I'm I'm okay. Good, thanks, very much. Sorry. And so now we turn to some more fine-grain data looking at what register data in Finland can tell us about religion. And we ch that the floor is yours.

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Hello! My name is Way Chen. I'm based at Stockholm University in Sweden. And

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so this is a project I co-author with Megaard, who is not here today. And also Martin and Young are our 2 other co-authors.

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They can use the

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yeah making use all our very, very unique and promising

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at the administration data on religious

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Toshihiko HARA: of creation in English.

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what

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Toshihiko HARA: we just after the ancient

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and not not any Hong Kong

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Toshihiko HARA: religious creation.

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Jose Navarro: And we cannot hear you? Can you please me to you of Mike, please

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Toshihiko HARA: religious affiliation in English

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sorry families.

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Toshihiko HARA: What is this affiliation in English?

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This is someone speaking of

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this laptop. Is the host, or is yeah? Yes, some black person the holes. This laptop is the host, but there's there's also

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I have the letter as hosting rights.

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Professor Hara.

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Toshihiko HARA: I'm sorry.

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Thank you.

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yes. so

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we. We try to contribute to the literature of post Secularization

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topic, which is, I think it's a mess right now. There's so many new theories and hypotheses, and

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on whether there's some similarization at all, or there are different patterns of secularization. And what are the contributors to to secularization, and with very inconsistent findings and

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much doubt on the the castle effect of such as education, economic growth, and

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and some more boat

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positions on the revival of religion in

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some part of the word depending on the population and the the context. And also, we have seen Religions

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Row has grown. Yeah. Contrary to to many's expectation, religion is still very strong in in the political discourse.

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partly, and due to the migration and increasing religious diversity in many parts of the world. And

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and not only the yeah, not only the new

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denominations brought by migrants, but also the the local religions have kind of emerged in in the Western. at least, not not at least in the Western world.

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like. So such as

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yeah, such as the Christian nationalism in us, and also a part of Europe.

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So when we survey the the literature, we find that most of them are based in us which is not surprising, because

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it's an outlier among the advanced countries. There's they are still very religious, and also have very high religious diversity.

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and

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so make make us put a lot out on the comparative research in other contexts, because the the measurements and the concepts are

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often not very comparable. across time. In context.

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it's even worse in in European context, since most country are very

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a homogeneous in religion, and also, on the other hand, very secular at this stage.

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and I mean, if you, if you look at some like fox news media, they will say, like Sweden, will be occupied by Muslim in 10 years. and then you look at statistics in 2,016 there are

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150,000 Muslims in Sweden, in the 10 million population which is not really what you see in the media. So how to check this such small population in surveys

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very difficult. We've got something something new. We have

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obtain this population registered data in in Finland. the context that is quite similar to Sweden and other Scandinavian countries.

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 it is brought by the religious community membership recorded in from the Finnish Government. That's all. Religious communities

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who are listed in the United States must provide a list of their members like not just the number, but also like.

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who are their members for receiving public funding, and they have incentive to this, because the more people they report, the more money they get.

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 anyway. So

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and we have a population level registration of religious circulation from 20 from 1,970 to 2,020, which is

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including even very small denominations, such as Baha'i and Jehovah instances, and of course

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the very focal books, such as Muslims and

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Buddhist.

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we can link it to other registration resources, such as work, education and family.

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But yeah, you may know that you may already note that the data is very problematic in some aspects.

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and it's just

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affiliation. It's we we cannot say, like they are really religious or not. This

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especially to the in the Scandinavian context, the the State Church.

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It's very historically very dominant. And more than 60% of the population are members of State Church. But it's actually just less than 10% who will go to church.

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But we, we think it might reflect some sort of cultural belonging because

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they they need to pay tax, being a church member, and which is not a very good thing, I think, and

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In order to participate in

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ceremonies and get a graveyard, they have to be the membership they have to be a member in.

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Yes. So

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yeah, I have to talk about. it's very sensitive data. It's yeah, it's a micro data and religious population, the whole population. It's it's freaking. And we are very careful.

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We have an ethical approval from cities to Finland, and we don't own the data we analyze through their remote

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a system. And and and we are censored. If, like

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some of the outputs, they don't think it's appropriate. So and we will be very careful in communicating our results.

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so

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yeah. As I said, the

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State Church or National Church in the Finnish context

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has been dominant, and

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they are. They have the the status status reaching the Constitution, and they have many ceremonial and administrative roles, and the most important is, they can levy tax

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From from the members and in order. And

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even though the majority is to affiliate with the State Church, it's justically declining because of both

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secularize value, change and and tax avoidance. And

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and but there are other groups as well. We we think they might reflect more journey religiosity

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and also the data show that they have not really declined a lot and even increased. And so one critical thing is the

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a lot that we are interested in that. It was brought in 2,003.

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So basically, it kind of liberalize

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religious membership. For example, before 2,003 when a child is born, and they will be automatically registered as

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Their mother's affiliation. And it was father in in the beginning. But now it states that the parents have to make a joint decision like if

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the children will be put into the religious

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population or not.

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And also another very interesting thing is that

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is that before that you, if you want to leave the State Church, you have to go to the parish and talk to the priest and explain why you are doing so. And now, right now, you just send an email, and

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which is quite convenient right? And then the

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the as this group in in Finland. They even create a website. If you don't want to send email, you just register this website, they send the email for you.

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which we think you will bring down the the State Church affiliation rate even more so, then we look at the the data and it looks like it. It is so like you can see the red line. It's the State Lutheran Church.

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It has been declining, but it looks like it has declined even more. After 2,003,

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and we also look at other minor groups, and we see, like some groups like

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protests in 3 churches.

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Other Protestants outside the State Church and Muslim and Catholics. They have grown quite dramatically.

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and also some even even smaller groups. and that we, we fortunately could check them in this data.

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and we also, look at some democratic demographic patterns. We have seen that the women are more affiliated to the

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to Women are more likely to be affiliated to the a church or or religious organization in which is mainly due to the State Church membership.

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Rather the man, and it looks like the cat is even getting larger and

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 And we we also see that the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland has 2 official languages and Finnish and Swedish, and 5% of the population is

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identify as the ethnic Swedish. since they have been more affiliated, even though we know that they are like

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much better off and highly educated than the rest of Finnish Finnish-speaking majority.

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And we also look at some

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 a duration across and socially, with state social economic status and its.

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and also very striking that

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and the Swedish speakers are not not only more affiliated, but if we break down by education, we see that the

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and the the highly educated Swedish speakers are, are more affiliated than the

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finish speakers without highly high education.

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and we have another working paper on this ethnic dimension.

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So feel free to ask me if you have any questions

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on

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some other very interesting patterns on

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by income groups.

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yeah, basically, it's consistent to to the

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conventional wisdom that the ritual groups are likely to be

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less like you to be fitted and accept except juice, which is also.  you you might have an idea about that.

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 Then we try to look at if the reform has an impact, and particularly

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at first, because now the

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the newborn infants are no no longer automatically registered to their mothers. we, we look at.

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we, we focus on the the Lutheran State Church and

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and break down by if their parents.

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our

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State Church members, and like mother, father, or both, are State Church members or none. But actually, we don't really find any

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any change around this time.

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And some what? Surprisingly, we look at a slightly older group. And

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so basically, after 2,003, we see that the share of

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children

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whose parents are not members, but their members, have dramatically increase.

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 which is a institutional loophole, because

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because Now, when the parents leave the church. before that, when parents leave the church, because children automatically follow parents

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 and under the outlaw, so it will be

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they will leave automatically. But now it's like everyone has to

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make their own decision

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to submit the resign letter. I mean, it's a which is interesting, but also quite anti-clamics.

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and especially we, we. We look at

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not the parents currents of elation, but they they are affiliated

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at the birth of children. Then we see like no much changing

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We try to do some formal models to test the

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effect of the reform. I it's primarily I'm not sure if I'm doing this correct, but

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looks like, and the reform has a positive impact on affiliation. lubricant church affiliation rates.

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But it's really, really marginal. And as we control an

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 yeah, as we control for for square term of year, it's basically diminished. And there are some heterogeneity across an education and rural urban divide and

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age groups. But the effects are not very substantial, I will say.

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and yeah, so

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we think that essentially the the

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reform in 2,003 did not have much

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impact on the State Church affiliation rates. And it's

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surprising because some one previous study in in Done in Sweden

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has shown the quite substantial impact, which is a similar reform done in 1995.

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that could be the reason the reason could be that the the Finnish population is.  Even now it's more more religious, relatively more religious and more traditional than the Swedish population, and it's more likely to, even though they, they, being given a choice to no registering

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the children to to the church, they were still inclined to do so.

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and we find the and unintended consequence that because when parents drop out, the the children do not follow. So it looks like

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the share of an affiliated children have have recent

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 because they they normally, they only

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make their own resign after coming of age.

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And so we have many future plans and don't know we

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yeah. But we we want to examine even more

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shocks such as economic shock and public health shocks, such as Covid. We. We haven't got the new data to

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analyze that yet. And and without data, we can also imply, like more more serious technique. to examine.

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for example, how how education and

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affect religious evolution, or the other way around, and using such as sibling, sibling comparison design.

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We are also interesting at how we'll just beulation is related to to education, to  to occupation, and even to health, and

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and also the dynamic of really just change.

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not only church leaving or joining the church, but also switching

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animation. And how does they relate to their life course experience, such as marriage, divorce, etc.

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And yeah, we also try to create a larger collaborative project with other

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scholars from other Scandinavian countries. So in Finland we have everything

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in other countries. We don't have everything but we. It is also registration of a State Church member which was used by the the Swedish study mentioned.

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So we, I'm for yeah bigger

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project in that sense. And thank you.

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Thank you. We Chan, those are some really intriguing and fascinating patterns. And I look forward to these continued future ambitious projects with this really unique data that you have access to

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now for our final presentation, we go to the Uk. And Dr. Asma Khan, who will be telling us about the economic activity of Muslim women in Britain.

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Asma Khan: Hi, good morning. Everyone, thank you, and just wanted to check if everyone can hear me.

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Yes, we can hear you. Can you just give us 30 s to

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get

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the last slides off-screen.

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Sorry asthma won't be. That's okay.

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Jose Navarro: So ask my sharing his screen. And I can see them all right.

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Okay, that's great.

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and I just want to check Toshihiko. Can you also see?

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Send him a message?

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Thank you. Asthma.

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Asma Khan: Thank Sasha. Okay, good morning. Everyone in this presentation. I am going to share findings for my Ph. D. Research to consider if and how religious beliefs explain high levels of economic inactivity among British Muslim women.

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Asma Khan: I was addressed. 2 key questions. Firstly, do British Pakistani Musk and women hold religious beliefs that prevent or deter them from being economically active? And if so, how do they explain and describe these beliefs, and are their notable generational variations?

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Asma Khan: And, secondly. to what extent do religious beliefs drive high rates of economic inactivity among British Pakistani Muslim Women.

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Asma Khan: A full paper reporting these findings in details has been accepted for publication by ethnic and racial studies, and should be available online in the next couple of months.

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Asma Khan: So just an overview of my presentation today. First, I'm going to cover some of the background evidence and literature on the topic.

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I'll then give an overview of my research approach

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Asma Khan: and present findings with a focus on qualitative materials. And finally, I will present some conclusions.

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So to begin what is economic inactivity.

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Asma Khan: the economically inactive of those people, not in work nor actively seeking work.

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Asma Khan: and whilst a marginal outcome for most groups, economic inactivity is a modal outcome for British Muslim women, and this has been the case since the 19 seventies.

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Asma Khan: Here is some data from the census of England and Wales, 2021,

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and Muslims in Britain are represent

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Asma Khan: in Britain, have the highest levels of economic inactivity represented by orange bars among all religious groups.

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Asma Khan: and on this figure we see that economic inactivity is a gendered labour market outcome. Blue bars here represent men and yellow bars, women, high rates of economic inactivity among Muslims are driven by women, and the percentage of Muslim women who are inactive is substantially higher than for other than for women of other religious groups.

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So why is economic inactivity a problem?

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Asma Khan: Firstly, persistent labour market disparities for minority groups in a diverse society are indicators of structural disadvantage and discrimination.

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Asma Khan: Secondly, and importantly, the economic inactivity of Muslim women is likely to be a driver for high levels of socioeconomic disadvantage among British Muslim households who disproportionately experience household poverty and live in deprived areas.

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Asma Khan: the persistent labour market mys, marginalization which has been in in evidence since the large scale migration of Muslim women to Britain.

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and from the 1,900 sixtys omelette is of considerable social significance. Addressing the disadvantages Muslim women face in their economic activity is a matter of social and economic, just

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Asma Khan: social and economic justice. And here is a brief overview of the literature.

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Asma Khan: In some studies, a preference for traditional gender norms of male breadwinner and female homemaker roles has been taken as a proxy for religiosity. Using this approach, Koopman's finds that a preference for traditional gender values can explain high levels of inact, of inactivity.

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Asma Khan: Recent developments, British surveys mean that they now include direct questions about relegosity, such as, How frequently do you pray, or how important is religion to you.

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Asma Khan: So far the evidence suggests that higher levels of religiosity are not significantly associated with the likelihood of being inactive for Muslim women

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Asma Khan: mit Ctl. And but statistical measures of relijosity in cross sectional surveys don't tell us about the content of strongly held religious police. Do they necessarily deter Muslim women from economic activity. Furthermore, there is the possibility that relegosity is overstated in serving responses due to social desirability. Bias 150.

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Asma Khan: An important factor to consider here is that within the Islamic tradition, Muslims are encouraged to keep any shortcomings in relation to their religious practice and beliefs as a private matter

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Asma Khan: and significantly qualitative literature has reported that religiously informed beliefs around gender norms held by Muslim men and women

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Asma Khan: to have limited employment opportunities for women, and this important body of research should not be disregarded. However, these accounts are now rather dated. What is the current state of playing Muslim families and communities?

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Asma Khan: I use mixed methods, research to answer my questions in the quantitative phase. I analyze data from the ethnic minority. British election election survey, a one-off nationally representative cross-sectional survey of ethnic minorities conducted in 2,010, I included measures of religiosity, both religious salience and individual religious practice alongside other independent and control variables in logistic regression models and found no significant association with economic inactivity.

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Asma Khan: and I conducted qualitative research in Manchester, England, over a period of 18 months in an area of high Muslim concentration and high deprivation. Today I will present data from in depth interviews with 27 economically inactive Pakistani Muslim women, 14 first generation and 13 s generation.

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Asma Khan: all aged over the age of 30, I interviewed Pakistani women only to reduce complexities around, separating ethnic and religious cultures.

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Asma Khan: going to start, though, by With a quick note on terminology.

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Asma Khan: I refer to religiously informed beliefs and not Islamic beliefs, because the beliefs expressed by my participants weren't necessarily rigorous. Theological positions.

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Asma Khan: I found that the issue of women and work is not a simple answer of halal, permissible or haram forbidden in Islam.

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Not wanting to minimize the extent to which these beliefs are deeply held meaningful and related to the religious and spiritual. Well being of my interviewees, I use this term as a compromise.

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Asma Khan: My use of work refers to formal paid employment only as it was used by interviewees, whilst acknowledging the ways that domestic and caring work are significant contributions to household economies.

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Asma Khan: and finally, in this study, the first generation are all those born in Pakistan, or who arrived after age 5,

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Asma Khan: sorry, or who arrived in Britain before age 5. No sorry I got it wrong again, who arrived after age 5, and within this I distinguished between older and younger first generation women, the older generation are all those aged over 45.

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Asma Khan: I found that all interviewees agreed that economic activity was not her arm for Muslim women. There were, however, differences as to whether they considered it desirable. This variation was related to migrant generation and migrant cohort.

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Asma Khan: So what were these differences? One third of first generation interviewees saw paid work as undesirable. None of the second generation interviewees expressed a similar opinion, and the younger first generation tended to share the views of the second generation.

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Asma Khan: All of the second-generation interviewees and all but one of the younger first generation told me that there was nothing in their understanding of Islam that discouraged them from working. All of these women expressed a desire to return to or to join the labour market.

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Asma Khan: When asked about the impact of their religious beliefs on economic activity. Their responses were limited to simple statements. That Islam does not prohibit women from working. For example, Shabana said.

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Asma Khan: What's religion got to do with not working like? Why would religion stop you from working? Put to the question? But in in an almost dismissive tone. Religious beliefs did not form a significant part of explanations of economic inactivity.

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Asma Khan: For most, however, ethnic cultural norms around gender roles operated as limitations. If religion was mentioned in their accounts, it was to name ethnic cultural constraints as UN Islamic.

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Asma Khan: For example, Maxouda told me that some Pakistani women are prevented from working by their husbands, and that this was a misinterpretation of Islamic religious beliefs. she said.

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Asma Khan: We have placed Islam in disrepute. Our culture has shamed Islam because we say that a woman shouldn't leave the house. Islam has said that a woman needs her husband's permission to leave their home. The opinion of the husband is important here, but it is not the case that you should imprison women inside their homes.

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Women are given every feed in in Islam.

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Asma Khan: This is our Pakistani culture that a woman should just share a bed with her husband and cook and look after his children, and that's all she should do.

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Asma Khan: In contrast, 5 of the 14 first generation interviewees held religiously informed beliefs that paid employment was undesirable for Muslim women.

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2 concepts, Berkett and Magebury, were key to their explanations

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Asma Khan: at its simplest Bergus in Urdu or Baraka in Arabic, refers to blessings from Allah. Muslims find evidence of Burkett in individual spiritual progress, but also in their material circumstances.

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Asma Khan: For the interviewees. Burgers referred to income that had received a last blessing, and would benefit the immediate and future material and spiritual well-being of a household.

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Asma Khan: and much brewery is an U. The word which translates approximately to compulsion, constraint, or vulnerability. In the context of the interviews the term was used to refer to financial hardship

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for women who saw work as undesirable. A woman should only work in the context of much.

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Asma Khan: For example, if her husband was in low paid work, or unable to work through illness, and the woman, therefore, would need to work to meet immediate basic needs, such as shelter, clothing, and food for her family

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Asma Khan: course told me that Muchbourne means financially tight circumstances. And so you have to help your husband. And that's why you have to work

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Asma Khan: for some women, even in this circumstance, where a woman's work was necessary to meet immediate needs, her earnings would not have broken.

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Asma Khan: Fatima said. A man receives Burkett from a from Allah for earning an income. There is no burket for a woman's earnings.

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And now I want to add a bit of context around this quote.

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Asma Khan: Fathom, I used irregular roots to migrate to, written in the early 2 thousands. She came from conditions of rural poverty in Pakistan. She only attended school for a couple of years, and could not read or write, and and was unable to speak English fluently. She had a teenage son with additional caring needs.

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Asma Khan: Her distance from the labour market might therefore be explained, not only by her strongly expressed religious beliefs, but by the complex mix of constraints she faces. And this was the case, for many of the women who shared Fathom's perspective.

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Asma Khan: and not all of the women who saw work as undesirable, thought that Muslim women's earnings did not have broken. Shehita was rather dismissive of that perspective.

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Asma Khan: she said, this is just chit, chat, myth. It's not true, because there are some women women who run whole households, and there is Berk, it is always is about whether the work you are doing is legitimate or not. Is it? Hello, work! If so, there is Burg it. Effort is always rewarded.

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Asma Khan: Other first generation. Women saw benefits of younger women working, and did not hold beliefs that they shouldn't. For example, Rashida did not make any distinctions between the Berkeley and between men and women. She recognized the differences between the experiences of women like her who had arrived in the 19 sixties and seventies and youngest second generation, and more recently arrived first generation women.

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Asma Khan: She told me we were new here. We didn't know anything about what we should do but as we have spent longer here, then, we have learnt that if a woman becomes educated and then works, this is a very good thing. If both husband and wife work, then life will be good. They will be able to buy a house and pay a mortgage. It does make a difference to both of them. I think there are only benefits.

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Asma Khan: Both Rishida's British born daughter and her Pakistani, born daughter in law, were inactive at the time of the interview, and she was supportive of their efforts to return to the labour market.

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Asma Khan: So some.

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Asma Khan: none of the interviewees thought, believed that economic activity was Islamically for burden. There were, however, however, differences around whether it was considered to be desirable.

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while negative views of economic activity were expressed by only 5 interviewees. These were significant because they were expressed mainly by older first generation women who were generally authoritative figures in Pakistani families and communities.

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and then, therefore, this might can signify a considerable deterrent to economic activity, for somewhere in

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Asma Khan: overall I found that while religious beliefs influence how the interview is understood and explained to the labour market experiences. Other factors, both structural and socio-cultural, emerged as more significant barriers to economic activity.

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Asma Khan: These findings confirm those of recent quantitative studies. Higher levels of religious salience do not appear to increase the likelihood of economic inactivity among Muslim women. The qualitative evidence presented here suggests that this is because they do not believe that economic activity is prohibited for them in Islam.

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Asma Khan: I conclude that religious beliefs are not significant drivers of economic inactivity. They are, however, important because they allowed interviewees to make sense of and to find value in their experiences of inactivity.

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Asma Khan: Sometimes, in the face of fairly severe structural constraints and entrenched patriarchal ethnic norms.

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I suggest that further research is required to understand whether these insights can be applied to Muslim women of other ethnic groups.

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Asma Khan: And I wanted to end by mentioning some impact work I've been doing around these findings in a recently completed project called Pathways to Work for Muslim women. I co-produced a workshop program with a third sector organization to support and encourage a group of 6 Muslim women who want to join the labour market.

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We created a space that recognized and valued Muslim identities

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Asma Khan: as well as sharing experiences and discussing religious beliefs around work participants received skills, training around seeking and applying for jobs.

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Asma Khan: This small project was successful. All of the participants reported an increase in their likelihood to apply for a job.

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Asma Khan: and this work has generated interesting conversations with practitioners and policymakers in the field of work and employment.

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Asma Khan: Thank you for listening, and I look forward to receiving your comments and questions.

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Thank you very much. Asthma. And my suggestion now is that maybe we can adjust the zoom screen so we can see everybody who is joining us remotely.

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and perhaps we Chan and Sasha, you'd come up to the podium, and then that way you'll be able to be on camera, at least one of you, and maybe, Sasha. I can invite you to kind of moderate the questions.

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and and we'll go from there.

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Hi! There!

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So whatever your question, you have to any of the 4 speakers just say who you want to ask, and then

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Jose Navarro: I, if if I may.

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Jose Navarro: yeah, yeah, no, it's only I thanks very much everyone for the excellent presentations. And from my side. You know I I, when looking into religion, I grapple always with the religiousity and religious affiliation, and those are crucial angles from which to view religion, and in in asthma's presentation we saw, you know, the

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Jose Navarro: the religious affiliation. But I I wonder how much the religiosity. So the intensity of religion is is a and and also, you know, the the services that religion provides in in terms of

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Jose Navarro: you know the the welfare welfare services that in in modern nation states are provided by the State.

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Jose Navarro: but in more religious or or less less well off countries are provided by religious organizations. So we? I, yeah, I I would like to get the the, the impressions from from the panel and the audience on that.

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Okay.

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I can start.

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So given that our work is a survey. We try to represent whatever the authors

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say in their particular work.

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and some of the work is comparative in nature. Comparing Protestants to Catholics, Lutherans to Calvinists, and so on.

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and

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and maybe in earlier periods of history people were more engaged in religion than they are today. But there is a huge caveat, by the way. So church attendance rates in sixteenth century Germany seem to have been in the order of 10 to 20, so by no means. It was like people were going to judge one

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And that's why Luther was also pushing the Reformation to reinvigorate the church and have some work on what we call shallow Christianity, that even in the Middle Ages Religiosity was not as deeply rooted as we today think anyways.

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but in the different papers we cover. Some of the papers are comparing just people in different religious denominations, and what I find interesting, especially with our modern

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classes on.

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even if you look at the nuns as the non-religiously affiliated. There is a lot of baggage in that. DNA. Yeah. So maybe the nuns have left church, as we heard from Ms talk.

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because they have to pay so much church tax. And they hate that. Yeah. So they leave the church.

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But the fact that they may maybe acquired so much education, in the first place, may have been the result of some Lutheran teaching on. You have to be able to read the Bible 20 generations ago. And now the the preference you have is to be highly educated and you are atheist, maybe even

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yeah. But still, why are you so highly educated? Why? Because your ancestors cared so much.

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and it was a religiously instilled trait. Okay?

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So, depending on what the different papers say what they highlight, whether it's religiosity or whether it's religious denomination or regulation of the or the the theology of a given church. we we stress that. So we're absolutely right.

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And there is often this complete confusion. And when I see papers that say religion and are already, I get nervous, yeah, because it can be religious domination, it can be activity, it can be. Believe in heaven and hell it can be whether you pray 5 times a week, and it's often all over the place, you know.

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and some degree.

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I want to say something to the same question. Yeah, yeah, I think, like, from the perspective of our project.

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Actually in in Scandinavia, state churches do provide some some extent of public good.

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and even though we see like

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people, are not really religious, but there are so many of them who are even willing to pay the tax to the church.

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and in return

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some public good, such as the graveyard and performing a marriage in the church, which might be quite tribal, but they they intend to do so, and

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we think there might be another another dimension of culture belonging

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a national identity attached to the church.

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And so basically paying the tax for churches.

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It's

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I similar to paying the text to to the States, and

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even though you might not get that much, you reward from it. And

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 It still is strengthened, this national solidarity.  yeah, that's what I can reflect on. Thank you.

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Yeah, absolutely.

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Asma Khan: Okay.

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Asma Khan: one thing that I found when I'm doing my research was that Muslims in Cross sectional surveys in Britain at least, express the the highest levels of religious practice and religious salience, and higher than all of the religious groups. And and you know well into the nineties, 90% and onwards for

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Asma Khan: 5 times a day. Religious practice, for example, in in the Embass survey that I use. And I check. So I'm a I'm a British Muslim myself, and I was like that doesn't really resonate with my experience and lived experience knowledge. And I checked it with my colleagues, who are religious scholars as well, and with my interview participants, and actually.

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Asma Khan: and the strongest sense that I get is that religious practice is is overstated. It's a harder to say that the religious salience and but we it is our My sense is that it's overstated amongst British Muslims, and in terms of support. in comparison to State support and religious institutions in Britain, the cases that for income,

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Asma Khan: income-based and financial support that is from State organizations through State benefits. Household benefits and mosques, for example, are very limited

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Asma Khan: kind of ability to provide that kind of support for their communities. but what they religious communities do provide. Then I found, is social

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Asma Khan: mental health and kind of psychological support. But that's for dealing mostly with difficult financial circumstances as opposed to actual kind of material income related to support.

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Jose Navarro: Fantastic. Yeah, yeah, asthma, because you, you have actually a very interesting natural experiment. I mean, you have to subgroup of the British Muslims of Pakistani descent. Yes, so you could compare them to Pakistani. So Pakistani Muslims in Pakistan, and whether in activity is different.

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Jose Navarro: you know, in activity levels, or because you you have, on the one hand, the the British Welfare State, and on the other the the Pakistani welfare state. So you could. Actually, it's a it's a very interesting sample, I think, for

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Jose Navarro: to to compare, you know whether whether having a welfare system is a a makes a difference in in activity levels. On on the other hand, you know, I

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Jose Navarro: So people who have grown up in a country different from their own. They intend to. you know, affirm the identity

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Jose Navarro: by by, you know, I'm going back to traits that they like religion, and they they they become more Catholic than the Pope. You know, or more Muslim, that the Muslims back at home. It happens also with the Turkish diaspora quite a lot in in places like Germany, where they are much more conservative and much more religious.

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01:20:17.800 --> 01:20:44.199
Jose Navarro: Then then people back home who always surprised, you know how come these people who live in this secular societies? They they are so religious. And but you know by. And as Sasha said, you know, the religion is A is a it. It is part of the cultural programming we all have, and that gives you, you know, I mean, in the case of of Islam. It very strong value judgments

509
01:20:44.200 --> 01:21:13.000
Jose Navarro: around the saving behavior, or or how a fair it is to tax somebody to to give it to the poor, you know which in in some some religions they they don't see that at all. You know they and and some religions have very strong opinions on that. So and yeah, as you know many, many of them. As Sasha mentioned this, a Jewish researcher, so Einstein was famously, very, quite the atheist.

510
01:21:13.000 --> 01:21:32.620
Jose Navarro: and you know whether. But he he behaved very much like like people who are very strong, also looks to his beliefs, you know, and he said so himself. So it's a you. You have to be aware of your cultural programming. And yeah, I I find it a fascinating field of studying

511
01:21:34.830 --> 01:21:37.120
one. Follow up

512
01:21:37.380 --> 01:21:52.630
for asthma, and related to Jose's question. So I found it interesting that you had in your interviews to finding that many women dismissed the idea that their view on work is religiously motivated. Yeah.

513
01:21:53.290 --> 01:21:59.689
So I grew up in a church where the Church leader, when he was around 80,

514
01:21:59.790 --> 01:22:05.019
announced that the Lord Jesus would return in his lifetime. Okay?

515
01:22:05.370 --> 01:22:19.200
And then my grandmother, who wanted to become an opera singer, wouldn't be allowed to do that, or she was told, this is pointless. Yeah, because the Lord Jesus will come before you even finish your studies. Okay?

516
01:22:19.360 --> 01:22:21.409
So that instilled in her

517
01:22:21.470 --> 01:22:38.059
norm that she should rather stay home. Okay. My mom also stayed home when I was born. She would also, I think, dismiss the idea that she's staying home for religious reasons. She would just say, I'm staying home, because I think it's the right thing to do.

518
01:22:38.850 --> 01:22:48.919
Yeah. So I I like this idea what to say at there is, we are often conditioned by stuff that happened a generation or 2 ago.

519
01:22:49.110 --> 01:22:59.600
and now we dismiss the idea that it has to do with religion. But the roots are religious. What do I? What do I think about that? I I think.

520
01:22:59.770 --> 01:23:04.049
Asma Khan: the one conducting qualitative research.

521
01:23:04.250 --> 01:23:25.979
Asma Khan: And you can apply many truth to what people have said. And and you can. Yeah, you and and and you might not believe everything that your interview say. But what you can only take is is what they have told you and how they understand their lives. So that is how I interpret and analyze the data. And because

522
01:23:26.220 --> 01:23:46.619
Asma Khan: British Muslim women over the age of, say, 25, who are married and who who have children, is so marginalized within British society but also sometimes within their own communities as well. My preference is therefore, to acknowledge and appreciate and value

523
01:23:46.620 --> 01:24:15.509
Asma Khan: the words that they and the narratives that they have shared with me, and and I take that as as what I represent in my research, whether whether I doubt it or not. You know, I spent a lot of time with the data. And I just kind of quite a lot of time distancing myself because I saw each interview as this pressures of nugget that I couldn't separate out and kind of just identify themes within. So that there was a process involved in in kind of creating a presentation like today's that required, you know, a good

524
01:24:15.510 --> 01:24:20.400
of distancing, but I take the words of my interviewees, and even that is more.

525
01:24:20.420 --> 01:24:34.870
Asma Khan: It is a significant move forward from the very quantitative field of religious inequalities in the labour market here in Britain, and contemporary qualitative voices of Muslim women, I think, needed to be represented, and I I chose to do that in their own words.

526
01:24:35.330 --> 01:24:36.440
Jose Navarro: Hmm, thank you.

527
01:24:37.290 --> 01:24:41.730
In your there is one. I think you have to come to this. Mic.

528
01:24:41.830 --> 01:24:42.500
Yeah.

529
01:24:46.060 --> 01:24:46.860
yeah.

530
01:24:55.830 --> 01:24:58.749
I used to work on issues of

531
01:24:58.920 --> 01:25:06.499
Islam in Europe and in the Uk. Fascinating subject of your study. Asthma. I have a few questions

532
01:25:06.740 --> 01:25:08.470
concerning

533
01:25:08.690 --> 01:25:14.960
your research. First, I would be interested if you could say a little bit more about the people.

534
01:25:14.990 --> 01:25:39.259
about the religious sort of diversity of your sample. There are many various types of Islam, within the Pakistani community, and within the wider ethnic diversity, super diverse Islam, also various sort of religious angles, various religious groups, Gyobans, Bravis, and others. They have different ideas also about the

535
01:25:39.340 --> 01:25:53.949
the labour market participation. If you could say a little bit about this, and whether you are able to say something on your sample, and also on the basis of the quantitative research that will be interesting. Second.

536
01:25:54.120 --> 01:25:59.059
I was wondering whether you have tried also to compare

537
01:25:59.110 --> 01:26:00.900
the

538
01:26:01.080 --> 01:26:06.850
levels of labor in activity in the

539
01:26:06.940 --> 01:26:21.040
the Uk and in other countries in other European countries, and how this varies from the situation in the Uk, and especially interesting for me is not so much

540
01:26:21.090 --> 01:26:36.060
labor inactivity of the first-generation migrants, those who would be arriving. But, as we know from the latest, for example, census. The majority of British Muslims are are British

541
01:26:36.300 --> 01:26:56.529
were born, most of them. This was the last census which already showed, I think, the latest one I haven't seen yet, but the last one I was working with the Muslim Council of Britain to analyse, and we see a significant number of people still coming, and this is an important element of the growth of the British Muslim community.

542
01:26:56.530 --> 01:27:08.430
which was actually not accounted for so much. But but what is important, there is the the majority of people who are second generation in the way, third and fourth generation.

543
01:27:08.430 --> 01:27:31.130
So, and for me the most interesting it would be. And I wonder whether this was also a focus to to even more so the focus on the second and third-generation labor inactivity, and what was the cause of it. And I wonder at what extent, for example, discrimination was an element of it, whether you have unlike that, and to

544
01:27:31.130 --> 01:27:50.889
whether whether this was in any way something which was preventing people from being in the labor market, and and also as part of this also. One of the element is the the visibility part. So how many of the people, whether there is any research on one

545
01:27:50.990 --> 01:27:58.399
hijack wearing, and how this is preventing people from entering the labor market. Just a few things.

546
01:27:58.410 --> 01:28:19.830
Asma Khan: Thank you. Yeah. Hi, Conrad, thank you for your questions. I I think I I think I need to send you my thesis to to answer all of them, but very briefly and religious diversity. most of my participants were Hanafi Muslims. But I also find in my research that

547
01:28:19.860 --> 01:28:39.709
Asma Khan: awareness of schools of thought amongst British Muslims can sometimes be quite a an intersecting back to with social class as well. So. most British Muslims, you know. They have to have the resources to to access religious education, to find out more about different schools of thought in Islam.

548
01:28:39.710 --> 01:28:50.230
Asma Khan: Mit. Ctl. And and most of my participants were all of them were of working class background, so their awareness of kind, of differences in schools of thought was limited to 150

549
01:28:50.330 --> 01:28:57.320
Asma Khan: because of the information and the the educational resources that they had. But most of them were Han, a fee and

550
01:28:57.610 --> 01:29:18.470
Asma Khan: a and comparison, or you can other EU countries. That wasn't a feature of my research. And and I don't find that there is so much a research out there that that kind of makes those comparisons. And although I think in the real head that has recently done a economic inactivity research in

551
01:29:18.470 --> 01:29:30.689
Asma Khan: Erez agmoni, both on Canadian and Australian data. But that's not a feature of my research, although I think it is applicable to other Muslim minority contexts in the European countries 250,

552
01:29:30.960 --> 01:29:39.249
Asma Khan: and the persistence of economic inactivity rates amongst the second and third generation, I think, indicates

553
01:29:39.600 --> 01:29:59.580
Asma Khan: an overarching explanation which is either religious, really related to religion, and which all the generations share, or to structural disadvantage, and including ethnic and kind of combination of ethnic and religious discrimination. And but I found that hey, job wearing the women themselves did not say.

554
01:29:59.760 --> 01:30:23.180
Asma Khan: and that they felt they felt that wearing a hey job should not prevent them from being active in the labour market, and that most employers would be understanding of Islamic practices, such as wearing Hey, job and accommodating prayer during the working day and things like that. So from their perspectives, it wasn't a barrier to economic activity. What?

555
01:30:23.180 --> 01:30:33.019
Asma Khan: But, however, in terms of actually getting a job, a discrimination on behalf of employers, and might indeed explain some of the low levels of it.

556
01:30:33.250 --> 01:30:40.029
Asma Khan: economic activity amongst them, if if that was really brief and it a bit of a whiz through, but I hope you answer some of your questions.

557
01:30:40.480 --> 01:30:41.459
Thank you.

558
01:30:41.960 --> 01:30:49.080
We have one more from the floor, 2 more from the floor. Maybe you both ask one after the other, and then we answer them.

559
01:30:53.590 --> 01:31:07.030
Hello! I am in Nashville from the center for social conflict and question studies in Chile, a very stimulating of the the presentation of your your works, and my question is to Josh and I

560
01:31:07.400 --> 01:31:11.549
you. You said that you don't propose like a sanity in your work.

561
01:31:11.560 --> 01:31:17.360
But I can't stop thinking about Norris, and in her argument, because

562
01:31:17.420 --> 01:31:27.740
the most common explanation is maybe the reverse. You know a wealth theorem moral and gated, a people tend to become more an affiliated.

563
01:31:28.060 --> 01:31:38.679
So And I'm interesting, you know. How could you base your argument heretical this

564
01:31:38.770 --> 01:31:51.900
this side of the no, but the direction of the relation. And my second question to say is that the idea of religion as a

565
01:31:52.050 --> 01:31:57.310
marker of identity that transcend geographic borders.

566
01:31:57.440 --> 01:32:03.390
But maybe yourself with with your comment to asthma's work. he said, that

567
01:32:03.900 --> 01:32:08.210
religion is a is a social, situated

568
01:32:08.880 --> 01:32:13.340
value, religion as a social value. So

569
01:32:14.090 --> 01:32:25.340
as as an idea, maybe it could be interesting. Disaggregate your data by regions or cultural a tradition. Maybe it's a

570
01:32:25.540 --> 01:32:27.759
oh, yeah, an aviation about it.

571
01:32:27.890 --> 01:32:51.990
Thank you so much. We have one more question from the floor, and then you can say Hello. I'm I'm Bog. If it's good from the Barcelona Institute of International Studies, and my question is to Sasha, so my work is mostly on the effects of Christian missionaries in Africa, and I think one of the stylized facts that it emerges from the temperature is that we see strong persistence in educational outcomes. So that will be the human catalogue channel that is at work.

572
01:32:52.070 --> 01:33:16.710
But then, Increasingly, I think we find that the economic effects of that are very limited. So Rami, yet up and co-authors of a recent paper on that I have a paper from Madagascar, where I also show that there's a strong effect on education, but not on incomes, especially when you look at the local level, right? So once you take into account migration within countries, then that might disappear. But at the local level you don't see these effects. And so I start to wonder more and more

573
01:33:16.740 --> 01:33:21.079
whether this is actually, this has to do with the fact that perhaps

574
01:33:21.120 --> 01:33:29.569
we shouldn't just look at religion and its various mechanisms and effects in isolation, but also how these were embedded in wider institutions, and where, then.

575
01:33:29.580 --> 01:33:50.240
the work of Christian missionaries and also colonizers, really appears as something. I mean as a we know that it was a shock to colonial societies, but also it led to a lot of fragmentation and personal fragmentation, and what we usually think about. So the missionaries were involved in their own scramble of Africa and the colonizers. They often went to different areas. So settlers went to 100

576
01:33:50.240 --> 01:34:08.380
the less populated areas mission to the populated areas. And so what? There was never really any, any scope for the type of synergies that we would think about when we look at this these these historical processes and places like Europe. And then a question of sorry about. I guess my question was a little bit too long, but the question is, oversee

577
01:34:08.380 --> 01:34:32.519
because you have such a large sample and cross country with them. You also looked at the effect of different demographic behaviors, so maybe by that cross-sectional variation that you have, and also that time frame that you have. Maybe there is something them involving differences in fertility rates, and so on. And how this, then, influences per capita incomes. Thank you and great presentations. I really enjoy all of them. Thank you.

578
01:34:32.640 --> 01:34:38.779
Thank you. Let's also take the last question, and then we do a reply round, and then we wrap it up.

579
01:34:40.850 --> 01:35:00.519
I know I will be from Oslo to to Sasha. It is. How about it's ends have done in a specific studies on Pentecostalism. It's a very fast rising religion from 0 to 500 million in about a hundred years, and then, especially Pentecostalism in Africa.

580
01:35:00.540 --> 01:35:15.099
 there's sort of some theories that it. It has a connection to it in Pentecostal lesson, and the and economic activities, almost like all the Weberian kind of ideas about Protestantism.

581
01:35:15.190 --> 01:35:27.899
and then this is getting a professional clarification for Jose and Navarro. It's a little bit the same here. You know your your group of an affiliated. How heterogeneous is that? Is it both

582
01:35:28.040 --> 01:35:30.240
just about all Chinese.

583
01:35:30.260 --> 01:35:41.779
plus, you know, middle class rest and best and secular people, or or is the yeah or this is the more yeah, how? How it? How

584
01:35:41.810 --> 01:35:43.690
of heterogeneity?

585
01:35:45.950 --> 01:35:50.739
Thank you. Say, since most of it was for you, why don't you start.

586
01:35:51.330 --> 01:35:54.929
may I add one more question to yeah, one more.

587
01:35:55.830 --> 01:36:04.719
Yeah. I would like to know more about this data you use because and continuing our discussion on affiliation. And really.

588
01:36:04.940 --> 01:36:15.369
 yeah, like, affiliation is very, very so much across countries like in in Scandinavian.

589
01:36:15.470 --> 01:36:17.069
a total different thing.

590
01:36:17.300 --> 01:36:22.090
And also the the Chinese. Are they really on the fate idea? I

591
01:36:22.350 --> 01:36:23.949
Nostura is

592
01:36:24.550 --> 01:36:29.809
you have to think about like his confusion is, and religion, of course, but

593
01:36:30.240 --> 01:36:31.590
but also

594
01:36:33.190 --> 01:36:44.449
like, and people might not be like religious members, or they might not think they are religious. But somehow they're so really, just imprint in their behavior and look at like.

595
01:36:44.780 --> 01:36:52.610
like, how I mean, how business people in China like there's so much into superstition and spirituality in.

596
01:36:52.680 --> 01:36:57.530
If you think they might play a role. Yeah, that would be my question.

597
01:36:57.910 --> 01:36:59.299
Thank you, Jose.

598
01:37:00.510 --> 01:37:12.260
Jose Navarro: Yes, no, thanks. thanks so much. So to the the first question. So the yeah. The the ingle had secularization hypotheses. And

599
01:37:12.270 --> 01:37:13.770
Jose Navarro: you know, I I am.

600
01:37:13.920 --> 01:37:33.770
Jose Navarro: So that that basically says that, yeah, this, a a relationship, a mutually reinforcing link between economic development and that decline in religions role in society, and that that is You know what that is. 1 one thing, when you look at the affiliation data

601
01:37:33.900 --> 01:38:03.539
Jose Navarro: worldwide. What we find striking is then that if if that was true, you should see, then, you know, a a declining role of religion in society and and less religiously affiliated. But it's it's been counting to it. If that the number of affiliated people keeps growing as a percentage of the global population. So they there, there may be a what what I think is happening there is that the economic development is a multi faceted process.

602
01:38:03.610 --> 01:38:04.970
Jose Navarro: And then

603
01:38:05.270 --> 01:38:22.799
Jose Navarro: religion is one of the aspects. And there, there's many other things that I play there, and that that's why you you. It's it may not be a linear relationship, and so the the future is not going to be more secular, or or

604
01:38:22.870 --> 01:38:37.369
Jose Navarro: or or or more religious, but it so. Both religion and and and Secularism may change as as concepts. You know, it's a I. I tend to think of culture as a fluid thing.

605
01:38:37.370 --> 01:38:44.940
Jose Navarro: and it's not what it was 200 years ago. So if you would talk to somebody from 200 years ago, he wouldn't

606
01:38:44.940 --> 01:39:09.500
Jose Navarro: have a clue of what you're talking about, and then, 200 years from now, people may think of Ssb. United, and the you know as as very, you know, very UN secular in many aspects and and very unreasonable in in how we hold the the beliefs that we hold you know about. And I I am. I'm focusing on on economic production and wealth. So this there's a lot of things.

607
01:39:09.500 --> 01:39:10.730
prejudices

608
01:39:10.780 --> 01:39:14.810
Jose Navarro: that the different religious groups tend to have as

609
01:39:14.990 --> 01:39:30.880
Jose Navarro: related to to economic production and wealth, and how it should be distributed, and how fair it is to to have certain levels of inequality between different religious groups, and then so

610
01:39:31.410 --> 01:39:47.500
Jose Navarro: but they going forward also on the granularity of the data. So this this data set that I'm working with is a a, A combination of it's survey data. And it's a combination of 2,500 surveys.

611
01:39:47.550 --> 01:39:51.549
Jose Navarro: And they are supposed to be all and nationally representative.

612
01:39:51.560 --> 01:40:02.830
Jose Navarro: And they what if you, if you look at the data individual, it's fantastic, because you can actually ascribe a religious belief or the lack of it, to to every single person on the planet.

613
01:40:02.870 --> 01:40:14.239
Jose Navarro: and they the the way we we looked at the in trying to a portion. Then economic output to each of these people is a we took the biggest countries.

614
01:40:14.330 --> 01:40:17.830
Jose Navarro: And so, for example, in the Us. Where

615
01:40:18.070 --> 01:40:28.919
Jose Navarro: the this a a big Muslim population, a very big Christian population, but also an affiliated have been growing quite a lot in the last 50 years.

616
01:40:29.180 --> 01:40:35.890
Jose Navarro: and they and we get them. And so we are. We are taking away from the national

617
01:40:35.910 --> 01:40:48.219
Jose Navarro: and a lens, and they so the the the granularity is, I mean, it's constructed, but it's a I I would say it's the the best estimate that you can get.

618
01:40:48.400 --> 01:40:53.549
Jose Navarro: and So from the other questions.

619
01:40:54.219 --> 01:41:21.999
Jose Navarro: So in the difference in fertility. And that is another paper that we, Vega and myself have for consideration of them. A population development review is a whether the people with the lowest fertility are actually doing better in, in, in in economic terms, and and that this seems to be the case. So Yeah, I mean, religion and fertility have been linked in numerous studies.

620
01:41:22.030 --> 01:41:30.549
Jose Navarro: and the global fertility levels have been declining in the last 50 years as well, and they and you find that again I mean

621
01:41:30.610 --> 01:42:00.069
Jose Navarro: people without religion. And so they, the unaffiliated that I showed before that their proportion of of the global population is declining. it's a while. The absolute number is slowly increasing because of growing share of unaffiliated people. In places like the Us. And the and many other developed countries, they tend to have lower fertility, so that means that their number not increasing as much as as other populations.

622
01:42:00.150 --> 01:42:07.429
Jose Navarro: but they are investing much more in their human capital. And so they're increasing their proportion

623
01:42:07.500 --> 01:42:26.520
Jose Navarro: of the economic pie. And, so to say, more than proportionately, and that that is we we find a an interesting finding. But as to who exactly the the unaffiliated and the what the the definition is. So this is survey data.

624
01:42:26.750 --> 01:42:32.179
Jose Navarro: So it's people who who define themselves as a not having a religion.

625
01:42:32.340 --> 01:43:00.219
Jose Navarro: And they so then, yeah, I I I mentioned the Chinese singling out the country because it's the biggest group of UN affiliated globally at around 500 million people in the in the latest surveys, and but you know it. It used to be that Eastern Europe they were all unaffiliated. So in 1,980 they they almost nobody in in Eastern Europe declared themselves as having a a religion.

626
01:43:00.230 --> 01:43:21.639
Jose Navarro: and they and that has changed drastically. So there is almost a. And there are countries, on the other hand, like India, where 98% of people affiliated and who have, you know, and also the claims, surveys like the world value survey, that religion has a strong influence in their daily lives.

627
01:43:21.639 --> 01:43:31.730
Jose Navarro: and so that contrasts with with the Us. Where, in the last 20 years the an affiliate that have grown, and the Conrad has excellent date on this.

628
01:43:31.809 --> 01:43:46.049
Jose Navarro: and they, and where religion is playing, and you know, contrary to what? One here from politicians in the in the Us. where they only 2 members of Congress, I believe, who are declared that they are unaffiliated

629
01:43:46.070 --> 01:43:59.599
Jose Navarro: Well, that's not very representative of the Us. Population overall, but you know I mean I I have. I'm very glad to to send the presentation and the database to people interested.

630
01:44:01.420 --> 01:44:02.749
Okay, thank you.

631
01:44:02.770 --> 01:44:10.269
Let me briefly answer the 2 questions. The one on Africa. Could you send me your paper? By the way, the one you you mentioned.

632
01:44:10.310 --> 01:44:24.470
So. indeed, I think there is a strange disconnect between a literature on missionaries and then a literature on colonialism. Yeah, and they rarely meet each other. So the number of papers that

633
01:44:24.610 --> 01:44:25.960
look at

634
01:44:26.470 --> 01:44:34.340
private people, settlers, or even firms. And I'm starting to work on firms in the context of German colonialism.

635
01:44:34.490 --> 01:44:45.580
then, missionaries! And then the State, all of that together, is barely ever looked at. It's it's very pieceme it catering to specific literature. Right?

636
01:44:45.640 --> 01:44:51.489
And I agree that it should be brought together, and that that will give

637
01:44:51.640 --> 01:45:06.300
erez agmoni much my insight. So we, I think we do cite some stuff. There is some work on Madagascar that looks at missionaries and at state schools, and compares missionary schools and state schools that has a little bit of that flavor, but it is a rare occurrence, 101

638
01:45:06.430 --> 01:45:12.429
then on Pentecostalism. There is now some stuff in

639
01:45:12.680 --> 01:45:25.649
my economics box that I know better. On Pentecostalism. In Brazil there was quite a number of papers unlike the influence of Media on Pentecostalism and the influence of Pentecostalism on

640
01:45:25.650 --> 01:45:44.480
ere

641
01:45:44.610 --> 01:45:51.669
savings the size of the labor force, a total factor of productivity.

642
01:45:51.690 --> 01:46:02.119
Please let me know I'm I'm happy to take on whatever comes to mind. Yeah, if you could just send it to me. If you have something nicer for people.

643
01:46:02.550 --> 01:46:09.389
thank you so much. Everyone. It's exactly 1220, like completely magic, and we are done. Thanks, everyone.

644
01:46:11.480 --> 01:46:12.480
Thanks a lot.

645
01:46:13.970 --> 01:46:16.350
and thanks for putting it together, Jose.

646
01:46:16.790 --> 01:46:23.230
Jose Navarro: I am sorry that you have to. You know the shop and wedding style. But yeah, thanks very much. Yeah.

647
01:46:23.250 --> 01:46:25.000
Everyone.